glow with unwonted ardour-that her quicker breath did not fan her lips, disparted with wonder, curiosity, and ambition? Who can doubt whether the final act was not the result of that irresistible impulse which, to this hour, is the immediate cause of compliance with any temptation that the mind has contemplated, until an impetuous tumult of excited feelings has been produced? We think that the nature of intoxication and its effects on the mind and moral powers afford a strong resemblance to the several phases of this as well as of every subsequent premeditated transgression. Accordingly, Milton, with no less philosophical than scriptural accuracy, represents that,

"In her cheek distemper flushing glow'd, [that she was]
Heighten'd as if with wine, jocund and boon."

Nor does he omit to mention "the fruit" as one "which to behold might tempt alone," or to make "the guileful tempter" descant on the physical attractions of "the goodly tree." "Loaden with fruit of fairest colours mixed,

Ruddy and gold:

And from whose boughs a savoury odor blown ;
Grateful to appetite, more pleased my sense
Than smell of sweetest fennel, or the teats
Of ewe or goat dropping with milk at even,
Unsuck'd of lamb or kid, that tend their play."

The poet thus particularizes the agency of physical causes,
"Meanwhile the hour of noon drew on, and waked
An eager appetite, raised by the smell

So savoury of that fruit, which with desire,
Inclinable now grown to touch or taste,
Solicited her longing eye."

He thus describes the completion of the act

"What hinders then

To reach, and feed at once both body and mind?

So saying, her rash hand in evil hour

Forth reaching to the fruit, she pluck'd, she ate;
Greedily she engorged without restraint,

And knew not eating death."*

Although, however, temptation of every kind proceeds and prevails by means of raising a similar disturbance in the physical part of our nature, yet moral evil achieves an easier conquest over fallen humanity, in consequence of "the weakness of the flesh," and "the law of sin" inherent in its members. It seems also probable, that every good or evil action, or even idea, serves to substantiate a corresponding structure in some or other part of the body that facilitates the repetition of such an action

* "Paradise Lost," book 9.

or idea, and that such a structure constitutes the principle of good or evil habits. It is also certain, that when once the moral principle is overwhelmed and the dominion of vicious habits is established, and especially when in such a case, our nature is subjected to physical or mental excitement, the progress of depravity may resemble that "of a bowl down a hill, that increases its motion by going, and will not be stopped or diverted," and that the enormities resulting from moral insanity may be boundless.

In pursuing our Scriptural investigations, we find the murder of Abel by his brother Cain ascribed by the writers of Scripture to "hatred;" but both hatred and murder are by St. Paul enumerated among "the works of the flesh," as also that "wrath" and those other evil passions indicated by Cain's "fallen countenance." Moses also intimates the connexion between polygamy and depravity, and evidently dates from the marriage of the sons of God (or his worshippers) with all the daughters of men (or the irreligious), whom they chose, "the great wickedness that was in the earth" before the Deluge. The most learned commentators also point out physical and moral as well as religious reasons for the prohibition of "eating blood" imposed upon the family of Noah and his descendants; and also for many of the Mosaic regulations respecting food. In the Book of Job, which comes next in our chronological order, that patriarch evinces his acquaintance with the tendency of feasting to produce impiety, and fears lest his "sons," during their several days' festival, may have "cursed" or forsaken "God in their hearts." Satan suggests that "if God would put forth his hand and touch or afflict Job's bone and his flesh, Job would curse Him to his face." Satan received permission to make the trial, and Job, in the anguish of his bodily pain, "cursed his day," and said many things, both then and afterwards, that fully illustrate the maddening effects of intense bodily suffering on the mind, &c. Eliphaz argues: "What is man that is born of a woman that he should be righteous?" Bildad asks, "How can he be clean that is born of a woman?" where the physical origin of man seems admitted as the invincible cause of his moral imperfection. Job thus expostulates with the Almighty as a reason for forbearance: "Hast thou eyes of flesh? or seest thou as man seeth?" In this early book we find the important concession that moral evil is sometimes associated with a deficiency of mental strength, or of natural understanding. "Wrath killeth the foolish man, and envy or indignation slayeth the silly one." Here, too, we find one of those numerous and diversified references to the heart which abound in the Scriptures. Job complains, "God maketh my heart soft, and the Almighty troubleth me:" which seems

like an allusion to the timidity connected with such a physical state of the organ. It is frequently considered that such references as this, and those others that will be subsequently selected out of a multitude, are to be regarded as metaphorical expressions. But we think that the remark of Sherlock applies to them that "metaphors do not arise out of nothing." May we not rather suppose that such expressions are derived from actual observations made by priests, sacrificers, embalmers, and diviners?

Returning to the historical books of Scripture, and omitting the instances quoted in the previous paper, we find the immoral effects of the excess of wine remarkably illustrated in the case of the two priests Nadab and Abihu, who together with all the people, had experienced terror at the manifestation of the Divine presence, yet shortly afterwards attempted to celebrate the divine service in a state of inebriation, and were miraculously punished with instant death. The idolatry of Solomon himself is ascribed to his voluptuousness and old age. The writer of the book Ecclesiasticus also remarks that "He bowed his loins unto women, and by his body he was brought into subjection." Repeated references occur to the debasing effects of sensuality on the moral principles. It is particularly enjoined on "kings and princes not to drink wine or strong drink, lest they drink and forget the law, and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted." "Whoredom and wine, and new wine, take the heart." The slave of lewdness thus testifies to its tendency to lead to still further depravities, "I was almost in all evil in the midst of the congregation and assembly."

(To be continued.)

ART. VI.-WILLIAM DOVE.

