anxious, by anticipating the President, to gain the credit -among pacifists of all shades and countries-of being first in the field, and to be in a position to utilise the support of the United States. It was of course possible that, when the German Note appeared, the President would have paused, out of fear that his action, immediately following that of Germany, might seem to argue collusion, and might therefore be regarded as unneutral. This fear is referred to in the Note; but on the other side was the consideration that, the subject of both Notes being the same, they might be considered together. What may be assumed to have weighed equally with the President was the further consideration that, had he delayed till the Allies had delivered their reply to the German Note, he might have been met by a fait accompli. If the Germans-as we may be sure-knew of his intention, they may well have reckoned on this motive as likely to hasten the action on which he had determined; and, if so, they reckoned rightly.

Whatever Dr Wilson may say as to the independent origin of his Note-and we need hardly say we give full credence to his statement-the coincidence in time is a matter of fact; and there can be no question that, in some respects, the support which his honourable suggestion gives to the dishonest German offer has increased the difficulties of the Allies. We do not believe that such is his intention, but such is the result. To the German Note, couched in menacing terms and based on two false assumptions, we could return but one reply; for conditions of peace based on those assumptions would evidently be intolerable. We were thus placed in the dilemma of having either to tell our enemies indirectly-the futile suggestion of confidential communications was of course dismissed-what we have refused to tell them directly, or to decline the request, couched in friendly terms, of a neutral state, connected with us by peculiar ties. The Allied Governments have adopted the former alternative, and have published a statement which has the great merit of declaring their objects in fuller detail than might have been expected, even in the United States. We have laid our cards on the table; can the German Government and its allies afford to do the like? In so doing, we have shown the high value that we set upon the opinion

of the American people and its President, and our trust in the soundness of their judgment, and their perception of the community of our vital interests. But, whatever happens, our duty is clear. We must persevere to the end, and secure the peace which justice and the future of civilisation alike demand.

III. The Travels of Sir John Mandeville.

By Prof. Paul Hamelius (of Liège) IV. Old and New in the Daily Press. By T. H. S. Escott V. The Foreign Policy of Italy. By William Miller VI. The Origin of the Franco-German War. By Joseph Reinach VII. Cyprus Under British Rule. By Sir John Page Middleton VIII. Agricultural Co-operation in Germany.

By Lionel Smith-Gordon IX. The Music of Wild Flowers. By the Rev. Canon Vaughan X. Dominion Views on Imperial Unity. IV. Canada. XI. The Fleets of Our Allies. XII. The Pontificate of Pius X. XIII. The Archives of the War. XIV. The Dardanelles Report. XV. Indian Cotton Duties.

By Lord XVI. German Steel and Iron. XVII. The Irish Problem. XVIII. The Course of the War.

By Archibald Hurd By the Rev. Alfred Fawkes

By Sydney A. Moseley

Sydenham of Combe, G.C.M.G.
By Prof. W. J. Ashley
By Lord Monteagle, K.P.
(With Maps.) By Colonel Blood

Canada Subscription, $4.65 per year; Single Copies, $2.00

Entered at New York Post Office as Second Class Matter

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY

THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. 451.

PUBLISHED IN

APRIL, 1917.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

NEW YORK:

LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY.

1917.