permanent members of the Security Council in accordance with two principles: "due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to, the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution". (Article 23, paragraph 1).

VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Even more than the composition of the Council, the voting procedure highlights the special position of the great powers.

The Yalta voting formula provides for a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council, which represents an advance over the procedure in the Council of the League of Nations. In no instance is the unanimous vote of all of the members of the Council required; in all cases a majority vote of seven is sufficient to take decisions. When the question under consideration is one of procedure, the vote of any seven members, whether permanent or nonpermanent, determines the position of the Security Council. On all other matters, decisions of the Council must be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including those of all of the permanent members, except that in decisions with respect to peaceful settlement of disputes (Articles 33 to 38) a party or parties to a dispute must abstain from voting.

The issue of the voting procedure in the Security Council was the most difficult one which confronted the nations in the preparation of the Charter. At Dumbarton Oaks it was not possible to reach agreement on these issues, which bring into sharpest focus the entire problem of the adjustment of the relations among the great powers, and between them and the other nations of the world. While there was no question at Dumbarton Oaks as to the necessity of unanimity of the great powers with respect to enforcement action, it was not possible to reach agreement on other aspects of voting procedure and consequently the entire matter was left open. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were completed in respect of voting procedure at the Crimea Conference in February, 1945, when President Roosevelt submitted a proposal which was approved by Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, and later accepted by China. The principal decision made at Yalta was that the unanimity

requirement should apply to procedures of pacific settlement but that it should not be carried to the extent of permitting a member of the Security Council to take part in deciding a case to which it is a party. Therefore, it was agreed that any party to a dispute must abstain from voting. Both then and subsequently the United States favored strongly the requirement of abstention because it would facilitate the consideration of disputes in the Security Council.

The voting procedure in the Security Council became one of the most controversial issues of the Conference. The special voting rights of the great powers were vigorously attacked by the smaller powers on the ground that the so-called veto, particularly as applied to decisions at the stage of peaceful settlement, is unreasonable and might result in many cases in the inability of the Security Council to take jurisdiction of situations the treatment of which would then be shifted outside the Security Council. For the various reasons referred to below, the great powers strongly supported the Yalta voting formula and it was ultimately accepted by the Conference without change. It constitutes Article 27 of the Charter.

During the debate on the voting formula, the smaller powers asked a series of questions as to its application, and a Subcommittee was created for the purpose of clarifying the doubts which had arisen in the Committee discussion. It was decided to prepare and address to the Sponsoring Powers a formal questionnaire on the subject. Upon the receipt of this questionnaire, the delegations of the Sponsoring Powers began the preparation of a joint statement designed to interpret the formula officially, insofar as such an interpretation of a basic constitutional provision could appropriately be made in advance of its adoption and without any practical experience as to the operation of the Organization or the Security Council.

In the course of the preparation of this statement there arose a point on which the Sponsoring Powers differed. They were at all times fully in agreement that the text of the Yalta formula must be approved without change and that the rule of unanimity of the permanent members should apply to decisions of the Security Council during the stage of peaceful settlement as well as during enforcement. However, a question of interpretation arose as to whether under the formula any one permanent member, not a party to a given dispute, could prevent the consideration and discussion of

such dispute by the Council. The Department of State between the time of the Crimea Conference and San Francisco, had issued an official statement interpreting the Yalta voting formula in the sense that no one member could prevent such discussion. The United States Delegation placed considerable importance upon this interpretation and its views were shared by the delegations of the United Kingdom, China and France. The Delegation of the Soviet Union expressed the opinion during the preparation of the joint statement that the discussion and consideration of a dispute in the Security Council should be considered a substantive, rather than a procedural, matter. In the exchange of views which occurred on this important point the United States Delegation stressed the imperative necessity of providing for full discussion and consideration of any situation brought before the Security Council before any one permanent member could prevent further action by the Security Council with respect to the dispute. After full deliberation the Delegation of the Soviet Union agreed to this viewpoint, and complete agreement was therefore reached among the great powers on this basic question.

There follows the principal portion of the joint statement of the Sponsoring Powers with which France associated itself. (The Chapters referred to in the first four quoted paragraphs are those of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.)

"1. The Yalta voting formula recognizes that the Security Council, in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, will have two broad groups of functions. Under Chapter VIII, the Council will have to make decisions which involve its taking direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to the peace, removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of breaches of the peace. It will also have to make decisions which do not involve the taking of such measures. The Yalta formula provides that the second of these two groups of decisions will be governed by a procedural vote—that is, the vote of any seven members. The first group of decisions will be governed by a qualified vote—that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members, subject to the proviso that in decisions under Sec

tion A and a part of Section C of Chapter VIII parties to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

"2. For example, under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire Section D of Chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; determine the method of selecting its President; organize itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; invite a member of the Organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that Member's interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute.

"3. Further, no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention under paragraph 2, Section A, Chapter VIII. Nor can parties to such dispute be prevented by these means from being heard by the Council. Likewise, the requirement for unanimity of the permanent members cannot prevent any member of the Council from reminding the members of the Organization of their general obligations assumed under the Charter as regards peaceful settlement of international disputes.

"4. Beyond this point, decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under Section B, Chapter VIII. This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation, or determines that the time has come to call upon states to settle their differences, or makes recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute.

"5. To illustrate: in ordering an investigation, the Council has to consider whether the investigation—which may involve calling for reports, hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inquiry,

or other means-might not further aggravate the situation. After investigation, the Council must determine whether the continuance of the situation or dispute would be likely to endanger international peace and security. If it so determines, the Council would be under obligation to take further steps. Similarly, the decision to make recommendations, even when all parties request it to do so, or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfill their obligations under the Charter, might be the first step on a course of action from which the Security Council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its responsibilities.

"6. In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to decisions of the League Council. Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by the unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of parties to a dispute under Article XV of the League Covenant. Under Article XI, under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute.

"7. The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system non-permanent members of the Security Council individually would have no 'veto'. As regards the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had. The formula proposed for the taking of action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity.

"8. It should also be remembered that under the Yalta formula the five major powers could not act by themselves, since even under the unanimity requirement any decisions of the Council would have to include the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members. In other words, it would be possible for