bring, according to the divine expostulation with Cain, "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? And if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door" (Gen. iv. 7). And though the good or evil done shall generally be partial, as in the instance of what is called some particular merit or failing, yet there can be little doubt either of general good or evil being its consequence, or that the whole subject must generally abide the consequences of what is "done in the body" of every description; as a whole family is liable to be affected by the good or evil performance of a single member: "and whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it" (Cor. I. xii. 26).

Then such being the natural train of cause and effect, one should think there could be no difficulty in apprehending the reality not only of merit and guilt, but also of their reward and punishment all in the same train; as it is only to subsitute Merit or Guilt for the Cause; and for the Effect, Reward or Punishment, as either may happen to be due; and, the terms interchanged being perfectly synonymous in this case, the doctrine is proved at once,proved only by a translation of terms. For to every separate act that may be performed in the kingdom, there is attached a certain reward or penalty, and that greater or less by necessary consequence, in the way of cause and effect, according to the degree of good or evil appearing in the said act or performance.

That there are degrees in both, v. g. in both good and evil, and especially in the moral department, of which we are chiefly to consider, there can be no question; and it would not be an impracticable task perhaps, if it has never yet been satisfactorily performed, to ascertain these degrees; neither would such a discovery be without its use in determining the quantum of merit or guilt attending any performance, with a view to retribution. Only we should observe, that as there are two sorts of doing, inward and outward before

mentioned, and two corresponding sorts of responsibility, one to God, the other to man; so there are two several scales or modes of computing merit and guilt adapted thereto, one human, extending outwardly; the other, divine, extending inwardly. In cases of guilt, at least, or of the evil actions to which they relate, it is in the manner here called human, that men are wont to estimate; actions of a good quality being rather left to the animadversion and recompense of Him from whom they proceed. And according to their estimate, any offence against a man's principles, or as we say, against the inner man, shall be light compared with one against the outer man, that is to say, against a man's person, and lighter still than one against his property or circumstances; you may debauch his principles, or spit in his face, but you must not touch his pocket.

Thus the world has reversed the true scale of injury and guilt, which rises in a quite contrary direction to the above mentioned, and is here asserted as the proper line of excess. For the proper centre or essence of every object who may have been injured, is the proper object of offence, consisting, as we have seen, in the inner man; the outward person comes next, the property next: therefore, to touch a man's person, the crime must run beyond the man's estate; and to touch his principles, beyond the man's person; and on account of such excess, offences against a man's person should be esteemed more serious than offences against his property; and those against his principles, more serious than either, as being the last or farthest injury that he can possibly receive, even beyond the loss of life, if an injury should extend so far. It was thus that some superior lawgivers, as Moses and Solon, for example, estimated; but the scale of another Greek, who lived and legislated in a period of antiquity, between the times of Moses and Solon, was, to visit an offence in its extreme effect, and the detection rather than the offence; a plan now pretty generally followed in jurisdiction by

nations that were then barbarian: and we must not expect any better course from human justice, but may be glad sometimes, to get even that. With respect likewise to offences that are nearer to the perpetrator than any that he can commit against others, even those against his own soul and body and fortune; with respect to these, men cannot judge or legislate much; they must be left likewise to One who omits nothing, who animadverts on every point in every case without a possibility of mistaking, who will judge not according to appearance, but judge righteous judgment" (John vii. 24); punishing heavily many faults which human authorities censure lightly, and some which they approve. "For that which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God" (Luke xvi. 15).

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To sum up this argument, we shall find, that as there are two sorts of action, inward and outward, and two characteristics of each, good and evil, and two judges of good and evil, God and man, and two sorts of consequences, reward and punishment, so there are two sorts of merit and guilt answering to their judges or objects, besides the degrees before mentioned. And so distinct are these two sorts, that what may be merit or a favourable claim towards man, shall be guilt, and perhaps an heavy debt towards God. An example to this effect is often seen in some nefarious victory, where the best fall foremost, and the victor is crowned

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men-outwardly with laurels upon earth.

by God-inwardly with scorpions in an hell of the victor's own making.

And all this notwithstanding that God himself, as LORD OF HOSTS, has had the greatest share in the victory.

Here then lies the difficulty of guilt in this case, that while the evil is inflicted chiefly by the Lord of Hosts, his general shall bear the guilt and chastisement. We do not find much difficulty respecting either guilt or merit towards men; but it is in our account with God that the

difficulty lies. It may seem strange, that being impelled to evil by so strong a necessity, we should yet be accountable for the same, as if it were entirely our act from beginning to end; particularly considering that our good, if we do any, should be placed at the same time to the account of another. But this is very naturally explained in an article of the church*, implying, that as we go wrong naturally, but not innocently, evil is our natural desert: and as we go right by means of another, while the benefit of the act is ours, the merit will be only his: the necessity of the evil with all its guilt is entailed upon us; the benefit of the good we enjoy by favour, and for the sake of another.

But of native merit, and of the means of grace whereby that which is naturally given to one may become the portion of many, with other topics relating to this matter, it will be more seasonable and convenient to speak hereafter: and at present another distinction or two may be well bestowed on the original properties or characteristics over and above what has been yet signified; and namely, as both good and evil may be either

First, positive, that is real and unquestionable; as the latter for instance; which whoever does or suffers, either does or suffers evil certainly and indisputably in the case assigned; or

2d, comparative: depending on various circumstances in relation either to the subject or object of evil or both. In which case a man may either do or suffer either good or evil comparatively or conditionally, and neither do nor suffer either in effect: or,

3d, in the same case a man may either do or suffer positive good or evil in doing or suffering the opposite to either comparatively: because, as it has just been observed, necessary evil is good in respect of the necessity, though evil in itself; and on the other hand good as well as evil must be evil however good in itself when it hap* The Tenth.

pens to be, as it may, either useless, or unnecessary, or even injurious.

By such distinctions as these we avoid the necessity and incongruity of supposing a third kind of principal characteristic, namely, the indifferent; that which is indifferent having no character of course, and consequently belonging to the class of essentials as before explained. And when we consider, that every essential, however gross or however minute, whether incidental or constituent, and of the former sort whether personal or real, of the latter sort whether material, spiritual or intellectual, will be furnished with its proper apparatus of characteristics as aforesaid, we cannot think the whole inconsiderable; or if we should, there are degrees not only of evil as before specified, but also of good; and sufficiently numerous, if not so well understood as the degrees of physical properties. Happy were it for us, if we could always ascertain the degrees of good and evil as promptly and decidedly as those of long and short, or wet and dry, or heavy and light! But there seems to be a great deal of intricacy in this matter; or a great difference of opinion however respecting it.

In distinguishing between the subjects of these two principal characteristics, people generally consider two opposite spheres, heaven and hell, assigning one of these as a subject to each respectively; v. g., heaven as its subject to good, and hell to evil. But the circumstance of either sphere being denoted by characteristic constituents will not preclude from such sphere the essentials to which these characteristics relate, as before observed. And as much having now also been generally observed as seemed needful respecting the two said principal characteristics; good and evil, it may be time to consider the same more particularly in succession; and the good first, as that which was first in existence, consequently ever was and ever will be first in importance: considering the same, first, broadly and simply as it exists in every sphere;