on Baltic Port, which lies westward of Reval, five children and two soldiers being killed. There is some doubt as to how the German vessels fared in beating a hasty retreat. At the time a number of explosions were heard, and Russian scouting vessels subsequently picked up a quantity of débris and floating articles, which, it was claimed, supported the belief that the Germans lost at least six mosquito craft, either owing to the gunfire of pursuing vessels or by mines. The reception which the enemy met was, at any rate, of such a character that no further attack on the Gulf has since been made. · No account of events in the Baltic would be complete which ignored the work done by British and Russian submarines. These vessels have been employed with skill and daring; and not only have heavy losses been inflicted on the Germans, but their communications with Sweden have been repeatedly interrupted. The Germans have formed a new conception of Russian sea power owing to their experiences in the Baltic. As Sir Robert Buchanan pointed out, in presenting the Tsar with the Grand Cross of the Bath, ' In spite of the great numerical superiority of the German Fleet, the Russian Baltic Fleet has repulsed with loss all its attacks on Riga, has carried out successful raids, and barred its entrance to the Gulf of Finland.' In conveying to the Tsar King George's 'lively appreciation' of the services rendered by the Russian Fleet, the British Ambassador at Petrograd gave expression to the feelings of admiration in all the Allied countries which have been excited by the successful resistance of the Russian Navy, thus making a valuable contribution to the united efforts to maintain communications in northern waters. It was essential to the Allies that they should have command of the Mediterranean. During the period preceding the war, the French naval authorities had foreseen the necessity of effecting a concentration of force, since the Mediterranean represented the life-line of the British Empire and was essential to the full development of the fighting strength of France. When the Grand Fleet was formed for duty in the North Sea, the French Ministry of Marine assembled all its most efficient units in the Mediterranean. They were thus able to constitute four squadrons, three of battleships and one of armoured cruisers, supported by flotillas of destroyers and submarines. The weakness of the combination lay in the small number of fast scouting vessels. The most modern of the armoured cruisers was the Waldeck Rousseau,' launched in 1908, and the newest light cruiser the Jurien de la Gravière,' which took the water in 1899. In view of the absence of effective scouting ships under the French ensign, the British Admiralty, when the redistribution of the Fleet occurred and the last battleships were withdrawn from southern waters, placed in the Mediterranean a powerful force of fast ships, consisting of four battle-cruisers-one of which was at home refitting on the outbreak of war-four armoured cruisers of recent construction, and a quartette of light cruisers. In effect, the battle force in the Mediterranean was supplied by France and the scouting units by Great Britain, supported, in each case, by mosquito craft. The situation of the Allies had been complicated a year or two before the beginning of hostilities by the appearance in the Mediterranean of the German battlecruiser Goeben,' in association with the light cruiser 'Breslau.' They were despatched by Germany on the excuse that it was necessary to support German interests in view of the critical conditions in the Balkans. When peace was restored, the two ships remained; and the French naval staff felt sure that they were intended to play a dramatic rôle in the opening days of the warattempting to cut off the French troops quartered in Algeria and Tunisia, whom it was intended to transport immediately to the main theatre of war. Nor could the Austro-Hungarian Fleet be ignored. This enemy had completed three battleships of the Dreadnought type, one other being almost finished, and also possessed three battleships of the 'Radetski' class, besides six older preDreadnoughts. The Austrian Admiralty, however, had neglected to lay down an adequate force of cruisers; and the fleet on the eve of the war contained only two modern scouting ships-the St George,' laid down in 1902, and the Admiral Spaun,' begun in 1907. The enemy fleet was therefore blind, and this weakness proved no small advantage during the early days of the war, when it was certain that Admiral Haus would not risk his relatively weak battle squadrons in a fleet action. The first work falling to the Allies was to give safe conduct to the 19th Army Corps of the French Army, and the 7th British Division, distributed between Gibraltar, Malta and Egypt. At the last moment, Admiral Souchon, flying his flag in the Goeben,' abandoned the project of endeavouring to interfere with these transport arrangements, carried out an ineffective bombardment of the ports of Bone and Philippeville, and then fled to the Dardanelles in circumstances which have become notorious. Let it be added that the French Navy possessed no ship approaching the speed of these two vessels by five knots or more. However unfortunate the escape of the Goeben' and 'Breslau' may have been to the Allied cause, their disappearance from the Mediterranean at least relieved the situation at a moment when the first thought was for the safety of the British and French troops already mentioned and the transport of other British divisions, which had to use the Mediterranean during the general post' carried out by Lord Kitchener's orders. The relief of the regular forces in the Mediterranean, Egypt, and