implacable war against each other; and perpetually clog and discon cert one another's schemes and operations. Hence men are impelled, &c. to good, or to evil, according as they come under the power of the good deity, or the bad one."-Or, to speak calvinistically, They are necessarily made willing to believe and obey, if they are the elected objects of everlasting love, which is the good Principle; and they are irresistibly made willing to disbelieve and obey, if they are the reprobated objects of everlasting wrath, which is the evil Principle. For free-will has no more place in Manicheism than it has in Calvinism. Hence it appears, that, setting aside the other peculiarities of each scheme, the grand difference between Calvin and Manes, consists in Calvin's making everlasting electing, necessitating Love, and everlasting, reprobating, necessitating Wrath flow from the same divine Principle; whereas Manes more reasonably supposed, that they flow from two contrary principles. Whoever therefore denies Free-will, and contends for Necessity, embraces, before he is aware, the capital eiror of the Manichees: aud it is well if he does not hold it in a less reasonable manner than Manes himself did. "I believe "[adds Mr. Toplady]" it is absolutely impossible to trace quite up to its source, the antiquity of that hypothesis, which absurdly affirms the existence of two eternal, contrary, independent principles.-What led so many wise people, and for so great a series of ages, into such a wretched mistake; were chiefly, I suppose, these two considerations: (1) That evil, both moral and physical, are positive things, and, so must have a positive cause.-(2) That a Being, perfectly good, could not from the very nature of his existence be the cause of such bad things."

Here Mr. Toplady reasons like a judicious divine. The misfortune for his scheme is, that his "two considerations," like two millstones, grind calvinism to dust; or, like two cogent arguments, force us to embrace the doctrine of free-will, or the error of Manes. Mr. T. seems aware of this; and therefore to shew that God can, upon the Calvinian plan, absolutely predestinate, and effectually bring about sin, by making men willing to sin in the day of his irresistible power; and that nevertheless he is not the author and first cause of sin: To shew this, I say, Mr. T. asserts, "That evil, whether physical or moral, does not, upon narrow inspection, appear to have so much of positivity in it, as it is probable those ancients supposed." Nay, he insinuates, that, as "Sickness is a privation of health;" so the sinfulness of any human action is said to be a privation;" being called aroua, illegality;-and he adds, that, wonderful as the thing may appear, Dr. Watts, in his Logic," ventures to treat of sin under the title of not-being." When Mr. Toplady has thus cleared the way. and modestly intimated that sin, being a kind of non-entity, can have no positive cause, he proposes the grand question, "Whether the great First Cause, who is infinitely and merely good, can be, either efficiently or deficiently the author of them," i. e. [according to the

*

* If the Calvinists, in their unguarded moments, represent sin as a kind of not-Being or non-entity, that they may exculpate God for absolutely ordaining it, do they not by this means exculpate the sinner also? If the first cause of sin is excusable, because sin is a privation, and has "not so much of positivity in it" as the ancients supposed is not the second cause of sin, much more excusable on the same account?

context] the author of iniquity, injustice, impiety, and vice; as well as the author of the natural evil, by which God punishes sin?

Page 139, Mr. T. answers this question thus: "In my opinion, the single word permission solves the whole difficulty, as far as it can be solved," &c. and page 141, he says, "We know scarce any of the views, which induced uncreated goodness to ORDAIN (for, &c. I see no great difference between permitting and ORDAINING) the introgression, or more properly the INTROMISSION, of evil." Here Mr. Toplady goes as far as he decently can: rather than grant, that we are endued with free-will, and that when God had made angels and men free-willing creatures, in order to judge them according to their own works, he could not, without inconsistency, rob them of free-will by necessitating them to be either good or wicked ;—rather, I say, than admit this scriptural doctrine, which perfectly clears the gracious Judge of all the earth; Mr. Toplady first indirectly and decently extenuates sin, and brings it down to almost nothing; and then he tells us, that God ORDAINED it. Is not the openness of Manes preferable to this Calvinian winding?-When Mr. T. grants, that God "ordained" sin, and when he charges "the intromission of evil" upon God, does he not grant all that Manes in this respect contended for? And have not the Manichean necessitarians the advantage over Mr. T—, when they assert, that a principle, which absolutely ordains, yea necessitates sin and all the works of darkness, is a dark and evil principle? Can we doubt of it if we believe these sayings of Christ, "Out of the [evil] heart proceed evil thoughts," &c. "By their works ye shall know them."" The tree is known by its fruit?"

Again: If "sin, or rather the sinfulness of an action, may be properly called a Not-being" or a non-entity, as Mr. Toplady inconsistently insinuates, page 137; it absurdly follows, that crookedness, or the want of straightness in a line, is a mère privation also, or a not-being: whereas reason and feeling tell us, that the crookedness of a crooked line, is something every way as positive as the straightness of a straight line. To deny it is as ridiculous as to assert, that a circle is a not-being, because it is not made of straight lines like a square; or that a murder is a species of non-entity, because it is not the legal execution of a condemned malefactor. Nor can Mr. T. mend his error by hiding it behind "Dr. Watts's logic;" for the world knows, that Dr. Watts was a Calvinist when he wrote that book; and therefore, judicious as he was, the veil of error prevented him from seeing then that part of the truth which I contend for.

