poor;

injury upon him, and murdered her while under that delv sion, he would be none the less amenable to punishment. Therefore, according to the law as laid down by the highest authorities, to exempt a man from the penal consequences of his actions those actions being contrary to law-the jury must be of opinion that at the time he did the act, he was not conscious that the act was one he ought not to commit. Of course that also meant that it was an act prohibited by law; because a man might imagine that there were some things perfectly right which were yet prohibited by law. For example, some persons might think it perfectly right to rob the rich to give to the but if a person with such an opinion were to commit a theft, he would nevertheless be liable to the penal consequences of his acts. But if he not only thought it would be right so to do, but that he was not doing anything wrong or liable to punishment for it, then they should acquit him on the ground of insanity. Suppose a man imagined that another had done him an injury, and waylaid and murdered him, that imaginary injury would not be an excuse for the crime. But supposing the injury were real, and not imaginary, that would not justify him in taking away life; if he did so, he must suffer for it. Punishment was not merely administered in reference to an act done, but a criminal was punished to correct him and to hold out an example to others. If they punished a man who did not know he had done wrong, what example would that be to the world? People would say they had punished a man who was unconscious of wrong. But if they punished a man who possessed evil propensities and gratified them, they would deter him for the future, and also hold out a warning to others not to follow his example. If they let it go forth to the world that they would not punish a man who had a propensity or desire to do wrong, they would take away from persons in that position one of the things that would have prevented them from indulging in that propensity. Hence, to a man of weak mind and strong animal propensities, the knowledge that the law would not punish him would be to take from him one of the first and most powerful reasons for not repeating his crime."

According to the dicta of this Judge, no man is legally irresponsible unless he is in a state of absolute dementia, or, in other words, to use the language of Mr. Baron Bramwell, he labours "under such a defect of reason, and such a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature of the act." In order to establish a valid plea of insanity in criminal cases, if this doctrine is to be held as orthodox, a man must be proved to be idiotic or demented. The great majority, or at least one-third of the insane actually in confinement at this moment, are, according to Mr. Justice Bramwell's exposition of the law, legally responsible

for their actions, for they are clearly conscious of the "nature of their acts." It is a great mistake to imagine that persons decidedly insane, and undoubtedly irresponsible, have no knowledge of the "nature of their acts," and are not also fully cognisant that what they often do is both morally and legally "wrong."

We solemnly enter our protest against the doctrine that persons" partially insane," are to be viewed and treated as responsible beings! Science, justice, and humanity, cry out loudly against so fatal and monstrous a dogma. "Suppose," says Baron Bramwell, "a man imagined that another had done him an injury, and waylaid and murdered him, that imaginary injury would not be an excuse for the crime."

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We maintain, in the face of the world, and in the teeth of men of science practically acquainted with the phenomena of insanity, that it would be an iniquitous, unjustifiable, and an indefensible act to hang a man who committed murder under a delusion that the victim had "done him an imaginary injury." This was the character of M'Naughten's insanity: he shot Mr. Drummond under the influence of a delusion of this kind, and he was properly acquitted on the ground of insanity. Westron shot Mr. Waugh under somewhat similar circumstances, and his life was spared. In Westron's case there was some semblance of foundation for his impression relative to Mr. Waugh, although, not according to our judgment sufficient to justify his acquittal. The jury, however, recommended Westron to mercy on account of his predisposition to insanity," and he escaped from the gallows. We presume that the insanity of this man is now an acknowledged fact, for we saw him not many days back, herding with some thirty or forty murderers in the criminal den of Bethlem Hospital! We feel that we are exposing ourselves to much obloquy, abuse, and animadversion for venturing to breathe a word against the strictly legal view of the question under consideration, raising a voice in favour of the criminal "partially insane," and going counter to popular clamour and prejudice. But we must not be deterred from an exposition of what we consider to be agreeable to the principles of SCIENCE, and in unison with the sacred cause of TRUTH, by any apprehensions like those referred to. All feelings of a personal character dwindle into utter nothingness when placed in juxtaposition with the great and eternal principles of justice and humanity. It is our duty, as public journalists, to expound what we conceive to be the right, philosophical, scientific, and practical view of the question of insanity in relation to jurisprudence, with the hope that the day is not far distant when men of great legal eminence will not only acknowledge the truth of our views, but act upon them when engaged in the solemn administration of the law.

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ART. VII.-TRIUNE MAN.

THE INAUGURAL DISCOURSE* DELIVERED AT THE OPENING OF THE LAST SESSION OF THE LONDON HOSPITAL MEDICAL COLLEGE.

BY ANDREW CLARK, M.D.

"And Godt said, let us make man in our image and after OUR likeness."

Genesis, c. i. v. 26. "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."—Romans, c. i. v. 20.

GENTLEMEN,-It is a great occasion which calls us together today. Fraught with the deepest interests of individuals, and through them of humanity, its importance cannot be overrated, nor its objects too zealously enforced. It is the starting point of one of those great journeys which, collectively, constitute the business of existence, and the design and conduct of which will not only determine for ourselves the final failure or success of the end for which we live, but will reflect upon others also the good or the evil which must arise from duties neglected or fulfilled.

It is an occasion which may prove distasteful to the unthinking, frivolous, and idle; but it is one which must prove peculiarly welcome to the earnest in object, the heroic in self-denial, the resolute in will-to all those who are learning to feel and to know that man is born into the world to do something else than to eat, and to sleep, and to drink, and to die; that life is not an arena of pleasure, but a field of battle; that the end of existence is not the fullest enjoyment of its sensuous attributes, but the completest development of all that is true, and therefore divine, in man.

