consoles himself on the exit of summer with the prospect of a future spring, the discontented changes summer into winter by hard anticipation. Cheerfulness may therefore be regarded as one note of a good subject in the heavenly kingdom of God, as it generally seems in his earthly kingdoms. No human policy indeed can always ensure this happy note among subjects; but as far as the same may predominate, it will generally bespeak a good local government. What then should we think of the gaiety, peace and enjoyment naturally diffused through the animal creation; insomuch that there is not, as far as we know, one creature (sinners and their adviser excepted) but seems to have its proper fund of delight? To see the general ebullition of spirits, even under favourable circumstances, what should we think? And what should we think, to see it under the most unfavourable? as e. g. to see the humour of a Lapland gamme or encampment -to see the endless dance too on equatorial sands not prompted by art and emulation, but prompted and sustained by real good humour among the children of nature? It is chiefly in a rural life that downright good humour prevails for there the very beasts of the field are seen dancing as it were for very joy of heart, and that sometimes in such circumstances as would rather seem to indicate a degree of tribulation.

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Is not this some evidence of a wise and gracious government in the world? Let theologians of the material school insist on perfection in the material department, and propose it as an evidence, which it certainly is, of divine goodness reigning there: but spiritual observers can find a more striking evidence of the wisdom and goodness of that government in the provision it has made for the spiritual enjoyment of the creature; and refer to the abovementioned FUND OF DELIGHT as one particular of the same, being still inconsiderable, perhaps, compared with what may be further seen or suspected; inconsiderable too, when compared with our conception of happiness properly so called.

For the general property of happiness is very comprehensive, as we have observed; applying to the perfection of incidentals as well as to that of constituents, and being itself also more like an incidental, founded on good hap, as we call it. But happiness properly so called is the highest or most intellectual cast of the property under consideration as well as the most stable or permanent.

Happiness is pleasure permanent; or rather, the substance of that property of which pleasure is a shadow or resemblance. For pleasure does not imply perpetuity, but a thing of comparative duration; and there is no permanent pleasure even for this life only; whereas happiness is an immortal property, not depending on circumstances, but existing independently, it may be, in the most wretched, though then clouded and imperceptible. Its seat is in the members of the soul, as that of pleasure, or the ordinary characteristic, is more diffused among the members of the body. It may not consist in a particular property, whether incidental or constituent; but in a state or mood, in which the troublesome properties of both body and soul are counterbalanced and kept under by the more agreeable. Or it may consist in one particular property, a sweetener to the rest; being a medium of enjoyment, as the property of grace is a medium of holiness, between the Creator and his creatures. It is not so material for us to know how such a thing as happiness may be or consist, as it is to know, that whether in word or operation, God is its author; that we may understand the derivation rather than the composition of so great a blessing, and how to pursue, and where to apply for it.

This property, therefore, (considering happiness as a property) will appear to us quite another thing than what is meant by Cheerfulness: and also for the following reason besides what has been already mentioned; namely, that we regard this cheerfulness with good humour, and every other property of the sort, as temporal and fugitive: and though they do not vanish instantaneously, like mirth

and other properties of the first mentioned sort, each of which is a mere flash of pleasure, they still continue only as tapers: they have no root, no foundation in immortality, like the good objectives. Therefore, the said properties are but half good, not naturally and necessarily like these; and if they do seem so nearly related to them, as a shadow to its model or substance, we should still make a distinction between them so far as to put the last named class of good objectives by themselves: and there now remains only one branch more of the good subjective sort, which is the intellectual, for consideration, before that highest class may be also considered.

3. By good subjective intellectual characteristics we do not understand the same, embodied with their respective objects; as ideas, phantoms, visions, conceits, recollections, devices, inventions and the like; which according to the vulgar notion of store-rooms constructed in this department, would furnish a rare assortment of ready-made articles for them but the goodness or good side of their characteristics, and especially in relation to the owner or subject; which, however abstracted to our consideration, will make them as positive constituents in themselves as any of the essential class. They do not seem to have found any general name so express as the objective characteristics of this class have found: but Talents might serve; though these good intellectual subjectives seem to be oftener acknowledged by the name of their corresponding essential, Sense. And in this double naming there may also be found a convenience, as making, apparently, a distinction of the class into rare and common; the first, genius or talent; the second, common sense-as it is vulgarly expressed; or Light, as the foremost distinction is named in Scripture, when the two happen to be there mentioned in opposition to each other; as e. g. where our Saviour says, "The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light" (Luke xvi. 8): i. e. they have more common sense, if they have not so much light or intelli

gence. These two sorts of good intellectual subjectives, common and uncommon, or sense and talent, or worldly wisdom and heavenly light, may possibly subsist together in one character or person, as there is no natural impediment to such an union: and such an union is also much to be desired, but hardly to be expected, or at least in the measure that our Saviour recommends to his disciples in their earthly relations. "Behold, I send you forth (says he) as sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves" (Mat. x. 16).

Subject to this primary division of good subjective intellectual characteristics into common and uncommon, or worldly and heavenly, another may be had for the association, and taken from the essential species on which the said characteristics are severally founded; making five classes of the same, or one for either species of the essential constituents.

1, For the good subjectives of the first species, which is apprehension, wanting intellectual terms, we are obliged to borrow sometimes any that we can assimilate from the material department; as solidity and extent, bluntness and acuteness with others most opposite to the nature of intellect. But this will not always be the case: seeing other properties of the apprehension have a more congenial supply of expressions in the other department, as justice, elevation, quickness, life, and others of the sort; together with some of a more peculiar cast; as shrewdness, penetration, discernment: by all which properties so many different characters or qualities of apprehension; as lofty and mean, swift and slow, &c., may be conceived. Also various modes or degrees too may be conceived by other criterions; as by the grasp, or firmness of apprehension, certainty, faith, conjecture, opinion, knowledge, science, &c.; by the process; 1, learning, reading, information, erudition; 2, experience, observation, consideration. Which kinds, modes and degrees are all important characteristics in practice, though with regard to the subject of our pre

sent discussion it does not seem worth while to insist on them any more than it does to insist on the kinds, &c. of good characteristics of the second department of intellect.

2, For there are also different characteristic sorts of memory acknowledged by public opinion, as capacious and shallow, retentive and treacherous, vast and contracted, besides the two general distinctions of good and bad, which are most to our purpose. According to public opinion, indeed, a good or bad memory will signify no more than a retentive or treacherous, or either of the other forenamed distinctions; but this opinion cannot be so just as one should expect from the public; because a good or bad memory, if it signified no more than retentive, &c., or the reverse, would signify nothing. Memory itself, meaning the same withholding or retention of intellectual subjects, or the same withholding and retention in an intellectual sense, as before observed. It may not be so common, but it would be a juster opinion of memories, not to consider the most particular or retentive memory always the best, as if retention alone were needful to constitute a good memory; but that which is productive of most pleasure: and the pleasure attending it, as one indispensable qualification for a good memory. FOR FEW MEN WOULD ACCOUNT THAT A GOOD MEMORY PERHAPS, THAT SHOULD BE A PERPETUAL PLAGUE TO ITS OWNER.

What may be considered a good memory, therefore, is one that should be at once both retentive and pleasant; convenient for use, edifying in practice, and peaceful in reflection. We should not call a memory good, that was stored with vanity, whether learned or unlearned, nor one stored with wicked arts or information; but one in which the best ideas should always lie uppermost. No more should we call a memory good, however retentive, or much of a memory it might be, that reflected its owner's folly to no purpose; but one that should either correct errors and suggest room for improvement, or preserve for its owner a