most important powers of the Security Council. It leaves a wide latitude to the discretion of the Security Council, which decides whether a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression exists, and having so decided is free to choose whether to make recommendations to the disputing parties or to proceed with sanctions or to do both. While there was some sentiment for laying down more precisely the duties of the Security Council in particular circumstances, an overwhelming majority of the participating governments were of the opinion that the circumstances in which threats to the peace or aggression might occur are so varied that the provision should be left as broad and as flexible as possible. The general duties of the Security Council are clear, and reliance upon the fulfilment of those duties is based, as it must inevitably be, on the good faith of its members.

ACTS OF AGGRESSION

One of the most significant lines upon which debate concerning the liberty of action of the Council proceeded, was that which concerned the proposed inclusion in the Charter of provisions with respect to determination of acts of aggression. Various amendments proposed on the subject, including those of Bolivia and the Philippine Commonwealth, offered a list of sharply-defined eventualities (such as invasion of, or attack on, another state, interfering with its internal affairs, etc.) in which the Council would be bound to determine by formula not only the existence of aggression but also the identity of the aggressor. These proposals also implied that in such cases the action of the Council would be automatic. The United States Delegation, believing that the acceptance of such a concept was most undesirable, played an active part in opposing the amendments. The Conference finally agreed that even the most simple and obvious cases of aggression might fall outside any of the formulae suggested, and, conversely, that a nation which according to a formula strictly interpreted could be deemed the offender in any particular instance might actually when all circumstances were considered-be found to be the victim of intolerable provocation. Since it was admittedly impossible to provide a complete list, the Security Council might have a tendency to consider of less importance acts of aggression not specifically covered therein. The problem was especially complicated by the

progress in modern techniques of warfare and the development of novel methods of propaganda and provocation.

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Finally, it was recognized that if the Council were bound to automatic action, the result might be that enforcement measures would be applied prematurely. The Technical Committee dealing with this tion therefore decided to hold to the provision quoted above which gives the Council ample authority to decide what constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and to decide also which of the disputing parties has been mainly at fault.

PROVISIONAL MEASURES

Related to the general question of the enforcement authority of the Security Council was the matter of provisional measures designed to prevent a deterioration of any disturbance pending the definitive recommendations or decisions of the Security Council. While such an authority was implicit in the original paragraphs which introduced the section on enforcement measures in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the Sponsoring Powers decided to propose the insertion of an entirely new provision, incorporated in the Charter as Article 40. The measures envisaged in this Article are measures which the disputing parties will be asked to undertake themselves upon recommendation of the Council, and are therefore not to be regarded as preliminary

sanctions.

It is anticipated that such provisional measures will in no wise delay the final recommendations or decisions of the Security Council, but that on the contrary compliance with them will greatly facilitate and expedite a final solution of the dispute. As specifically stated in Article 40, compliance with provisional measures will in no way prejudice "the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned”. The Security Council shall on the other hand "duly take account of failure to comply". It was felt that the language of the latter statement, which leaves a certain discretion to the Council, was preferable to a more positive statement binding the Council to direct all its measures against that side which had failed to comply. As in the matter of defining an aggressor, it was recognized that while failure to comply with provisional recommendations must be regarded as serious, the burden of provocation might nevertheless in some instances be overwhelmingly on the other side.

Provisional measures will be used only in appropriate cases. If they are not used or if they do not resolve a particular dispute, the Security Council will proceed to use other measures either non-military measures under Article 41, or military measures under Article 42. It should be pointed out that the sequence of Articles 41 and 42 does not mean that the Council must in all cases resort to non-military measures in the first instance. While ordinarily this would be the case, since crises generally take a long time to develop, in a case of sudden aggression the Security Council may resort at once to military action without proceeding through any intermediate step, and the language of Article 42 has been refined to make this clear.

