are we to invite that particular government to an inter-American conference and be representative of the people of that State? When has this new de facto government met the conditions which would make it just to accept it as representing the people of that State and in that capacity empowered to sign a treaty which will bind not only that government but all succeeding governments? The importance of this question is realized when you remember that a treaty duly signed and ratified by a government binds the country itself, and that means all succeeding governments. But suppose that the new government really does not represent the people of that State. Would it be just in point of democratic ideals to regard that State as bound by the action of this so-called government? It is a complicated problem, and it is difficult to state it in a few words.

The Juridical Committee in Rio de Janeiro had discussed certain rules to be followed. The idea of the Committee in Rio was that if rules were established, and if consultation took place among the American Governments on the basis of those rules, the abuses would be avoided. The abuses that have taken place in the past have been owing to the fact that a strong power has granted or refused recognition to a new government coming into power by revolution on the condition of its acceptance of certain conditions not bearing directly upon its de facto character. That is clearly an abuse of the procedure of recognition. But in view of that abuse some States have tried to abolish the procedure of recognition completely. The Mexican government reiterated at Bogotá its long-standing doctrine of 1930, called the Estrada Doctrine, which seeks to elim inate the whole procedure, and to lay down the rule that when a new government comes in other governments either continue or discontinue diplomatic rela

tions with it, but they must not humiliate it by going through the formality of recognition. A State, it is said, has a right to revolution, a right to change governments in any way it pleases, and it does not like to have other States recognize it as if they were doing it a favor. No agreement could be reached at Bogotá, so the Conference referred the matter to the new Council of Jurists, hoping that it could find the solution which the Juridical Committee could not find. I wish the new Council of Jurists well in its attempt to formulate rules on that subject. It should be done, and in my judgment it can be done. But the time to do it is not at a big conference, where it is very hard for the delegates to detach themselves from the policies of their governments and to approach the subject in a constructive manner.

Much was said about the defense of democracy at Bogotá. The Guatemalan Government had introduced at the Conference at Mexico City in 1945 a project calling for the refusal to recognize antidemocratic governments. The Juridical Committee, to which the project was referred, could not accept it, saying that the term "anti-democratic government" was too vague. At the Conference itself several delegations supported the idea of outlawing subversive activities carried on by Communist organizations. A resolution to that effect was finally adopted.. It is called The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America.3 It condemns in thei name of the law of nations interference by any foreign power in the public life of the nations of the American continent. Further, the resolution condemns the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international Communism or any totalitarian doctrines. The signatory States go on to say that they Resolution 32 of the Final Act.

are going to adopt measures necessary to eradicate and prevent activities directed or instigated by foreign governments, meaning of course, Communist governments; and to suppress subversive propaganda, threats, or any other form of pressure which might disturb the sovereign right of the people to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations; and that they are going to exchange full information on the subject.

And now a last word, on a difficult subject. A number of the Latin American States felt that the time had come to condemn the existence in America, which we must remember includes North, Central, and South America, of colonies of foreign powers. A resolution was adopted after at great deal of controversy on the subject. Brazil dissented. The title of the resolution is Colonies and Occupied Territories in America and the Creation of the American Committee on Dependent Territories. A long preamble states that the emancipation of America will not be complete as long as peoples and regions subject to a colonial regime or territories occupied by nonAmerican countries remain on the continent. It is very comprehensive. The resolution itself, which follows the long preamble, is is not so far-reaching. It creates what is called an American Committee on Dependent Territories to centralize the study of the problem of the existence of dependent and occupied territories in order to find an adequate solution to the question. There was nothing in that part of the resolution to which objection 4 Resolution 33 of the Final Act.

might be taken. It was the strong statements in the preamble which were open to question. While the United States re fused to sign the resolution, the Brazilian delegation was more outspoken. The Brazilians made a formal statement in which they said that while the declaration un doubtedly expressed the common aspiration of the Republics of the continent and under other circumstances would merit support, the delegation of Brazil considered that an inter-American conference was not the appropriate occasion for debating a question that affected the interests of countries outside the continent. That is an interesting point of view. Every one of the American States is a member of the United Nations, having ac cepted the Charter. Under that Charte they are obligated in case of a controvers with any foreign power, any other State and that would mean Great Britain, o France, or Holland, to submit the cor. troversy to the procedures enumerated ir the Charter. Brazil felt that an interAmerican conference was not the place to settle a question which was of internationa import. In view of the above circumstances, the delegation of Brazil considered that it could not legitimately adhere to the declaration.

The foregoing is a survey in very summary form of the juridical and political problems of the Conference. Any one of them could be made the subject of a whole lecture, and I wish that that were possible. Some day in the fall when we inaugurate our new system of public lectures, we may be able to go into details of each problem.