Once more: Whether sin has a positive cause or not [for Mr. T. insinuates both these doctrines, with the inconsistency peculiar to his system] I beg leave to involve him in a dilemma, which will meet him at the front or back door of his inconsistency. Either sin is a real thing, and has a positive cause; or it is not a real thing, and has no positive cause. If it is not a real thing, and has no positive canse; why does God positively send the wicked to hell for a privation, which they have not positively caused? And if sin is a real thing, or a positive moral crookedness of the will of a sinner, and as such has a positive cause; can that positive cause be any other than the self-perversion of free-will, or the impelling decree of a sin-ordaining God? If the positive cause of sin is the self-perversion of freewill, is it not evident, that so sure as there is sin in the world, the doctrine of free-will is true? But if the positive cause of sin is the impelling decree of a SIN-ORDAINING, sin-necessitating God; is it

not incontestable, that the capital doctrine of the Manichces [the doctrine of absolute necessity] is true; and that there is in the Godhead an evil principle [it signifies little whether you call it matter, darkness, everlasting free-wrath, or devil] which positively ordains and irresistibly causes sin? In a word, is it not clear, that the second gospel axiom is overthrown by the doctrine of necessity; and that the damnation of sinners is of God, and not of themselves?

While Mr. T. tries to extricate himself from this dilemma, I shall produce one or two more passages of his book, to prove that his scheme makes God the author of sin, according to the most dangerous error of Manes. The heathens imagined that Minerva, the Goddess of wisdom, was Jupiter's offspring in the most peculiar mauer. Diana was indeed Jupiter's daughter, but Latona, an earthly princess, was her mother. Whereas Jupiter was at once the father and the Mother of Minerva. He begat her himself in the womb of his own brain, and when she was ripe for the birth, his forehead opened after a violent head-ache, which answered to the pangs of child-bearing, and out came the lovely female Deity. Mr. Toplady, alluding to this heathen fiction, represents his Diana, Necessity, as proceeding from God with her immense chain of events, which has among its adamantine links, all the follies, heresies, murders, robberies, adulteries, incests, and rebellions, of which men and devils have been, are, or ever shall be guilty. His own words [page 50] are, "Necessity, in general; with all its extensive series of adamantine links, in particular is, in reality, what the poets feigned of Minerva, the issue of Divine Wisdom" [he should have said, the issue of the Supreme God, by his own wise brain] "deriving its WHOLE EXISTENCE from the Free-will of God; and its WHOLE EFFECTUOSITY from his neverceasing Providence." Is not this insinuating, as plainly as decency will allow, that every sin [as a link of the adamantine chain of events] has been hammered in heaven, and that every crime, "derives its WHOLE EXISTENCE from the free-will of God?" Take one more instance of the same Manichean doctrine."

Page 64. Mr. Toplady having said, that He [God] casteth forth his ice, like morsels-and causeth the wind to blow, &c. adds, "Neither is material nature alone bound fast in fate. All other things, the HUMAN WILL itself not excepted, are not less tightly bound, i. c. EFFECTUALLY influenced and determined."—Hence it is evident, that, if this calvinism is true, when sinners send forth volleys of unclean and prophane words, Calvin's God has as "tightly bound" them to cast forth Manichean ribaldry, as the God of nature birds the clouds to cast forth his ice like morsels.

I would not be understood to demonstrate by the preceding quotations, that Mr. T. designs to make God the author of sin. No: On the contrary, I do him the justice to say, that he does all he can, to clear his doctrines of grace from this dreadful imputation. I only produce his own words to shew, that, notwithstanding all his endeavours, this horrid Manichean consequence unavoidably flows from his scheme of Necessity.

SECTION II.

We have taken a view of the Scheme of Necessity, and seen how it represents God, directly or indirectly, as the First Cause of all sin

and damnation. Consider we now, how Mr. T. defends this Scheme by rational arguments as a philosopher.

Page 22. "The soul is, in a very extensive degree, passive as matter is:"-Here Mr. Toplady, in some degree, gives up the point. He is about to prove that the soul is not self-determined; and that, as our bodily organs are necessarily and irresistibly affected by the objects, which strike them; so our souls are necessarily and irresistibly determined by our bodily organs, and by the ideas, which those organs necessarily raise in our minds, when they are affected. Now, to prove this, he should have proved that our souls are altogether as passive as our bodies. But, far from proving it, he dares not assert it: for he allows, that the soul is passive as matter, only in a very extensive degree; and therefore, by his own concession, the argument on which he is going to rest the notion of the absolute passiveness of the soul with respect to self-determination, will be at least in some degree groundless. But let us consider this mighty argument, and see if Mr. T.'s limitation frees him from the charge of countenancing materialism “ in a very extensive degree.”

