will again venture on a trial of strength with us.' The language is vague, but its purport cannot be mistaken. An increase of strength which would enable Germany to defy a united Europe can only be obtained by large additions to the German Empire. Three months later, the Chancellor, rendered more confident by the conquest of Russian Poland and the failure of the Anglo-French offensive, was a little clearer. In August 1915 he said:

'This gigantic war will not restore the old situation. A new must arise. If Europe is to arrive at peace, it can only be through the strong and inviolable position of Germany. . . . The English Balance of Power must disappear.'

No more equilibrium! The peace is to be a German peace. It is the dream of Charles V, of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, in a new form.

The Chancellor's next utterance is specially remarkable. In December 1915 he complained that the Allies would not accept the verdict of the war and offer to treat with Germany. Herr Scheidemann, leader of the 'tame' Socialists, remarking that in such a war neither party was likely to be beaten to its knees, concluded that it was for the victors to offer terms. Such terms, he added, should not include annexations; we are opposed to all who would convert this war into one of conquest.' The Chancellor indignantly retorted that Germany could not offer terms; that was the function of the defeated. So long as the enemy continued to be 'entangled in guilt and ignorance, any offer of peace on our side would be folly, which would only prolong the war.' As to guarantees for the future he refused to be precise, but his words were ominous :

'I cannot say what guarantees the Imperial Government will require, e.g. in the Belgian question-what foundation of power it will consider necessary for these guarantees... But neither in the East nor in the West must our enemies of to-day dispose of gates through which they can fall upon us. . . It is known that France gave her loans to Russia on the express condition that Russia should build her Polish for tresses and railways against us; and it is just as well known that England and France looked on Belgium as a startingpoint for an attack upon us. Against that we must protect ourselves.'

The opportuneness (as the Chancellor alleges) of the moment now chosen for the offer to treat consists in its coincidence with striking military successes; and these are emphasised to enhance the generosity of the proposal. That a beaten Power should sue for peace is natural, but that a victorious Empire should offer to treat in the very moment of its triumph is, to say the least, unusual; indeed, we are unable to recall any other example of such magnanimity. Has the Chancellor come round to Herr Scheidemann's opinion, or has he recognised at least the impossibility of ultimate victory if the war goes on?

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But to return. In April last the Chancellor went a step further, and stated clearly that Poland and Belgium are to be brought under the control, commercial, military and political, of Germany; but he still avoided the use of the hateful word 'annexation.' He even, on this occasion, repudiated the idea. Who can seriously believe (he said) that it is lust for an extension of our frontiers that inspires our storming columns before Verdun? . . . It is not for a piece of foreign territory that Germany's sons are dying.' But other utterances gave the lie to these words, which can only be regarded as a momentary weakness. On June 18 of last year, referring again to terms of peace, he declared that they must be settled on the basis of the war-map. In other words, what Germany had she intended to keep-or as much of it as she could. Finally, on Sept. 29, he referred to his speech of the previous April as proving his desire for peace. From the first day the war meant for us nothing but the defence of our right to life, freedom and development.' Perhaps ; but the sting is in the last word. His previous speeches show that German 'development' involves considerable sacrifices on the part of her neighbours. Comparing these various utterances, stretching over a period of nearly twenty months, we remark, on the whole, a striking consistency in their expression. The recent Note may be regarded as a discreet summary of the Chancellor's speeches, only drawing the veil over certain dangerous places where he had, doubtless in obedience to the demands of his more fiery followers, occasionally lifted it.

But these utterances do not stand alone. Much may

also be gathered from the second and revised edition of Prince von Bülow's work Imperial Germany.' The Prince, as Mr Headlam points out, is one of the most important men in Germany. He is both a past andmay we not add?-a possible future Chancellor.' He is, from temperament and experience, a highly-skilled diplomatist; and no one is more likely to represent the German Empire in a Congress of the Powers summoned to draw up the terms of peace. He therefore speaks as a man of authority and with the sense of responsibility which his high position requires. What then does Herr von Bülow regard as the legitimate claims of Germany?

