At a later date, Count Czernin's revelations confirmed the rumours to this effect which were prevalent at that time; while Ludendorff actually threatened AustriaHungary with war, if she refused to continue to fight in conjunction with Germany.

This was the true condition of the 'closely-knit' alliance. Its lack of cohesion was becoming more and more real, and threatened to become visible also, a state of affairs which, having regard to the progress of the Entente, was extremely dangerous.

This lack of cohesion, however, as might be imagined, had not arisen for the first time during the war. Although latent, it existed from the beginning of their closer relations. Whilst the entire population of Germany, with the exception of the 4 million Poles and other Slavs, had been of one mind in going to war, and in spite of all particularist and party differences had felt themselves to be a national unit, in Austria-Hungary at least one-half of her 53 millions of people had joined the quarrel with reluctance and hidden bitterness. To go to war under such conditions was undoubtedly to incur a grave risk. With continued successes and the prospect of an early and victorious peace, the risk might have been justified; but, with the war dragging on indefinitely, under increasingly difficult and exhausting food conditions, and with no hope of a satisfactory conclusion, there could be no possibility of justifying it to these discordant associates.

This difference in the political and psychological equipment of the two countries in arms was bound to make itself felt in course of time. It can be realised with more conviction and impressiveness by comparing the allies to two travellers journeying along the same road. The one, Germany, to all appearances is a giant in health and strength; the other, Austria-Hungary, although a commanding figure, is burdened with an enfeebled heart and unsteady nerves. The one strides onward with confidence and eager feet, exulting in the knowledge that the thoughts of those at home are with him on his journey. The other journeys with a heavy heart and weariness, oppressed by the thought that onehalf of his people at home are opposed to his purpose and, even, are plotting evil against him behind his back.

Since the road grew ever steeper and the obstacles to the common goal-the 'Victory Peace'-became more and more frequent and difficult, that happened which was bound to happen: the strength of the weaker comrade failed. He was only able to keep pace with his companion by exerting all his power of will.

The German-to maintain the simile a little longersaw that his companion's strength was exhausted, but he paid no attention to his appeals when besought to stop; instead, with threatening mien and cruel words, he forced his Austrian associate to continue the march. For a time this was possible; the weakened comrade summoned the last remnants of his strength, and bravely withstood the temptations beckoning to him, and promising rest and refreshment; for he did not wish to be held faithless. So, struggling and stumbling, he dragged along; until, with a loud cry, he sank unconscious. All adjurations, all assistance now were useless; his companion kicked him contemptuously aside, called him traitor and went on his lonely way, in bitter anger and obstinate determination, although forced to admit to himself that he, too, could never reach the goal. Onward he went, heavily, until an abyss yawned before him. The spirits of Revolution, who dwelt below, had destroyed the bridge on which he relied. Then the strong man also fell in despair to the ground, and awaited in impotent fury the death-blow from his enemy.

Such is the tragic history of those fellow-creatures, those allies in deed rather than in spirit, Germany and Austria-Hungary.*

When, in the autumn of 1918, Austria-Hungary collapsed under the united onslaught of the nationalist and socialist revolution, the shameful word 'Treachery' was shouted not only by the public of Germany, but also by that of Austria-in so far as it was German; for instead of repudiating this insult as an outrageous calumny, the German Austrians-with the German Nationalists and Social Democrats at their head-agreed

* See also my articles, 'Die beiden Weggenossen' ('The Two FellowTravellers') in the Augsburger Post Zeitung' of Sept. 18, 1919, and 'Oesterreich-Ungarns Verrat' ('Austria-Hungary's "Betrayal "") in the 'Nenen Zürcher Zeitung' of Aug. 29, 1919.

with it vociferously, and did not care that in doing so they were challenging historical truth.

Austria-Hungary would, indeed, have betrayed Germany if, without warning, she had left her suddenly in the lurch. But she did not do that; on the contrary, as early as the beginning of 1917 she had freely acknowledged to her German ally that, in view of the economic and national dangers menacing her from within, she would not be able to hold out' much longer, and indicated the autumn of 1917 as the latest date to which she would be able to remain her effective ally. This fact is stated in black and white in Count Czernin's 2 memorandum, dated April 1917, to the Emperor Karl, in which occurs the following passage:

·

'Your Majesty, employing me as your responsible mouthpiece, has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to separate us from our allies, because Your Majesty is incapable of acting dishonourably. But, at the same time, Your Majesty has instructed me to inform the Ministers of the State of our ally the German Empire that our strength is exhausted, and that they will not be able to count on our support beyond the end of the summer.'

