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then the more we hope for, for the more shall we have reason to be thankful; and where hope goes gratitude will be likely to follow. Therefore, HOPE IN God and be GRATEFUL, is not a bad maxim of religion: for if you hope in him rationally, you will have reason to thank him heartily. "O, taste and see, how gracious the Lord is: blessed is the man that trusteth in Him" (Ps. xxxiv. 8).

But in relation to equals, gratitude is not necessarily joined with trust or esteem; that being rather a return for favours, the author of which may subsequently forfeit these by indesert, without cancelling our former obligation to him, or destroying its remembrance. In this respect however, the case of hope is different: Hope may be destroyed by the indesert of its object. But still this circumstance does not amount to a sufficient reason for considering it less an objective characteristic on constituents, or more on incidentals than the other; so they, that is hope and gratitude, may both stand in a line with the two forementioned excellent characteristics, faith and charity.

4. From the eulogium here bestowed on the good appetitive sort of moral characteristics we are not to infer any thing to the discredit of aversive characteristics, or characteristics founded on the opposite feeling of aversion. Through the natural reaction caused by this property, the same, being still as harmless an essential in itself as any, has gained a bad name somehow in the world, with all that belong to it; as if no good thing could come out of Nazareth. But it is evident, that aversions are not necessarily evil, either in the natural or in the moral department: if they were, it would go hard with us both in body and soul sometimes: they would both be likely to be poisoned. If we had not a natural and rooted aversion to some kinds of savours and to some unsavoury companions, there is no knowing what might become of us. "Do not I hate them that hate thee?" (Ps. cxxxix. 21) says David; implying a virtuous detestation of the detestable ingrates.

Thus much may be said for the cause of aversion in

general; and to shew farther its admissibility into the choir of good and righteous characteristics, it may only be necessary to mention two or three of its moral productions as a specimen, v. g. 1, Resolution; 2, Fortitude; 3, Caution and Vigilance: all members of the aversive tribe, the goodness of which needs not be questioned, if any one should be disposed to question their descent; and that is the most important particular at present.

1, The first characteristic property or sort, most properly called Resolution, is founded on the more spiritual than intellectual essential, courage, by a greater accession of intellect than we expect in courageous brutes; and particularly of that kind of intellect which relates most to judgment. Resolution in general, is judgment mounted on courage, or courage directed by judgment. It combines firmness with intention, and stability with conviction; as its antithesis, irresolution divides them; exhibiting judgment without courage, intention without firmness, and conviction without stability.

And it is remarkable, that the particulars of the property in question are not dependent on the same qualifications as the abstract; but a resolution may be conceived without any of those which are said above to be necessary to resolution; so that there would be no incongruity in talking of a timid, weak and wavering resolution; though the abstract property itself can never be either, nor any thing like it; any more than ideal beauty can be like the beauties that are occasionally seen in our species. A resolution may perish in the birth, without ever living to complexity: but where there is a power of keeping as well as framing resolutions, they may be highly useful. For a

resolution is formed by associating some contingent action or purpose with its object, in such a way, that whenever the object shall present itself again to our attention, the action will naturally meet and enter along with it; and so the doing part is forwarded without any additional expense

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of thinking. We cannot always have the reasons that determined us to adopt any particular line of conduct in view; and therefore we may be glad of this auxiliary, which we call a Resolution, sometimes, to indicate its necessity. It is a happiness to be as resolute in performance, as forward in determination: and some can go so far as to keep a resolution against any thing but sin.