THE much-agitated question respecting this man's moral and legal responsibility has been determinately and irrevocably settled by the public executioner! William Dove was hanged on the 8th of August. On the evening of the 1st of August the editor of this journal had a lengthened interview with Mr. Barret, Dove's solicitor, and Mr. Morley, one of the witnesses for the Crown. Mr. Morley was only called upon at the trial to depose to the fact of Mrs. Dove's death being caused by strychnine. No question was put to this witness respecting the prisoner's state of mind. Mr. Morley, however, entertaining a strong conviction of Dove's irresponsibility, considered it to be his duty, after his conviction, to cooperate with Mr. Barret and

others in making strenuous efforts to save him from the gallows. With this humane object Mr. Morley, accompanied by Mr. Barret, came to London; and it was at this time that the discussion referred to in the subjoined letter took place. The letter explains itself.

23, Cavendish-square, Aug. 1st, 1856.

MY DEAR SIR,-Since my interview with you and Mr. Morley, late on Friday night, I have given the subject of our earnest conversation and long discussion, much anxious thought and consideration.

You will recollect that at that interview I had no hesitation in expressing to you and Mr. Morley my decided and unqualified opinion respecting Dove's legal criminality. I have felt since his trial and conviction no sympathy for him, being strongly impressed with a notion that, if the punishment of death were under any circumstances justifiable, it should be carried into effect in Dove's case. I am bound, however, to confess, that after carefully and dispassionately weighing the additional facts laid before me by Mr. Morley and yourself illustrative of Dove's mental history, I have been induced somewhat to modify my opinion of the case. The words "defective intellect," embodied by the jury in their verdict, as justifying their recommendation of Dove to mercy, are not, according to my apprehension, accurately descriptive or expressive of Dove's mental condition.

His case is one of imbecility. If Dove's intellect were only "defective" or weak in the popular signification of these terms, he ought to be viewed as a responsible person. It would be fatal to the best interests of society if mere "defect of intellect" were considered in God our courts of law as a valid excuse or plea in criminal cases. forbid that so dangerous a doctrine should ever be propounded by those usually called upon to aid, by their scientific testimony, the administration of justice. If this doctrine be advanced, by what means are we to gauge the strength of the human intellect? Who is to decide upon the psychological test or standard of mental or legal responsibility in such cases? The great mass of criminals have admitted weak intellects, defective understandings, perverted moral sense, and no just Such persons recognition of the difference between meum and tuum.

are, nevertheless, rightly considered as responsible for their actions, and are justly punished when they violate the law.

I think, however, the case of Dove may safely be removed from the category of healthy, sane, or even weak' "-minded men.

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His conduct through life has been remarkably characteristic of imbecility or idiocy. It appears that his mental infirmity manifested itself in early life, and that those who were engaged in his educational training perceived a remarkable and obvious natural defect in the constitution of his intellect. His actions were not merely those of a wicked, vicious, or eccentric man, but they evidently sprung out of a stunted, irregularly developed, congenitally defective, and badly organized brain and mind.

If Dove had been made, a short period before murdering his wife, the subject of a commission of lunacy, the question at issue being his competency to manage his property, what, I ask, would have been the verdict of the jury? If the fact of his writing letters in blood to the devil, his faith in the supernatural power and predictions of Harrison, the wizard; the tremendous influence which this weird" person obtained over him; his cruelties to animals; his having threatened to shoot his father, and afterwards himself; his cutting down his corn when quite green simply because his neighbour had cut his down when ripe; his recklessness of conduct, want of moral perception, his inability in early life to acquire ordinary knowledge, and other facts sworn to in evidence as illustrative of his sad mental state, were laid before an intelligent jury empannelled to try the question of Dove's mental soundness and ability to manage himself and his affairs, can any reasonable doubt be entertained as to the result of the inquiry? Upon evidence considerably less satisfactory and convincing than that adduced in Dove's case, I have seen juries unanimously decide as to the mental unsoundness of individuals. Consider, for example, the celebrated case of Mrs. Cumming. This lady was pronounced insane by a jury, among whom were several county magistrates, simply because she was fond of the society of a few favourite cats, had an impaired memory (no wonderful fact, considering her bodily indisposition and advanced age), and was alleged to entertain a strong aversion to some members of her family who had by force dragged her out of her own house, and confined her in a lunatic asylum. From my knowledge of the conduct of juries, I feel convinced that Dove never would have escaped the verdict of insanity if the question for their consideration had been of a civil, and not of a criminal, character—one of property, not of life.

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If Dove's mind was so unsound as to render him manifestly incompetent to manage himself or his affairs, ought he to be viewed as altogether responsible for any criminal act he might be guilty of? I use the word altogether" advisedly; for although I am willing to acquiesce in the wishes expressed by yourself, Mr. Morley, and others, to state in writing an opinion adverse to carrying into effect the extreme penalty of the law in Dove's case, I am bound to say that I shall deeply regret if he were in consequence of his alleged "defect of intellect" to be exempt from punishment or penal servitude for the remainder of his life. I have no hesitation, however, in asserting that it would be a great and fatal mistake and a grave fact of inhumanity to hang this wretched man. Considering the conclusive evidence of Dove's mental imbecility, his life, I think, ought not to be forfeited on the gallows.

The absence of all symptoms of delusion or hallucination renders the case different from those of ordinary insanity with which our Courts of law have to deal, and consequently to those not practically cognizant with the insane, the somewhat anomalous case of Dove appears one most difficult of comprehension. The eye of the practical psychological physician views in this case one of modified responsibility. As in many instances of indictment for capital crimes, the jury records,