Page 22. "The senses are necessarily impressed by every object from without; and as necessarily commove the fibres of the brain; from which nervous commotion, ideas are necessarily communicated to, or excited in the soul; and by the judgment, which the soul necessarily frames of those ideas, the will is necessarily inclined to approve or disapprove, to act or not to act. If so, where is the boasted power of self-determination?"

This Mr. Toplady calls "a Survey of the soul's dependence on the body." Page 27, he enforces the same doctrine in these words : "The human body is necessarily encompassed by a multitude of other bodies. Which other surrounding bodies, [animal, vegetable, &c.] so far as we come within their perceivable sphere, necessarily impress our nerves with sensations correspondent to the objects themselves. These sensations are necessarily, &c. propagated to the soul, which can no more help receiving them, and being affected by them, than a tree can resist a stroke of lightning.

"Now, (1) If all the ideas in the soul derive their existence from sensation; and (2) If the soul depend absolutely on the body, for all those sensations; and (3) If the body be both primarily and continually dependent on other extrinsic beings, for the very sensations which [the body] communicates to the soul;-the consequence seems to me undeniable, that neither man's mental, nor his outward operations are self-determined; but, on the contrary, determined by the views, with which an infinity of surrounding objects necessarily, and almost incessantly impress his intellect."

These arguments bring to my mind St. Paul's caution, "Beware, lest any man spoil you through philosophy, and vain deceit." That Mr. T.'s scheme is founded on a vain philosophy, will, I hope, appear evident to those who weigh the following remarks.

1

I. This scheme is contrary to genuine philosophy, which has always represented the soul, as able to resist the strongest impressions of all the objects that surround the body; and as capable of going against the wind and tide of all the senses. Even Horace, an effeminate disciple of Epicurus, could say, in his sober moments,

Justum et tenacem propositi virum, &c.

"Neither the clamours of a raging mob, nor the frowns of a threatning tyrant;--neither furious storms, nor roaring thunders, can move a righteous man, who stands firm to his resolution. The wreck of the world might crush his body to atoms, but could not shake his soul with fear." But Mr. T.'s philosophy sinks as much below the poor heathen's, as a man, who is perpetually borne down, and carried away by every object of sense around him, is inferior to the steady man, whole virtue triumphs over all the objects which strike his

senses.

II. This doctrine unmans man. For, reason, or a power morally to regulate the appetites, which we gratify by means of our senses, is what chiefly distinguishes us from other animals. Now, if outward objects necessarily bias our senses, if our senses necessarily bias our judgment, and if our judgment necessarily biasses our will and practice; what advantage have we over beasts? May we not say of reason, what heated Luther once said of free-will; that it is an empty name, a mere non-entity? Thus Mr. Toplady's scheme of philosophical necessity, by rendering reason useless, saps the very foundation of all moral philosophy, and hardly allows man the low principle of conduct, which we call instinct in brutes. Nay, the very brutes are not so affected by the objects which strike their senses: but they often run away, hungry as they are, from the food, which tempts their eye, their nose, and their belly, when they apprehend some danger, though their senses discover none. Beasts frequently act in full opposition to the sight of their eyes; but the wretched scheme, which Mr. T— imposes upon us as Christian philosophy, supposes that all men necessarily think, judge, and act, not only according to the sight of their eyes, but according to the impressions made by matter, upon all their senses. How would heathen fatalists themselves have exploded so carnal a philosophy!

IH. As it sets aside reason so it overthrows conscience, and the light, which enlightens every man that comes into the world. For, of what use is conscience? Of what us is the internal light of grace,

enlightens conscience within, if man is necessarily determined hout; and if the objects which strike his senses, irresistibly urn his judgment and his will insomuch that he can no more resist their impressions, "than a tree can resist the stroke of lightning ?"

IV. As this scheme leaves no room for morality, so it robs us of the very essence of God's natural image, which consists chiefly in selfactivity, and self-motion. For, according to Mr. T's philosophy we cannot take one step, no not in the affairs of common life, without an irresistible, necessitating impulse. Yea, with respect to self-activity, he represents us as inferior to our watches: they have their spring of motion within themselves, and they can go alone, if they are wound up once in twenty-four hours. But, if we believe Mr. T—, our spring of motion is without us: nay, we have as many springs of motion, as there are objects around us; and these objects necessarily wind up our will, from moment to moment. For, by necessarily moving our senses, they necessarily move our understanding; our understanding necessarily moves our will; and our will necessarily moves our tongues, hands, and feet. Thus our will and our body, like the wheels and body of a coach, never move but as they are moved, and cannot help moving, when they are acted upon. How different is this mechanical religion from the spiritual religion, which the learned and pious Dr. H. More inculcates in these words! "The first degree