war has imported a new complication, by bringing a tariff within the certainties of peace arrangements, and even a protective tariff within the possibilities. It is, indeed, a portent when a staunch Free Trader like Lord Balfour of Burleigh accepts these principles. The recent report of his Committee was naturally accompanied by an Irish minority report, claiming separate treatment for Ireland to suit her special case, with full fiscal liberty; and this was signed by Mr Hazelton, M.P., a prominent member of the Irish Parliamentary Party-a notable departure from their attitude of blind acquiescence in the Act of 1914. This change was natural and even inevitable, for a tariff framed on British lines, especially if protective, would add artificial disabilities to the natural obstacles which already preclude the fostering of infant industries, and would even involve danger to her agriculture and to her great established industries, such as shipbuilding and linen.

It is evident, therefore, that here is the core of Ireland's desire, shared not only by republican Sinn Feiners, but by solid business men unconnected with party politics, possibly even by Ulster Unionists. If Ireland is to be allowed to work out her own salvation -to build up, in Mr George Russell's (A. E.'s) words, her 'national being'-the task would be difficult without control of trade policy, and impossible without that selfreliance which nothing can so effectually evoke as independence and responsibility. Here, then, we have

concentrated the most essential if also one of the thorniest Irish demands. It springs from the fundamental human conditions of the problem, and, as has been pointed out, it is not confined to Sinn Feiners or even to Nationalists. Many Southern Unionists also feel strongly that Home Rule, to have a fair chance, must be genuine and pure-bred, not a mongrel like the suspended Act. What Ulster would say in this regard a Southern Unionist can only guess, but she would certainly require very practical reasons for abating practical claims.

What, then, are the practical reasons against such a claim? Can Great Britain safely concede it? Would it endanger the great national and imperial interests of which she is the custodian? Is the sacrifice too great?

Here surely a distinction must be drawn. Great Britain's highest interests are imperial; and of the safeguards for these she can abate no jot. They cannot be bartered or sacrificed; and Ireland cannot sustain and must not advance any claim which can threaten them. This applies principally to Defence and to Foreign Affairs. There are, of course, other functions of government which it is expedient to treat as imperial, but Defence and Foreign Affairs are imperative and paramount. They are not, however, touched by the fiscal question. What, then, are the interests involved? Firstly, they are British rather than imperial, and, as such, afford no ground of principle for refusing. In a sense they are Irish also, but, if Ireland is misguided in making such a demand, that is her own affair. The inconvenience of a Custom House between the two countries is obvious, but it would hurt Ireland more than Great Britain, and is inevitable under any system that gives more than a provincial status to Ireland. A Custom House is set up by the Act of 1914; and be it noted in passing that the inconvenience would be tenfold increased by the exclusion of Ulster.

There remains the risk of injury to British trade. But is this really a substantial danger? As pointed out above, the Irish market is far less important to British trade than the British market is to Irish trade. Irish fiscal liberty need not infringe Free Trade between the two countries more than is involved in the fostering of infant industries advocated by Adam Smith. Some British trades might be slightly affected, but they are surely able to take care of themselves; indeed, to Irishmen generally, the question would seem rather one of preventing British trade from strangling Irish by means of trusts and similar devices, as it was strangled in the 18th century by direct Government action. Moreover, if Free Trade is vital to good relations (as in my opinion it is), how much more secure it would be if freely adopted by Ireland than if imposed in British interests by the predominant partner! Does the great British public think it unreasonable of Ireland to make this claim, if only in reparation for the admitted injustice of centuries of commercial legislation, of which the results still operate to this day? Is the sacrifice too great if thereby a real settlement can be obtained?

On the other hand, if Great Britain concedes this 'human' claim, Ireland must admit in full the strategic necessities of defence which are imposed by nature, and which are not only British but Imperial. And here it may be remarked that Nationalist sentiment is more amenable to Imperial than to British considerations. The former arouse no jealousies or suspicions, and in them may be merged the age-long controversies dating from a past in which the Colonies and Dominions had no share except as fellow-sufferers. Based on strategic necessity, the British and Imperial claim is impregnable, and will not be seriously impugned in Ireland. Republican Sinn Feiners may repudiate it altogether, though it passes comprehension how they fail to see that separation would turn Ireland into another Belgium, the cockpit not only of Europe but of the world. But, though that fanatical band have attracted many adherents during the last twelve months, that unfortunate result has been a tribute to their constancy and self-sacrifice rather than a proof of confidence in their statesmanship, and is largely due to the hunger for a constructive policy which the Irish Parliamentary Party have failed to satisfy. At any rate, as an organised party, these extremists are still a negligible minority; and the large floating mass of indeterminate opinion can yet be weaned from their extravagances by a constructive policy on the lines of Irish development within the Empire.