Let us begin with England. We remember what he said, in the earlier edition of his book, about the necessity for a strong German fleet, and the policy, followed during his tenure of office, of cajoling England until that fleet had attained dimensions sufficient to render a more outspoken attitude possible. Now he maintains that

'after a war waged by the German people... against half the world, we have the right and also the duty to require, not only our own security and independence at sea, but above all a real guarantee for the freedom of the seas, for the further completion of our economic and political tasks in the world.' Mr Headlam is right in pointing out that, considering the unusual defensibility of the present German coast, this demand can only mean the extension of German control over other parts of the shore of the North Sea. The 'freedom of the seas' doubtless means, as usual, the inviolability of private property at sea. The only other real guarantee' that England could give would be a limitation of her fleet and a formal recognition of German naval superiority. Next as to France :

'Perhaps the French people will, in the course of time, adapt themselves to the decisions of the Peace of Frankfort, when they see that they are unalterable, especially and if we succeed in confirming our strategic position as against France, which has hitherto been an unfavourable one.'

In other words, France is not only to give up all hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, but is also to submit to a rectification of the strategic frontier. At all events, France is to be placed, from the military point of view, at the

mercy of Germany. Russia is to be dealt with in a similar way.

'We have now (says von Bülow) the right and the duty to demand a real guarantee that East Prussia . . . shall not again be exposed to barbarous devastation. We require in the East a greatly increased and strengthened security, which in the nature of things can only consist in a correction of our unfavourable eastern frontier, a correction which will protect us from future invasions.'

Here again we are left to surmise what, precisely, the territorial cessions are to be; but they are evidently large. Besides the security of the eastern frontier, Prince von Bülow has in view the weakening of Russia by loss of population-an end which, he hints, may perhaps be attained by the cession of the Ukraine. This, presumably, is to be Austria-Hungary's share of the spoil.

With regard to Italy, the Prince is silent. He has his peculiar connexions with Italy, and probably nourishes the hope of winning her back into the fold. Nor does he deal, except cursorily, with the Near East or the Mitteleuropa' question. This is dangerous ground; and he knows well enough that Austrians and Prussians do not always see eye to eye when the Balkan States are concerned. Moreover, he is a practical politician; he cultivates Realpolitik, and is no dreamer of dreams. Security is his one ostensible aim; but it is clear from what has been said that security is but another word for conquest.

Other persons in Germany are less reserved. A joint meeting of the Conservative and Free Conservative parties, in December 1915, passed a resolution demanding, 'as the aim of peace, a Germany strengthened in its whole position, and enlarged beyond its present borders by retaining the greatest amount of those territories which are now occupied.' Herr Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberals, wrote in July 1915 that no peace was possible which does not bring us the frontiers in which we may find security against future wars.' The central committee of the party gave its approval to this language. The Progressives resolved in December 1915, that the conditions of peace must offer a permanent increase of power, of wealth, and, so far as its

security requires, of territory.' The Centre Party, adopting words used by the King of Bavaria, resolved, in October 1915, that the losses of the country call for a strengthened protection of our land in East and West, which will take from our enemies the desire to fall upon us again, and permanently secure the industrial provision for our growing population.' It is clear that German parties, excepting the Socialists, are at one in demanding large annexations as the reward of victory.

Mr Headlam, from whose book these quotations are taken, also prints two manifestoes, the one a petition presented to the Chancellor in May 1915 by six great Economic Associations, the other signed by a large number of leaders of German thought' in June 1915 and published at Berne in the following August. These documents show a marvellous agreement.

'For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken France both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategical position with regard to her. For this purpose we must radically improve our whole western front from Belfort to the coast. Part of the northern French coast on the Channel we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England, and to secure better access to the ocean. On Belgium we must keep firm hold. . . . Economically, Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us. Russia is so rich in territory that she will be able to pay an indemnity in kind by giving lands-but lands without landlords. . . . We shall assure ourselves of the Persian Gulf against the pretensions of Russia and Great Britain.'

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Thus the leaders of thought.' And let no one suppose that, because many of them are professors, their ravings are of no account. We in England are apt to laugh at professors; in Germany they are a force to be reckoned with. The economists and industrials are not a whit behind. They too demand the incorporation of Belgium and the adjacent districts of France-Calais and Boulogne, Verdun and Belfort-with the Baltic Provinces and a large part, at least, of Russian Poland. And the reasons? They are military and economic. France and Russia are to be dismembered, Belgium and

* Summarised also in the Times' of Aug. 14, 1915.