chose, perhaps might supply it? I have everywhere done my best, such as it is, to lay bare the course of ideas, and to help the reader to arrive at a judgment on each question. And, as I cannot suppose a necessity on my part to disclaim infallibility, I have not used set phrases which, if they mean anything, imply it. I have stated my opinions as truths whatever authority there may be against them, and however hard I may have found it to come to an opinion at all. And, if this is to be dogmatic, I certainly have not tried to escape dogmatism, It is difficult again for a man not to think too much of his own pursuit. The metaphysician cannot perhaps be too much in earnest with metaphysics, and he cannot, as the phrase runs, take himself too seriously. But the same thing holds good with every other positive function of the universe. And the metaphysician, like other men, is prone to forget this truth. He forgets the narrow limitation of his special province, and, filled by his own poor inspiration, he ascribes to it an importance not its due. I do not know if anywhere in my work I may seem to have erred thus, but I am sure that such excess is not my conviction or my habitual mood. And to restore the balance, and as a confession possibly of equal defect, I will venture to transcribe some sentences from my note-book. see written there that "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct." Of Optimism I have said that "The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil." Eclecticism I have found preach I that "Every truth is so true that any truth must be false," and Pessimism that "Where everything is bad it must be good to know the worst," or "Where all is rotten it is a man's work to cry stinking fish." About the Unity of Science I have set down that "Whatever you know it is all one," and of Introspection that "The one self-knowledge worth having is to know one's mind." The reader may judge how far these sentences form a Credo, and he must please himself again as to how seriously he takes a further extract: "To love unsatisfied the world is mystery, a mystery which love satisfied seems to comprehend. The latter is wrong only because it cannot be content without thinking itself right." But for some general remarks in justification of metaphysics I may refer to the Introduction. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION And It is a pleasure to me to find that a new edition of this book is wanted. I am encouraged to hope that with all its defects it has helped to stimulate thought on first principles. And it has been a further pleasure to me to find that my critics have in general taken this work in the spirit in which it was offered, whether they have or have not found themselves in agreement with its matter. perhaps in some cases sympathy with its endeavour may have led them to regard its shortcomings too leniently. I on my side have tried to profit by every comment, though I have made no attempt to acknowledge each, or to reply to it in detail. But I fear that some criticisms must have escaped my notice, since I have discovered others by mere chance. For this edition I have thought it best not to make many alterations; but I have added in an Appendix, beside some replies to objections, a further explanation and discussion of certain difficulties. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Preliminary objections to metaphysics answered. Book E. Appearance. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES. Attempt to explain error by taking primary qualities alone as real, 11. The secondary shown to be un- PAGES I. Qualities without relations are unintelligible. They cannot be found, 26-27. They cannot be got bare legitimately, 27-28, or at all, 28-30. II. Qualities with relations are unintelligible. They cannot be resolved into relations, 30, and the relations bring internal discrepancies, 31. PAGES 'Effort to avoid the contradiction of Change. But the Cause and its Effect are not compatible, 54, 55. Illu- sory attempt at explanation, 55, 56. The Cause spreads to take in all the conditions, and yet cannot be com- plete, 56-58. Its relation to its effect is unintelligible, Causal sequence must be, and cannot be, continuous, 58-61. Whether an original datum, or not, is irrelevant, 62. It has a meaning which implies change in time, 63, and self-caused change, 64, 65. Passivity what and how connected with Activity. Occasion what, 65. Condi- tion and Sum of Conditions, 66–68. Our previous results have ruined Things, 71. Things 73-74. The Self at last, but what does it mean? 75, 76. Self as body excluded, 77. I. Self as total contents of ex- perience at one moment, 77. II. Self as average con- tents of experience, 77-79. III. Essential self, 80, 81. Personal identity, 81-86. IV. Self as Monad, 86-87. V. Self as what interests, 88. VI. Self as opposed to Not-self, 88-96. Each is a concrete group, 89, 90. But does any content belong solely to self, 90, 91, or to Not-self, 91, 92? Doubtful cases, 92-94. Self and Not-self on the whole are not fixed, 95, 96. Perception |