The foregoing suggestions would practically confer a 'Dominion Status' on Ireland, modified to suit her peculiar position, but carrying full responsibility for Imperial as well as Irish affairs. No attempt is made in this meagre sketch to discuss the proposal in detail. That, as well as the choice of status to be adopted, must be the task of whatever conference, commission, or other body is set up to find a solution. But one vital consideration must not be overlooked, which concerns both countries, namely, the removal from the House of Commons of all Irish representatives. Taxation without representation nearly destroyed the Empire 150 years ago; and the imposition by Irish representatives at Westminster of British taxes, which their constituents would not pay, is unthinkable.

The cessation of Irish representation would have its attractions for the House of Commons; and it may be doubted whether the power of the British Government over affairs other than those exclusively Irish would be impaired thereby. But from the Irish point of view the matter is not so simple. The affairs to be dealt with may be classified, with Mr Erskine Childers, as (1) Affairs of common interest to the whole Empire; (2) Affairs of exclusive interest to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; (3) Affairs exclusively British, or exclusively Irish.

Affairs of the first class must remain vested in the British Parliament, until an Imperial Government is set up; and Ireland would be content, like the existing Dominions, to wait until then for representation respecting these. Affairs of the third class, as regards Ireland, would obviously fall to the Irish Parliament. But, if Ireland is given a Dominion status or semi-Dominion status, she will have to relinquish any parliamentary voice in affairs of the second class, and leave these to be negotiated between the two Governments. She may discover, however, when she has found herself under Home Rule, that she needs representation at Westminster for these United Kingdom affairs; but this would be a natural and healthy development, as the claim of the Dominions has grown naturally out of their experiences in peace and in war.

A more serious drawback from the Irish point of view-though, paradoxical as this may appear, Ireland hardly sees it as yet-is the risk of increasing her insularity. But it may be hoped that an Ireland with full powers of development within the Empire would become less and not more insular, and combine her strong Irish patriotism with a sense of her responsibility in the great British Commonwealth of free nations.

And now one word as to the alternative blend'-and it is the only alternative based on any consistent principle -of a federated United Kingdom in which Ireland would be a province, as advocated for many years by Lord Hythe, Mr F. S. Oliver, and others, and occasionally flirted with by politicians in and out of Parliament. As the simplification of the 'dominion' solution has its attractions, so the symmetry and even the complexity

of Home Rule' all round have their attractions for perplexed British politicians. But for Irishmen, at any rate for Irish Nationalists, it has hitherto had no charm. Mr Butt's scheme, indeed, was on federal lines, but it never captured the Irish ear; his pamphlet is buried in public libraries and completely forgotten.

The federal plan would give Ireland much more restricted powers-no control of trade policy, probably less financial independence than the Act of 1914, which indeed, as a Mr Facing-both-ways, gave both too much and too little-though it would give her a voice in United Kingdom affairs, on which she sets no very high value. But, even if it met Ireland's wants, there is a formidable initial difficulty. It would involve at least four parliaments-for the United Kingdom, England, Scotland, and Ireland—and possibly two more, for Wales and Ulster, in addition to the new Imperial Parliament contemplated. And as Mr Bernard Holland points out in a recent letter to The Times' (March 30), this means a 'consideration of the constitution of the United Kingdom as a whole.' Now, it is possible that the birth-pangs of Empire may produce this litter of parliaments, but certainly not now. Can Ireland wait? Will the House of Commons wait? And, even if we wait, can we hope that the federal plan will prove a real settlement? On one condition it might. Ulster has not yet spoken, perhaps has not even thought, on this particular phase of the question. If she were heartily to adopt the federal plan and be willing to form part of the Irish Province, it would transform the situation; and the winning of Ulster might compensate Nationalist Ireland for waiving her larger claims.

MONTEAGLE.

Vol. 227.-No. 451.

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