THE CONCENTRATED AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL In the opinion of the United States Delegation, the effectiveness of the Organization as an instrument of international peace was at stake in two groups of amendments to Chapter VIII, Section B, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. One group was intended to permit the General Assembly to participate in the Security Council's decisions, and the others sought in various ways to enlarge the membership of the Security Council on a permanent basis. Both were eventually discarded in the interest of greater speed and certainty of enforcement action, but only after a vigorous discussion in which certain of the smaller nations, especially some which had experienced occupation by the enemy, gave strong support to the position of the great powers. It was emphasized that the Council will act only on behalf of the Organization as a whole, and that, in view of the requirement of unanimity of the permanent members and of the representative character especially of the elective members of the Council, any positive action by it may be counted upon to reflect the wishes of the majority of the Assembly.

Enforcement measures, in order to be effective, must above all be swift. The majority of the delegations agreed with the argument of the United States that it is impossible to conceive of a swift and effective intervention if the decision of the Council must be submitted to Assembly ratification, or if the measures applied by the Council are susceptible of revision by the Assembly. Such provisions, more

over, would be contrary to the basic concept of the Organization, which, as has been shown, envisages a marked distinction between the functions of the two bodies.

"NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION"

One significant and constructive change resulted from the debate, in the adoption of a wholly new Article, 44, which contains the substance of an amendment submitted at the Conference by the Delegation of Canada and strongly supported by the other "middle powers". It gives realization on the level of international security arrangements to the cherished axiom of American history: "No taxation without representation". Once the Security Council has determined on the employment of armed forces, it must give to each state asked to contribute contingents a voice in the decisions concerning the employment of its own forces. For the purpose of such decisions, in other words, the voting membership of the Security Council may be increased by one-but by no more than one-for each decision.

Here is the way Article 44 will work: If four states not represented on the Security Council are to be asked to furnish armed forces to cope with an emergency, they may, if they desire, send representatives to sit temporarily with the Council; but each of these four ad hoc representatives would participate only in the decision which concerns the use of the armed forces of his own country. No similar right is given to states when the contribution involved is only the use of facilities and assistance they have agreed to provide, and an amendment to give such a right was rejected. The Conference felt that there is a substantial difference between sending men to fight and, for example, making an airfield available.

It is particularly important to notice that the membership of the Security Council remains unchanged for all decisions leading up to and including the decisions to impose military sanctions. Thus the operation of the security machinery will not be dangerously slowed by the new provision. Moreover, the provision will not affect the use of the contingents of the great powers, which will doubtless constitute the bulk of the forces used to carry out the Council's decisions. Even the process of consulting the states that are not members of the Council should not appreciably delay the effective functioning of their contingents.

PROVISION OF ARMED FORCES

The effort to clarify and to make more adequate the procedures for making military forces available to the Security Council involved some significant departures from the Dumbarton Oaks text as concerns the special agreements for supply of forces. Even as originally drafted in the earlier document, Paragraph 5 of Chapter VIII, Section B, was novel and far-reaching. The League of Nations Covenant, the only comparable document of the past, did not contain any provision requiring member states to conclude agreements for the supply of forces to execute military sanctions. The insertion of such a provision in the Dumbarton Oaks text thus represented a long step forward.

One point in connection with these agreements which should be stressed is that, as is brought out in the report of the Rapporteur, no Member of the United Nations can be called upon to supply for the use of the Security Council forces which are not provided for in the agreements.

AGREEMENTS WITH SECURITY COUNCIL

The Conference made useful improvements over the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals with respect to these agreements and clarified and strengthened the powers of the Security Council in regard to them. The delegations of the Sponsoring Powers and France, cooperating with that of Australia, presented, and the Conference adopted, a consolidated amendment embodying the substance of several proposals.

In the first place, under a clause containing the substance of a French proposal, the facilities which are to be made available under the special agreements will include rights of passage. Such a provision was implied in the original text, but it was deemed preferable that the obligation be stated clearly. In specifically naming rights of passage, the Conference nevertheless made it clear that this phrase should not be construed restrictively.

Under another French proposal, as modified in the new amendment, the special agreements will provide for the degree of readiness of the armed forces committed and their general location, as well as for the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities