and France attach such importance to the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin, it would seem that they should have no objection to such a settlement of the question. This, if you like, is a compromise proposal which should suit all parties if there is a real desire for agreement.

Another possible alternative for a settlement of this question would consist in the replacement of the troops of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in West Berlin by limited contingents of troops of neutral States.

It goes without saying that in this we proceed from the assumption that the presence of the troops of the four Powers or of neutral countries on the territory of the Free City of West Berlin, must in no way be regarded as an occupation of that territory and that the foreign troops will not interfere in the domestic affairs of West Berlin. The legal status of such troops might be determined by a separate agreement.

213. THE PROSPECTS FOR HOLDING A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM: Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, June 3, 1959 (Excerpts)1

There has not been any detectable progress [in the negotiations at the Geneva Foreign Ministers conference] that, to my mind, would justify the holding of a summit meeting. Now, I think I have expressed before my readiness to interpret satisfactory progress or define satisfactory progress rather liberally, because it would be unrealistic to believe that the foreign ministers could make a number of agreements that would be significant to the world and would of themselves promote a much more peaceful situation in the world. This is because these foreign ministers are, after all, acting for someone else, delegates of their governments, and these matters have to be brought back and studied carefully.

Nevertheless, I think that, as the very least, we should expect, as Mr. Herter said in his opening statement,2 that we could see where we are apart on issues, whether we could narrow these gaps, and whether we could define the areas where it was going to be worth while for us to confer that is, at the summit.

This would be, say, at least a decent working paper. But, at the same time, this crisis was brought about-the crisis that called for a summit meeting, or which was used by some to call for a summit meeting-was by the unilateral action of the Soviets with respect to Berlin. Therefore, there certainly should be some agreement that until a reunification of Germany could, in the future, be brought about, there should be a clear commitment that we will not be impeded in exercising our rights and privileges with respect to West Berlin; things of that kind. That, I would say, is specific.

Now, there are other ways, of course, in which there could be progress in the way of opening up contacts, exchanges of persons, of ideas,

1The replies printed here are taken from pp. 426-427 and 430 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959. 'Ante, doc. 197.

of books, and press comments, and all that kind of thing, some of the gaps into the Iron Curtain, back and forth.

Now, with respect to the speculating as to what the Soviets want, whether or not they want a summit meeting more or less than they did some months back, I don't know. I will say this: some of the statements made by Mr. Khrushchev were certainly not calculated to ease tensions and to promote, you might say, a relaxed atmosphere for the conduct of negotiations at Geneva.3

I don't see how the head of any self-respecting government can go to an international conference in response to any kind of thing that can be interpreted as a threat.

214. THE WESTERN POWERS' REFUSAL TO SETTLE THE BERLIN QUESTION AT THE EXPENSE OF WEST BERLIN AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION: Statement Made by the Secretary of State (Herter) at the Fifteenth Session of the Foreign Ministers Conference, Geneva, June 5, 1959 (Excerpts)1

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has said that by the term the "Berlin problem" he meant "primarily the ending of the occupation in West Berlin". It seems that this definition minimizes the real dimensions of the Berlin problem. For us, the Berlin problem means maintenance of freedom for more than two million human beings who at the end of the war with the agreement of the Soviet Government came under the occupation authority of the three Western Powers.

Since the prime Soviet purpose is to remove the allied presence from West Berlin it is not surprising that the key part of the plan 3a is the termination of Western occupation rights. Even if, as is clearly not the case, the rest of the plan were acceptable to us this point alone would vitiate the entire scheme.

The second salient defect in the Soviet plan is that it would in effect compel the Western Powers to grant a measure of recognition to the so-called GDR. No non-communist nation has recognized this instrument of the Soviet Union as an independent nation. I can assure you

'Reference to the several speeches made by Chairman Khrushchev during his May 25-June 4, 1959, tour of Albania.

1

These excerpts are taken from pp. 245, 247, 248-249, and 250 of Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva.

Statement made in a portion of Mr. Gromyko's remarks of May 30, 1959, not reprinted in doc. 211, ante; see Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva, p. 215.

За As set forth in doc. 211,ante.

that we have no intention of recognizing the so-called GDR as the price of a solution to the Berlin problem.

I should point out one other serious defect in the Soviet plan. Although purporting to terminate the occupation it would supplant the present regime by imposing in a real occupation spirit a new political status of the people of West Berlin. The U.S.S.R. in its note of November 27, 1958, formally acknowledged that West Berlin must be granted the right to whatever way of life it wishes for itself-with one qualification "When the foreign occupation is ended". I cannot find any hint or suggestion in the Soviet plan that even though the "foreign occupation" would be ended under the Soviet plan the people of West Berlin would have any real voice in whether or not the proposed new political status should come into existence.

One final defect in the Soviet plan should be noted. In addition to the Western military presence, West Berlin owes its viability to its political, economic and social ties with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The entire thrust of the Soviet plan for West Berlin cuts into these ties and is clearly intended to establish a situation which will be but a "way-station" on the road to the preferred Soviet solution-that of annexation of West Berlin by the communist controlled authority in East Germany.

In rejecting the U.S.S.R.'s second preference "Free City" proposal the Western Powers do not maintain that the present situation is ideal. We do not say that it cannot be improved in some respects.

In our concentration on Berlin we perhaps have tended to overlook the other important aspects of the Western Peace Plan. It would be an illusion, and a dangerous one at that, to believe that any long range Berlin solution can be reached in the face of a complete impasse on the central problem making for continuing European insecuritythat of a divided Germany.