We meet, gentlemen, to inaugurate the business of another academic year; to cast another stone upon that cairn which has been raised by the long labours of those who have gone before, which stands behind us now the lasting memorial of all that we venerate within these walls, and which speaks to us in tones

This discourse is printed, with some verbal alterations, as it was delivered. It is published reluctantly, and only at the renewed entreaties of several correspondents. It was written under unfavourable circumstances, and within a few days of its delivery. It is inadequate to the importance of the subject with which it deals it leaves undeveloped the theory of man which it promulgates; and fails to define the nature and limits of the relations which that theory holds to the science and art of medicine. I have on these points, however, sacrificed my own opinion to that of others, in the earnest hope that the Discourse may suggest something of what it fails to convey.

In this and several other passages of Scripture the substantive here translated "God," occurs in the original in the plural form, and might be rendered "Gods," or, more literally, the "adorable ones. Hence, (c. iii. v. 22,) "God said, behold,

the man has become as one of us."

inarticulate, but felt, of what will touch every hopeful heart today-of many a past beginning and its end-of lofty resolve and base expediency-of tedious self-denial and low indulgence. of earnest effort and vacillating desire-of ardent struggle and cowardly compromise-of glorious triumph and merciless but deserved defeat.

Present wisdom is often but the reflexion of past teachings transmitted through new conditions. Humanity is ever the same, though the circumstances under which it manifests itself may differ. It is ever repeating, renewing, recombining, reproducing. And so to-day we are met-like those who have met here before for the same purpose-to begin our new work, which, like theirs of the old time, is fraught with the same dangers, pregnant with the same promise, and stakes upon its success all that is true-otherwise all that is desirable, worthy, or great in life. Now if we would learn how to shun the rocks and quicksands upon which others have been wrecked or broken into useless fragments; if we would learn how to realize something more of the possible glory of humanity than the compass of mercenary ends, the enjoyment of unsubstantial pleasures, or the miserable consciousness of an unmerited repute; if we would know how to fulfil God's purpose in our creation, and to become justified at the close of life before God and our fellow men, we shall not only listen to those inarticulate histories which now hopefully and mournfully come back upon us from the past, but we shall pause, and at the outset of this business which we are about to undertake, we shall solemnly, reverently, with purged hearts and earnest minds, address to ourselves these questions: What is this work which we have before us to do? What are the instruments of this work? How are we rightly to do it?

In addressing myself to the consideration of these questions, and attempting such a rough reply to them as the occasion will permit, I undertake a task of no common difficulty. There are assembled here to-day the young and inexperienced, to whom knowledge is an opening mystery and a strong desire; the student who has already penetrated somewhat into the depths of things, and has begun to speculate about their meanings and relations; the gifted contemporary with his abundant knowledge and ripe reason, casting about for undeveloped truth; and the elders and fathers among us to whom knowledge and experience have been in some sort realized and consummated, and from whose lips I would gladly learn wisdom. One has his sanguine dreams, another his prophet-oracle of materialism. Some have their eclectics and their reasoned theory; others their rooted dogmas, their settled systems, and their method.

The object of all may be the same, but each has his different medium of vision and point of interest; each his own peculiar standard of judgment, and veracious,* or veritable test of success. To combine these conflicting elements into one, by enlisting sympathies and appealing to interests at once great in themselves and common to all, and to break ground upon a subject which constitutes the underlying greatness of humanity, the everlasting inheritance of individual men, and the medium of that perfect insight through which we are "to know even as we are known," is an attempt which needs, and for which I crave, your most generous indulgence.

In considering and answering the great questions which we have preferred to ourselves for solution, we shall have to go somewhat out of the beaten track pursued on such occasions, to lead you into what will prove to many new and untrodden fields of thought, to bring to light the fallacies and dangers of that gross materialism which pervades and pollutes the current of modern thought, and to lift up our voice, feeble as it is, in support of that view of the spiritual constitution of man which is being rapidly engulphed in the whirlpools of a drivelling and insensate reason. Questions of this kind lie at the root of all knowledge, all being, all life; and, for these to be sound, their foundations must be sure. I cannot apologise, therefore, for leading you into discussions upon the issues of which so much is staked. If my arguments should carry no conviction with them, and the hypothesis I advocate be declared untrue, they will not be valueless; they will provoke you to reflection, they will call forth your higher faculties into exercise, and they will make you think about the truth and seek it. However imperfectly these views may be embodied, I am in earnest about them, and if I fail in impressing you with their truth, I shall yet believe it is from no imperfection in the subject, but from impotence in the speaker.

The burden of the business in which we are about to engage is knowledge; and that our subsequent reflections may be endowed with unity and coherence, I shall speak to you in the first place of knowledge in general; and in the second, of that particular kind of knowledge which in this College it is our privilege to communicate and yours to acquire.

To comprehend the full significance of knowledge,-to perceive

* A friend, with the best intentions, informed me at the close of the delivery of this lecture, that these terms were synonymous. I apprehend, however, that the one has a very different meaning from the other. Veracity is the correspondence between the assertion of a man and his conviction, opinion, or belief. Truth is the correspondence between the assertion of a man and the absolute reality or fact. statement may be veracious (i. e. believed by the maker of it to be true) and yet not veritable-i. e. true.

A