the chances of lapses in intelligence coordination and chaos in domestic crisis response, there needs to be fewer government entities in need of coordination. • Although reducing the number of people and amount of bureaucracy seems to go against the tide in the present crisis atmosphere, preliminary indications are that coordination among governmental entities is the main problem, not a lack of raw information or insufficient resources. • Fighting a new stealthy, agile enemy is not like fighting cold or hot wars against nation-states. In the rush to "do something" Congress-by enlarging an already huge and sluggish national security bureaucracy--might make the risk of another successful catastrophic terrorist more likely. Even with real improvements to the intelligence and homeland defense machinery (rather than adding bureaucracy), it is probably only a matter of time before the terrorists strike again. Most high-level Bush administration officials say that it will be "when and not if." Of course, in the short-term, we must decisively take down the rest of the al Qaeda terrorist network militarily and with law enforcement but, in the long-term, we might want to take steps to lower our target profile to terrorists. The United States could do this by reducing unneeded interventions, both politically and militarily, in the world--particularly in the Middle East. According to a recent Zogby poll, a majority of the populations of all Islamic states polled liked U.S. culture, including movies and television, but disliked U.S. policies toward the Middle East. Because intelligence and homeland security cannot be perfect, a change in U.S. foreign policy might lessen the chance that terrorist groups would be motivated to launch catastrophic attacks against the U.S. homeland. Testimony of James S. Gilmore, III Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction Before the U.S Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information United States Senate June 25, 2002 Madame Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Committees, I am honored to be here today. I come before you as the Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of the Advisory Panel. The Advisory Panel to be established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105–261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). That Act directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks. It said: The panel shall- 1. assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for 2. assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass 3. assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the 4. recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with 5. assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in The Act requires the Advisory Panel to report its findings, conclusions, and It is likewise testimony to the continuing dedication of this subcommittee and its chair that the Advisory Panel's tenure was extended for two in accordance with Section 1514 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (S. 1358, Public Law 107-107, 107th Congress, First Session), which was signed into law by the President on December 28, 2001. By virtue of that legislation, the panel is now required to submit two additional reports one on December 15 of this year, and one on December 15, 2003. In Memoriam Mr. Chairman, the events of September 11 and its aftermath have changed the lives of Americans for generations to come. But those attacks had special meaning for this Advisory Panel. This Advisory Panel is unique in one very important way. It is not the typical national "blue ribbon" panel, which in most cases historically have been composed almost exclusively of what I will refer to as "Washington Insiders” people who have spent most of their professional careers inside the Beltway. This panel has a sprinkling of that kind of experience-a former Member of Congress and Secretary of the Army, a former State Department Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, a former senior executive from the CIA and the FBI, a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the head of a national academy on public health, two retired flag-rank military officers, the head of a national law enforcement foundation. But what truly makes this panel special and, therefore, causes its pronouncement to carry significantly more weight, is the contribution from the members of the panel from the rest of the country: Three directors and one deputy director of state emergency management agencies, from California, Iowa, Indiana and Virginia, two of whom now also serve their Governor's as Homeland Security Advisors of the Deputy A state epidemiologist and director of a state public health agency A city manager of a mid-size city The chief of police of a suburban city in a major metropolitan area A senior emergency medical services officer of a major metropolitan area These are representatives of the true "first responders"—those heroic men and women who put their lives on the line every day for the public health and safety of all Americans. Moreover, so many of these panel members are also national leaders in their professions: our EMS member is a past president of the national association of emergency medical technicians; one of our emergency managers is the past president of her national association; our law officer is president-elect of the international association; our epidemiologist is past president of her professional organization. Read our reports and you will understand what that expertise has meant to the policy recommendations that we have made, especially for the events of September 11. Those attacks now carry much poignancy for us, because we have an empty seat at our panel table. At a few minutes after 10 o'clock that morning, Ray Downey, Department Deputy Chief and chief in charge of Special Operations Command, Fire Department of the City of New York-the incident commander at the scene perished in the collapse of the North tower of the New York World Trade Center. Although the impending disaster had to have been obvious to Ray following the prior collapse of the South tower, he knew and those around him knew their duty. With fearless disregard for their own personal safety, focused entirely on saving the lives of others, Ray and his colleagues all stayed at their post, doing their job. The result of that decision, clear now in retrospect, was the rescue of literally thousands of people from those towers. Ray and 342 of his colleagues paid the supreme sacrifice, and all humanity must acknowledge and be eternally grateful for their actions. Our loss is tempered by the extraordinary opportunity that we had in being informed and counseled by Ray. Ray Downey served as a dedicated member of the Advisory Panel during its initial three-year tenure, bringing insightful first-responders' perspectives and consistently providing invaluable counsel based on his years of training, unequaled leadership, and exceptional experience in the field. Ray was not only a nationally recognized leader, author, and lecturer on rescue, collapse operations, and terrorism emergency response. He readily responded to the call for help in Oklahoma City, Atlanta, and other disasters outside his home jurisdiction. |