he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only "through a glass darkly," any more than he who considers them in action and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF SOCRATES'S METHOD OF SHOWING UP
IGNORANCE 15

[Socrates speaks:]

By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.

Meno-There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the virtue of a man-he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue; there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.

15 From the Meno of Plato, beginning on p. 71 D. Jowett's translation.

Soc.-How fortunate I am, Meno. When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?

[After a little further questioning, Socrates succeeds in showing Meno that what is wanted is not an enumeration of different virtues, but a common definition of virtue.]

Men.-Will you have one definition of them all?
Soc.-That is what I am seeking.

Men.-If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.

[Socrates then leads Meno to confess that this cannot describe the virtue of all, of children, e. g., and slaves, and, indeed, that it cannot describe any man's virtue, unless we add the words justly and not unjustly, which would introduce a vicious circle. Meno then enumerates the different recognized virtues, courage, temperance, etc. But this brings back the difficulty of his first answer. So he makes another attempt:]

Men. Well, then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honorable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say too:

Virtue is the desire of things honorable and the power of attaining them.

[Socrates makes Meno admit that all men really desire

the honorable, so that nothing is left of his definition but "the power of attaining it"; and to make this virtue, we must again introduce the qualification, "of attaining it with justice," which once more lands us in a circle. In despair Meno exclaims:]

Men.-O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons-and very good ones they were, as I thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is.

X

SOCRATES'S DEFENCE OF

HIMSELF AS RE

PORTED BY PLATO IN THE APOLOGY

WHAT impression my accusers have made upon you, fellow-Athenians, I cannot say. For my part, I came near forgetting who I was; they spoke so plausibly. Yet there was scarcely a word of truth in what they said. But of the many lies they told there was one which astonished me most of all. I mean the one where they told you you would have to be on your guard lest I deceive you, because I am a clever speaker. They did indeed seem to me most brazen-faced, not to be ashamed to say that, when they were sure to be confuted by me the moment I opened my mouth and exhibited myself as anything but a clever speaker;—unless, indeed, they mean by "clever speaker" one who speaks the truth. If that is what they mean I am ready to confess that I am eloquent, though not after the fashion of their eloquence.

Well, as I was saying, my accusers have spoken scarcely a word of truth. From me, however, you shall hear the whole truth. But, Athenians, you will not hear a speech like theirs, carefully constructed, and decked out with fine words and phrases. Far from it. I shall speak without preparation, in the words that come first to my lips. For I am sure that my cause is just. Let no one expect any different course, for it would surely be unseemly that at my time of life I should

OF

CALIFORNIA

SOCRATES'S DEFENCE OF HIMSELF

105

come before you forging arguments like a callow youth. But there is one favor, Athenians, that I do most earnestly request of you. If in defending myself I use the same words I am accustomed to use in the market-place, at the tables of the money changers, and elsewhere, where many of you have heard me, do not be surprised, and do not interrupt me for that. The fact is, I am seventy years old and this is the first time that I have appeared in court, and so I am altogether a stranger to your manner of speech. Were I in truth a stranger you would, I am sure, pardon me for speaking in my native dialect and in the way that use had made familiar. And so now I beg that you will look upon me in that light, and grant this request, which I think I have a right to make: Pay no heed to my manner of speaking, which may or may not be good; but look to this only, give your undivided attention to this: Is what I say right, or is it not? That is what makes an excellent judge, as speaking the truth makes an excellent orator.

In the first place, fellow-Athenians, it is but right that I should defend myself against my old, old accusers, and answer their false charges. After that I will take up the charges of my present accusers. For my accusers are many, and now full many a year they have been accusing me falsely to you. It is these old accusers that I fear, rather than Anytus and his accomplices, formidable though they be. But, my friends, the old accusers are the more formidable, for they got hold of most of you when you were mère boys and poured into your ears their false charges against me, persuading you that there is one Socrates, a wise man, who speculates about the heavens above and pries into all the secrets of the earth beneath, and who makes the worse appear