ARTICLE I. The High Contracting Parties, solemnly reaffirming their commitments made in earlier international conventions and declarations, as well as in the Charter of the United Nations, agree to refrain from the threat or the use of force, or from any other means of coercion for the settlement of their controversies, and to have recourse at all times to pacific procedures.

ARTICLE II. The High Contracting Parties recognize the obligation to settle international controversies by regional pacific procedures before referring them to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Consequently, in the event that a controversy arises between two or more signatory states which, , in the opinion of the parties, cannot be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels, the parties bind themselves to use the procedures established in the present Treaty, in the manner and under the conditions provided for in the following articles, or, alternatively, such special procedures as, in their opinion, will permit them to arrive at a solution.

ARTICLE III. The order of the pacific procedures established in the present Treaty does not signify that the parties may not have recourse to the procedure which they consider most appropriate in each case, or that they should use all these procedures, or that any of them have preference over others, except as expressly provided.

ARTICLE IV. Once any pacific procedure has been initiated, whether by agreement between the parties or in fulfillment of the present Treaty or a previous pact, no other procedure may be commenced until that procedure is concluded.

ARTICLE V. The aforesaid procedures may not be applied to matters which, by their nature, are

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within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. the parties are not in agreement as to whether the controversy concerns a matter of domestic jurisdiction, this preliminary question shall be submitted to decision by the International Court of Justice, at the request of any of the parties. ARTICLE VI. The aforesaid procedures, furBOL. thermore, may not be applied to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or EC. by arbitral award or by decision of an international court, or which are governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE VII. The High Contracting Parties bind themselves not to make diplomatic repre- AR sentations in order to protect their nationals, or to refer a controversy to a court of international V.. jurisdiction for that purpose, when the said nationals have had available the means to place their casebefore competent domestic courts of the respective state.

ARTICLE VIII. Neither recourse to pacific means for the solution of controversies, nor the recommendation of their use, shall, in the case of an armed attack, be ground for delaying the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Chapter Two

PROCEDURES OF GOOD OFFICES AND MEDIATION

ARTICLE IX. The procedure of good offices consists in the attempt by one or more American Governments not parties to the controversy, or by one or more eminent citizens of any American State which is not a party to the controversy, to bring the parties together, so as to make it possible for them to reach an adequate solution between themselves.

ARTICLE X. Once the parties have been brought together and have resumed direct negotiations, no further action is to be taken by the states or citizens that have offered their good offices or have accepted an invitation to offer them; they may, however, by agreement between the parties, be present at the negotiations.

ARTICLE XI. The procedure of mediation consists in the submission of the controversy to

one or more American Governments not parties to the controversy, or to one or more eminent citizens of any American State not a party to the controversy. In either case the mediator or mediators shall be chosen by mutual agreement between the parties.

ARTICLE XII. The functions of the mediator or mediators shall be to assist the parties in the settlement of controversies in the simplest and most direct manner, avoiding formalities and seeking an acceptable solution. No report shall be made by the mediator and, so far as he is concerned, the proceedings shall be wholly confidential.

ARTICLE XIII. In the event that the High Contracting Parties have agreed to the procedure of mediation but are unable to reach an agreement within two months on the selection of the mediator or mediators, or no solution to the controversy has been reached within five months after mediation has begun, the parties shall have recourse without delay to any one of the other procedures of peaceful settlement established in the present Treaty.

Article XIV. The High Contracting Parties may offer their mediation, either individually or jointly, but they agree not to do so while the controversy is in process of settlement by any of the other procedures established in the present Treaty.

Chapter Three

PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATION AND CONCILIATION ARTICLE XV. The procedure of investigation and conciliation consists in the submission of the controversy to a Commission of Investigation and Conciliation, which shall be established in accordance with the provisions established in subsequent articles of the present Treaty, and which shall function within the limitations prescribed therein.

ARTICLE XVI. The party initiating the procedure of investigation and conciliation shall request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation. The Council for its part shall take immediate steps to convoke it.

Once the request to convoke the Commission has been received, the controversy between the parties shall immediately be suspended, and the parties shall refrain from any act that might make conciliation more difficult. To that end, at the request of one of the parties, the Council of the Organization of American States may, pending the convocation of the Commission, make appropriate recommendations to the parties.

ARTICLE XVII. Each of the High Contracting Parties may appoint, by means of a bilateral agreement consisting of a simple exchange of notes with each of the other signatories, two members of the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation, only one of whom may be of its own nation- ! ality. The fifth member, who shall perform the functions of chairman, shall be selected immedi ately by common agreement of the members thus appointed.