India, by Territorial regiments from home, in order to strengthen the army in France, was a brilliant conception, entirely due to the fertile brain of Lord Kitchener and the confidence which he reposed in the Allied Fleets. After the dramatic incident associated with the disappearance of the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau,' the British battle cruisers were withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and the French Fleet, supported by several smaller British ships of high speed, was left to protect maritime communications in that sea which were essential to the Empire. tribute will be paid by the future historians of the war to the success with which the French seamen cooperated with a section of the British Navy in safeguarding this maritime route during the period when the oversea forces of the British Army were being concentrated in the main theatre. The character of the service rendered can only be appreciated if it be borne in mind that simultaneously the French Fleet was assisting in hunting down the German commerce-raiders in the Pacific, and subsequently took part in the naval attack A on the Dardanelles, supplying four battleships for this purpose. On May 23, 1915, the naval situation in the Mediterranean underwent a marked and favourable change in consequence of Italy's declaration of war upon Austria. During the preceding month the French Fleet, under Admiral de Lapeyrère, had entered the Adriatic with a view to rounding up the Austrian Fleet if it were at sea. The battleships steamed up on the Italian side and, crossing the Adriatic, approached the enemy's naval base, Cattaro, from the north; cruisers and destroyers advanced up the eastern shores. This movement resulted in the discovery of only three enemy units-the small cruiser Zenta' and two destroyers. The latter immediately fled to port, while the Zenta' was sunk, two-thirds of her crew of three hundred officers and men perishing. The Austrians were subsequently bombarded in the port of Cattaro, but apparently the results were not commensurate with the effort. In the meantime, blockading forces were established in the Otranto Channel, and the enemy was thus cut off from all sea communication with the outside world. The French Fleet was still maintaining this constriction on Austria-Hungary when Italy entered the war. The French ships performed blockading duty under serious disadvantages, owing to the distance separating them from their nearest base. This disadvantage was modified, though not removed, by the action of the British Admiralty in placing the naval establishment at Malta at the disposal of the French authorities for refitting and repairing their men-of-war. The intervention of Italy, with bases closer to the scene of operations, at once suggested a reconsideration of the naval situation; and thenceforward the Italian Navy, supported by several British and French units, became responsible for the blockade. The disparity of strength between the Italian and Austro-Hungarian fleets was not so great as to give Italy a marked advantage in view of the strategic conditions which existed. Austria had by this time completed her fourth Dreadnought. Italy possessed the same number of battleships of the new era, with two others approaching completion. These Italian capital ships were supported by eight older ships of the line. The Vol. 227.-No. 451. 2 1 Italian Fleet, on the other hand, possessed a marked advantage in cruisers. Unfortunately our new ally was called upon to confront in the Adriatic conditions of the most disadvantageous character. This land-locked sea corresponds approximately in length to the North Sea, but has a mean breadth of only about one hundred miles. On the Italian side the water is shallow, and the shore-line from Venice to Brindisi is unbroken by a single port capable of being employed as a naval base. Austria, when she grasped Trieste and secured to herself the whole of the Dalmatian coast, obtained a series of deep-water ports, fringed by a number of islands offering shelter to torpedo craft and even larger ships engaged in cross raiding. The enemy determined at once to take advantage of the geographical position when Italy entered the war. In accordance with a scheme which had evidently been prepared in advance, units of the Austrian Fleet, including battleships, were employed to terrorise and outrage the Italian population distributed along the shores of the Adriatic. The Italian towns and villages were entirely devoid of defence, not only against these merciless bombardments, but against the bombs dropped promiscuously by aircraft. It was not long, however, before the Italian authorities discovered an effective reply. Down the Italian coast, close to the waterside, runs a railway; with all speed armoured trains were equipped and manned by naval seamen. This expedient, in association with scouting operations by small naval craft and aeroplanes, has proved a satisfactory check on the Austrians. For many months past the enemy, under the menace offered by the armoured trains, has abandoned cross raiding, and the Austro-Hungarian Fleet has been forced, once more, to resign itself to inactivity. If there has been no fleet action between the Italian and Austro-Hungarian battle squadrons in the Adriatic, the reason is to be found in the same conditions which have prevented any from occurring in the North Sea, apart from the short and partial action of May 31. Italy's enemy has confined his main forces behind elaborate minefields, dominated by powerful coast artillery and supported by flotillas of destroyers and submarines. Those who are most familiar with the spirit which animates Italian seamen will best |