The heart of the Western Peace plan lies in its comprehensive proposal for the gradual reunification of Germany. The plan makes provision as well for European security and concomitant arms control moves and for an interim Berlin solution. But the continued dangerous division of Germany places great obstacles in the way of real progress on European security, arms control and Berlin. The unification of Germany is still our main task. We are confident that the solution proposed in the Western Peace plan will stand the test of history and will be seen to offer reasonable answers to the great problems raised by the continuing division of Germany.

What then is the present situation? The USSR while recognizing existing Western rights in and to Berlin still puts forward its "second

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 591-696. 'Ante, doc. 199.

preference" plan as unveiled some months ago. It proposes that the Western Powers abandon their present rights in favor of the Soviet plan. This we will not do. We will have no share in imposing a new status on the West Berliners against their will. Such a new regime would make German unity more difficult to achieve since it would establish still a third part of Germany.

However, we recognize our responsibilities for keeping frictions between our two systems to a minimum. We recognize that Berlin, because of its unique situation, can be a source of friction. We are willing to search in good faith with the Soviet Union for some reciprocal improvement in the Berlin situation. However, it should be very clear that any improvement arrangement must meet these criteria: a) respect for existing Western rights of presence and access to Berlin and existing agreements concerning such rights since the Western presence is essential to maintain West Berlin's freedom; b) no recognition of the so-called GDR; c) maintenance of West Berlin's political and economic ties with the West.

215. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A ONE-YEAR PROLONGATION OF CERTAIN OCCUPATION RIGHTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN WEST BERLIN PENDING THE FORMATION OF A GERMAN CONFEDERATION AND/OR SIGNATURE OF A GERMAN PEACE TREATY: Statement Made by the Soviet Foreign Minister (Gromyko) at the Sixteenth Session of the Foreign Ministers Conference, Geneva, June 10, 1959 (Excerpt)1

The Soviet Government is continuing to make efforts to obtain a mutually acceptable solution to the West Berlin question and also to the question of a peace treaty with Germany-the two questions for the examination of which the present conference was convened.

In its efforts to contribute to the success of our negotiations the Soviet Government has taken yet another important step in this direction. We are submitting, for examination by the participants in our conference, new proposals by the Soviet Government, which have been agreed with the Government of the German Democratic Republic.

These proposals are as follows:

The U.S.S.R., taking into account the position of the Western Powers, is prepared not to insist on the immediate and complete abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin. The Soviet Government could agree to the provisional maintenance of certain occupation rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin, but on condition that such a situation would exist only for a strictly limited period, namely one year.

During that time the two German States would make arrangements for the establishment of an all-German committee composed of representatives of the German Democràtic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on a basis of parity (one to one).

1

I.e., in the Nov. 27, 1958, note cited in footnote 4, above.

This excerpt is taken from pp. 261-263 of Foreign Ministers Meeting, MayAugust 1959, Geneva.

The committee must help to broaden and develop contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and prepare concrete measures for the unification of Germany, as well as examine questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. Should the proposal for the establishment of the committee be unacceptable to one or the other German State, then the four Powers could recommend the Governments of both German States to choose a form of co-operation acceptable to them with a view to solving the problems referred to.

In order not to postpone indefinitely the conclusion of a German peace treaty, a definite period should be set for the work of the all-German committee or some other body, namely, one year, during which the committee or some other body must reach an agreed decision in regard to the questions of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany.

The provisional recognition of certain occupation rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin is possible if agreement is reached on an interim settlement of the West Berlin question on the basis of the following provisions:

(a) the Western Powers shall reduce the number of their armed forces and armaments in West Berlin to token contingents;

(b) all hostile propaganda from the territory of West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries shall cease; (c) all organizations in West Berlin engaged in espionage and subversive activities against the German Democratic Republic, the USSR and other socialist countries shall be liquidated;

(d) the Western Powers shall undertake not to locate in West Berlin any atomic or rocket installations.

In the event of the conclusion of the aforesaid agreement the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the maintenance of the communications of West Berlin with the outside world in the form in which they now exist.

Such an agreement as a whole, including the question of maintaining the communications of West Berlin with the outside world, would constitute the provisional status of West Berlin. This status could be guaranteed, firstly, by the four Powers (on the basis of the protocol on guarantees submitted by the Soviet delegation) and, secondly, by the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which has expressed in principle its agreement to respect the agreed provisional status of West Berlin. If the Western Powers consider this ap propriate, the question of guarantees could be settled either in a joint agreement on the provisional status of West Berlin or in a separate document. Either document could be registered in the United Nations.

If agreement should be reached on giving West Berlin the status of a demilitarized Free City in accordance with the proposal previously put forward by the Soviet Government,' then the guarantees in regard to the unimpeded communication of the Free City with the outside world would be maintained so long as the unification of Germany has not been achieved.

In order to supervise compliance with the obligations arising out of the aforesaid agreement on the provisional status of West Berlin for the parties thereto, the Soviet Government proposes the establishment of a supervisory body composed of representatives of the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France. This body would have to keep a watch to ensure that there is no violation of the agreement in regard to the aforesaid questions on the part of West Berlin, and take appropriate measures to secure the implementation of the agreement regarding the provisional status without in this Connexion affecting the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet delegation must declare that if the Western Powers do not accept (agree?] to carry out the minimum measures we have indicated in regard to West Berlin within the transition period of one year, the Soviet Union will Lot accept [agree?] to confirm its agreement to the continuation of the occupation régime in West Berlin.

If the Western Powers or the Government of Western Germany obstruct the achievement, within the period indicated, of agreed solutions to the questions

'See ante, doc. 211.