Any one of the contracting parties may remove members whom it has appointed, whether nationals or aliens; at the same time it shall appoint the successor. If this is not done, the removal shall be considered as not having been made. The appointments and substitutions shall be registered with the Pan American Union, which shall endeavor to ensure that the commissions maintain their full complement of five members.

ARTICLE XVIII. Without prejudice to the provisions of the foregoing article, the Pan American Union shall draw up a permanent panel of American conciliators, to be made up as follows:

a) Each of the High Contracting Parties shall appoint, for three-year periods, two of their nationals who enjoy the highest reputation for fairness, competence and integrity;

b) The Pan American Union shall request the candidates to indicate their acceptance, and it shall place on the panel of conciliators the names of the persons who so notify it;

c) The governments may, at any time, fill vacancies occurring among their appointees; and they may reappoint their members.

ARTICLE XIX. In the event that a controversy should arise between two or more American States that have not appointed the Commission referred to in Article XVII, the following procedure shall be observed:

a) Each party shall designate two members from the permanent panel of American conciliators, who are not of the same nationality as the appointing party.

b) These four members shall in turn choose a fifth member, from the permanent panel, not of the nationality of either party.

c) If, within a period of thirty days following the notification of their selection, the four members are unable to agree upon a fifth member, they shall each separately list the conciliators composing the permanent panel, in order of their preference, and upon comparison of the lists so prepared, the one who first receives a majority of votes shall be

declared elected. The person so elected shall perform the duties of chairman of the Commission.

ARTICLE XX. In convening the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation, the Council of the Organization of American States shall determine the place where the Commission shall meet. Thereafter, the Commission may determine the place or places in which it is to function, taking into account the best facilities for the performance of its work.

ARTICLE XXI. When more than two states are involved in the same controversy, the states that hold similar points of view shall be considered as a single party. If they have different interests they shall be entitled to increase the number of conciliators in order that all parties may have equal representation. The chairman shall be elected in the manner set forth in Article XIX.

ARTICLE XXII. It shall be the duty of the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation to clarify the points in dispute between the parties and to endeavor to bring about an agreement between them upon mutually acceptable terms. The Commission shall institute such investigations of the facts involved in the controversy as it may deem necessary for the purpose of proposing acceptable bases of settlement.

ARTICLE XXIII. It shall be the duty of the parties to facilitate the work of the Commission and to supply it, to the fullest extent possible, with all useful documents and information, and also to use the means at their disposal to enable the Commission to summon and hear witnesses or experts and perform other tasks in the territories of the parties, in conformity with their laws.

ARTICLE XXIV. During the proceedings before the Commission, the parties shall be represented by plenipotentiary delegates or by agents, who shall serve as intermediaries between them and the Commission. The parties and the Commission may use the services of technical advisers and experts.

ARTICLE XXV. The Commission shall conclude its work within a period of six months from the date of its installation; but the parties may, by mutual agreement, extend the period.

ARTICLE XXVI. If, in the opinion of the parties, the controversy relates exclusively to questions of fact, the Commission shall limit itself to investigating such questions, and shall conclude its activities with an appropriate report.

ARTICLE XXVII. If an agreement is reached by conciliation, the final report of the Commission shall be limited to the text of the agreement and

shall be published after its transmittal to the parties, unless the parties decide otherwise. If no agreement is reached, the final report shall contain a summary of the work of the Commission; it shall be delivered to the parties, and shall be published after the expiration of six months unless the parties decide otherwise. In both cases, the final report shall be adopted by a majority vote. ARTICLE XXVIII. The report and conclusions of the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation shall not be binding upon the parties, either with respect to the statement of facts or in regard to questions of law, and they shall have no other character than that of recommendations submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facilitate a friendly settlement of the controversy.

ARTICLE XXIX. The Commission of Investigation and Conciliation shall transmit to each of the parties, as well as to the Pan American Union, certified copies of the minutes of its proceedings. These minutes shall not be published unless the parties so decide.

ARTICLE XXX. Each member of the Commission shall receive financial remuneration, the amount of which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties. If the parties do not agree thereon, the Council of the Organization shall determine the remuneration. Each government shall pay its own expenses and an equal share of the common expenses of the Commission, including the aforementioned remunerations.

Chapter Four AR. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

ARTICLE XXXI. In conformity with Article .5. 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them concerning:

a) The interpretation of a treaty;

b) Any question of international law;
c) The existence of any fact which, if estab-
lished, would constitute the breach of an inter-
national obligation;

d) The nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.

ARTICLE XXXII. When the conciliation procedure previously established in the present Treaty or by agreement of the parties does not lead to a solution, and the said parties have not agreed