But why not keep it there, too? Why cannot they subdue every bad, as well as every good and indifferent habit by dint of resolution? And why not support a good habit too, as well as subdue an evil one? Nay, why not subdue every evil, and support every good habit; as well as one, two, or three? It is

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-1, Because another chooses to have the merit of doing all this for us, and God allows it; as that other tells his disciples, "I am the vine, ye are the branches; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for WITHOUT ME YE CAN DO NOTHING (John xv. 5). We dare not name even a good request to God, but for His sake who is dear to the Father; as we to Him: much less can we promise unto the Lord our God, and keep it (Ps. lxxvi. 11). Before a man resolve any thing extraordinary, therefore, he had best consider its agreement with His gospel, and pray for His grace to proceed, if he find such agreement; or else either not resolve, or unresolve, if he have resolved improperly, and the sooner the better. It seems of consequence, to know when or in what case a resolution is better broken than kept; and this, to be as just a rule for it as can be given. If any one would have also an example in point, let him read the parable of the two sons, who both broke a resolution in the matter of filial obedience; where we find one obeying and the other disobeying contrary to resolution or promise (Mat. xxi. 28, &c.): and there can be no doubt which was right, if the principle above intimated be correct. But

-2, If a man wish to keep his resolutions generally,

he should not only consult an higher power, as stated above, but also take care at the same time to avoid two things; 1, over-large professions, that his good resolves may not evaporate in words; 2, over-large resolves, that his good deeds may not be discharged in empty resolutious. In short, he should join another grace already mentioned with his resolution, which is patience, to make it good.

2, But resolution with patience, or tried resolution, has found another name in Fortitude; a property that has been always justly admired, and sometimes possessed; especially by the Stoie, who seemed to take the lead among philosophers in the polite society of Greece and Rome for ages on this account, together with his indifference to ordinary, inferior, and as it appears, merely foreign properties. For while others were hunting abroad for sources of gratification, the Stoie would look at home, to his own heart or highest constituents, and find therein a source for every thing, à substitute for every comfort, a plaister for every sore, a remedy for every evil and inconvenience; it was his cloak, his purse, his friend, his house, his every thing. So Stoicism became fortitude; a proud distinction for the Stoics as long as it was so considered. Yet fortitude never shone forth from the Picture-Portico at Athens with the lustre that it drew from the Mount of Olives at Jerusalem; nor ever looked so amiable before it was engrafted on the meek and lowly form of Christianity; nor was ever so true in itself before she tempered it with a resignation to the will of the Supreme Being and a firm reliance on his protection, being the peculiarity of Christian fortitude. And without these qualifications, it may be added, fortitude is no virtue for a Christian; but rather an insolent, not to say atheistical disposition. For where was ever the human being that could vie with such a spirit as Lucifer in the essential aversion on which this property is founded? perhaps none, nor yet in atheistic fortitude; but in the essential beatified, in the

fortitude of faith, a Sampson, a David; aye, and many an humble Christian, might shame the proud spirit, and all his generation.

3, There are properties allied to fortitude, as Caution and Vigilance for example, which do not seem to rank so high as that; but whether it be for want of the high dependence properly belonging to fortitude, or on account of the less active complexion of these two properties, it will not be necessary to determine. If these properties were free from aversion, they would not consist with the class of righteous characteristics now under consideration, neither would they, nor any other sort indeed be able to rank in the same line with them, or to stand (as it may be said) in the congregation of righteous spirits, if they were necessarily devoid of the excellent gift of charity. But caution and vigilance, though of the aversive class, do not imply a dislike to their object; if they did, the great exemplar as well as preacher of charity would never have inculcated these properties as he did, first to his followers generally, and next more particularly to his chosen apostles at the point of their departure on the mission, saying," Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves" (Mat. x. 16). Which shews, by the way, what use of policy is allowed to Christians, being the same as the use of war, v. g. defensive.

And thus it has also been shewn in a general way what modes or characteristics of the spiritual class may be considered as morally good, or as good moral objectives. We use the material expressions lines, ranks, classes, congregations, and the like in speaking of them for want of more spiritual, as they are also used in Scripture; where we read not unfrequently of the same objects in similar terms, as the "heavenly host" for example. In comparing spirits or spiritual characteristics we also talk of one as excellent, and of another as more excellent, like

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