Hearing Charter CONTENTS Opening Statements Page Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives Prepared Statement of Congresswoman Constance Morella, Member, Com- Governor James S. Gilmore, III, Commonwealth of Virginia; Chairman, Advi- sory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism Governor James S. Gilmore, III, Commonwealth of Virginia; Chairman, Advi- sory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, Draft CYBER TERRORISM-A VIEW FROM THE GILMORE COMMISSION WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2001 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert (chairman of the committee) presiding. HEARING CHARTER COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Cyber Terrorism-A View WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2001 10:00 A.M.-12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 1. Purpose On Wednesday, October 17, 2001 at 10:00 a.m. the House Committee on Science will hold its second hearing to examine the vulnerability of our Nation's computer infrastructure as well as research-related challenges and opportunities facing the Nation's network security infrastructure and management. Testifying before the committee will be The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Governor Gilmore will assess the threats to our Nation's information infrastructure, describe the level of preparedness to address these threats, and describe steps that need to be taken to ensure that Federal, state, and local governments are prepared to respond. 2. Background The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought into stark relief the Nation's physical and economic vulnerability to attack within our borders. The relative ease with which terrorists were able to implement their plans serves as a pointed reminder to the Nation to identify critical 'soft spots' in the Nation's defenses. Among the Nation's vulnerabilities are our computer and communications networks, upon which the country's economic and critical infrastructures for finance, transportation, energy and water distribution, and health and emergency services depend. The existence of these vulnerabilities has called into question the extent to which the Nation's research programs, educational system, and interconnected operations are able to meet the challenge of cyber warfare in the 21st century. The Los Angeles Times in a recent editorial emphasized the importance of meeting this challenge: “A cyberterrorist attack would not carry the same shock and carnage of September 11. But in this information age. . .one could be more widespread and just as economically destructive." For additional information, refer to the charter for the full Committee hearing held on October 10, 2001 entitled Cyber Security-How Can We Protect American Computer Networks From Attack? located at http://www.house.gov/science/full/oct10/ full charter 101001.htm The Gilmore Commission Congress authorized the establishment of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission) in 1998 as part of P.L. 105-261, the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. The Act required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) to establish an expert panel to assess Federal, state, and local capabilities for responding to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. The National Defense Research Institute, a division of the Rand Corporation, was awarded the contract and selected the 20 members of the panel in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. In April of 1999, Defense Secretary Cohen announced the selection of Governor Gilmore to serve as Chairman of the Commission. The Gilmore Commission's charter will expire on February 17, 2002. First Annual Report-Assessing the Threat The Gilmore Commission released its first annual report in December of 1999 entitled "Assessing the Threat." The Commission noted that there has been a trend toward increasing lethality in terrorism over the past ten years and that terrorists may feel less constrained from using weapons of mass destruction “in an attempt to cause mass casualties, especially following the precedent-setting attack in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo."1 For the Gilmore Commission, this event marked a turning point in the history of terrorism requiring a reexamination of the motives and means by which terrorists would attempt to accomplish their aims. The 1995 Aum attack illustrated the potential lethality of non-state sponsored terrorist attacks. In response, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39). This PDD directed Federal agencies to improve domestic response capabilities to manage the consequences of attacks employing unconventional weapons. A year later, "The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act" was enacted as part of P.L. 105–261. A key component of the Act focused on programs to enhance state and local emergency response capabilities. The Gilmore Commission concluded that despite this increase in attention and funding, the Nation still lacked a comprehensive national strategy that could guide efforts to design integrated national domestic preparedness plans to combat terrorism. These plans must recognize that state and local authorities usually provide the first response to terrorist events and are responsible for addressing preparedness and long-term community consequences. The threat assessment conducted by the Gilmore Commission did not offer a formal assessment of the threat posed by cyber terrorism but concluded that the issues of cyber terrorism, while not conventionally included within definitions of weapons of mass destruction,2 were so interrelated to the forms of terrorist activity they had considered, that they could not be ignored. The Commission stated that it would "consider issues related to cyber terrorism in its activities, and include in its subsequent reports conclusions and recommendations on the subject." Second Annual Report-Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism The Gilmore Commission released its second annual report entitled Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in December 2000. This report built upon the threat assessment provided in the previous report by conducting a broad program_assessment of Federal, state and local efforts to prepare for terrorist attacks. The Commission made five findings with corresponding recommendations. In addition, the Commission made six specific functional recommendations, including recommendations for research and development, national standards, and the provision of cyber security against terrorism (see appendix II). The Commission offered a scathing critique of existing Federal efforts to ensure domestic preparedness against terrorism. It concluded that instead of a coherent and integrated strategy, the Nation had a loosely coupled set of plans and programs with varied objectives. The Commission reiterated concerns raised in its previous report and recommended that the next President develop and present a coherent_national strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office. This strategy was to be based upon the following assumptions: • Local response entities (law enforcement, fire service, etc.) will always be the first and potentially the only response to a terrorist event; • In the event of a major terrorist assault, no single jurisdiction will be able to respond without outside assistance; • Existing emergency response and management capabilities, developed for response to natural disasters, disease outbreaks and accidents should be used as a base for enhancing our domestic capability for response to terrorist attacks; and • The national strategy should address the full spectrum of our efforts against terrorism-intelligence, deterrence, prevention, investigation, prosecution, preemption, crisis management, and consequence management. National Office for Combating Terrorism (NOCT) The Commission called for the statutory creation of a National Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President responsible for developing 1 In 1995 the religious group Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway in an attempt to kill large numbers of people. The event is thought to be the first non-state sponsored effort to use a weapon of mass destruction against a civilian population. For more information, refer to "The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum" by David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall. 2 In order to ensure accuracy and clarity the Gilmore Commission substituted the term weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (CBRN). |