In the spring of 1917-note the date!-the German Government, therefore, was aware that Austria-Hungary would only be able to carry on the war until the autumn of that year. When, in the autumn of 1918 -that is to say, a whole year later-this prediction was verified, Germany had been given a period of over one and three-quarter years in which to adapt herself to the new requirement and to make the necessary arrangements. Germany must have known that Austria-Hungary was not indulging in poor excuses when she declared herself incapable of carrying on. Therefore, 'Ultra posse nemo obligatur.' Instead of their inveighing in Germany against the Dual Monarchy's treachery and desertion, they should rather have been grateful to Austria-Hungary for having made the tremendous sacrifice involved in co-operating with Germany for a whole year longer than had been promised. No other nation, in Austria-Hungary's place, faced with the dilemma of breaking away from her ally or of going to ruin, would have chosen the first alternative; we now

see that the Emperor Karl and his advisers should have placed their duty to the Empire, and to the welfare and future of 53 millions of subjects, before their obligations to the alliance. Enmeshed by a malicious fate in this conflict of duties, the Emperor decided for loyalty to Germany, and so proved himself an honourable man, indeed, and a faithful friend; but also, like his predecessor, the Emperor Franz Josef at Ischl, a shortsighted and imprudent statesman.

The accusation of treachery and of responsibility for the collapse of Germany made by his ally against the Emperor Karl, was the more unjust and infuriating because he had ample opportunity, during the war, if he had wished, to betray the nation that cast those reproaches at him. There was no lack of seductive offers from the enemy! Moreover, actual betrayal would not have been necessary; all required of him was to break away from Germany, a course of action which almost any other ruler in his place would have followed from motives of prudence. How dazzling these offers were has been shown in Count Revertera's revelations.*

It was not only scandalous and unjust on the part of Germany to endeavour to lay the blame for her collapse on the Emperor Karl's shoulders, it was also colossal folly, for he was the very man who had pointed out to them the road which, if they had followed his counsel, would have led to peace; not, indeed, the Victory Peace,' of which, in their megalomania, the Pan-Germans and the people they had misled were ever dreaming, but a moderate and reasonable peace, which would have saved Germany from the shameful treaty of Versailles. As early as 1915, Karl, at that time Archduke and heir to the throne, had pointed out to the German Headquarters, that if Germany would give up Alsace and Lorraine, the frightful wholesale slaughter of this war would quickly cease. Also, when Karl became Emperor, he returned to the subject, and endeavoured to rouse

As Emperor Karl's confidant, Count Revertera conducted with the French emissary, Count Armand, the negotiations between AustriaHungary and France, which were opened in the spring of 1917 in Switzer. land, in a non-official and secret manner. Count Revertera published details of these negotiations in the Historisch-Politische Blätter,' No. 9, in the spring of 1928.

Vol. 239.-No. 474.

B

the Kaiser and his advisers from the perilous illusions to which they were the prey.

In these endeavours Count Czernin supported him so far as he was able. In Czernin's memorandum, already referred to, which ostensibly was addressed to the Emperor but was intended for the German Headquarters, he indicated point by point, with an insight into coming events positively prophetic, the chimerical and dangerous nature of those illusions. He gave an impressive warning of the danger of over-estimating the submarines and of under-estimating the resources of England and America; and with uncanny prevision predicted the revolution, which could not fail to come about if the war lasted any great length of time, the results of which must be the downfall of the thrones of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. If, at the German Headquarters, they had paid attention to this warning, the war would soon have come to an end and the reigning dynasties of Austria and Germany would still be occupying their thrones. The sacrifice made by Germany in giving up Alsace and Lorraine would have been counterbalanced by compensations in the colonies; for France would then have been prepared to make big concessions.

The German authorities, however, being blind and deaf, would neither see facts nor hear reason, and rushed to their ruin, dragging Austria-Hungary with them. Thus, the presumption of the Pan-Germans was not only the cause of Germany's ruin but also of the ruin of the Empire of the Habsburgs; and the statement that Austria paid for her alliance by her downfall is justified. Historical fact, therefore, is directly contrary to that which the German Nationalists and the Social Democrats, in their calumnious inventions, gave out to be the truth.

The German Nationalists and Social Democrats, usually the bitterest of enemies-but of one mind in their common hatred of the Habsburgs and Austria-believed that the hour at last had struck for their dreams to be realised. The Socialists hoped for a powerful German democracy, a social democratic bulwark in the heart of Europe; the Nationalists looked for the resurrection from the ruins of the Habsburg Empire of a great