THE PENTAGON WASHINGTON Secretary Cohen briefing threat. DOD Response NT OF agencies share responsibility for preparedness and response in this realm, ranging from major players such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Defense to others with reduced roles such as the Department of Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Energy. Both legislation and multiple, often conflicting executive-level directives provide a wind an interagency definition is all the more necessary given the current status of Federal planning fall for any agency in search of new missions, funding, and expanded responsibilities. Replete with good intentions and ambitious for primary roles, agencies propagate programs, policies, strategies, and specially trained response teams. Examining the issues and determining the tasks in consequence management, let alone assessing the timeliness and efficiency of response procedures, can be an intimidating challenge. A Problem of Definition Current policies suggest three ways to enhance our ability to manage the immediate aftermath of WMD use: establish common definitions; deconflict and delineate interagency roles, responsibilities, and plans; and develop a streamlined, clearly defined response channel. Although existing interagency mechanisms have likely discussed these issues in other forums, consequence management principals (the heads of major Federal agencies) have made little progress in remedying problems. DOD (Helene C. Stikke Taylor et al. There is no official..definition of consequence management. The Department of State, which is responsible for coordinating consequence management abroad, identifies nine official definitions while the Department of Defense, which conducts preparedness and response training, uses two. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is responsible for domestic disaster relief, has its definition, as does the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy. Although these definitions share the common theme that consequence management constitutes actions taken in the aftermath of a disaster, they differ on the scope and type of disasters that require it. The Armed Forces use a narrow definition, limiting consequence management to actions that counter "effects of an attack from nuclear, chemical, biological weapons of mass destruction." By comparison the Department of State defines it more broadly, in line with its international role, responding to a "life threatening or destructive event." Other definitions include actions to counter effects of terrorist attacks using either conventional explosives or nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. Still others include NBC-related industrial accidents (see accompanying figure). WMD further confuse what constitutes consequence management. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, construes WMD as devices that are capable of a high order of destruction or can be used to destroy large populations. In the NunnLugar-Domenici Act, WMD include nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological devices.1 Moreover, other agencies embrace conventional high explosives in their definitions. An interagency definition is all the more necessary given the current status of Federal planning, which is poorly coordinated and lacks central authority. Misunderstanding is inevitable. For instance, planning by the Joint Staff is focused only on WMD situations resulting from terrorism while planning by the Department of State suggests responses to large disasters of every kind anywhere in the world. What is more, the Environmental Protection Agency is concerned with hazards such as chemical spills while the Department of Energy responds when nuclear reactors are involved. Establishing a common point of reference is crucial because definitions imply roles and responsibilities and serve as a basis for allocating resources. A common definition is needed to initiate reform of consequence management, for without it little can be done to synergize response plans. Current differences also create confusion among allies, who may have to coordinate their responses with ours. Summer 1999/JFQ The definition of disaster found in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (as amended in 1988 by the Stafford Act) "encompasses all conceivable manmade or natural occurrences whose catastrophic consequence could lead to a [state] governor's request for Federal assistance," which could include all the elements listed above. These two terms may incorporate all the elements above, but that is an assumption (for instance, an accidental release of chemicals may not be life threatening or destructive, depending on the amount and potency of the chemical released but may cause widespread nonfatal casualties). Organizing the Team. Another issue is assigning responsibilities across the interagency community. Current policies, procedures, and interagency memos are an amalgam of well-intended but poorly coordinated programs that achieve unity of effort by accident rather than design. The Senior Interagency Coordinating Group for consequence management is comprised of the heads of primary agencies and chaired by the FEMA director. It provides oversight, advice, and coordination on major policy issues before a crisis occurs. It meets monthly but has no permanent staff or tasking authority and is subject to competing agendas, powerful personalities, and the need for consensus. Contentious issues tend to be postponed. The problem of responding to incidents begins with the command and control concept of the lead Federal agency. As outlined in PDD 39, the concept assigns responsibility to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the period before an incident occurs, but then transfers it to the Federal Emergency Management Agency once it takes place. As one analyst remarked, this delineation is arbitrary and confusing: "In any domestic disaster, [consequence management) is the crisis." This arrangement creates jurisdictional problems between the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which seeks to control the immediate situation and protect criminal evidence, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which endeavors to stabilize the situation, save lives, and initiate protective and containment protocols. This relationship also complicates participation by the Armed Forces as military personnel find themselves in an environment where rules of engagement, responsibilities, and chain of command are fluid at best. A better procedure is needed to exercise command and control over an entire operation, especially where a clear transition from crisis to consequence management must be made. A Combined Response Responsibilities for consequence management also must be reviewed given the likelihood that local and state emergency management agencies cannot handle major incidents. Following criticism of its response to the San Francisco JPQ/Summer 1999 Taylor et al. Chemical warfare training, Roving Sands '96. (Environmental Protection Agency), Radiological Assistance Teams (Department of Energy), and Hazardous Materials Re sponse Unit (Federal Bureau of Investiga8tion). They operate independently of any centralized coordinating authority prior to. arrival on site. In addi tion, efforts to integrate them or conduct interagency training have been lacking. Assembling a combined Federal response force capable of addressing a range of contingencies on short notice is basically a question of prior planning, organization, and crisis decisionmaking to get the right units rapidly to the right place. This issue is especially important given the likelihood of early military participation in efforts led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the Department of State; the Armed Forces have the most highly-trained response units and the means to deploy them. Because the key to conse Simulated chemical earthquake in 1989, the Federal Government in- Recent disaster operations also point to a ized Federal units, such as the Metropolitan Med-quence management is rapid response, the Federal Human Services), Environmental Response Team ical Strike Team (Department of Health and CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT Emergency Management Agency and the Departments of State and Defense must more fully integrate their operations. The existing channels used to coordinate requests for military assistance must be streamlined. For example, DOD Directive 3025.15 designates the Department of the Army as the executive agent for CM planning and implementation with respon the answer cannot be a short term fix that assigns a mission sibility to task service com to the Reserve components ponents and commit CJCS Instruction 3214.01 and the Joint Strategic A system enabling the Federal Emergency JPQ/Summer 1999 Loading FEMA generators at DOD (Mon Seggeren units, is a case in point. The answer to consequence management cannot be a short-term fix that assigns a mission to the Reserve components at the expense of primary wartime roles. Moreover, it creates additional challenges: How should National Guard units from one state be deployed in another? How can Reserve units that require a Prestdential call-up be rapidly integrated in a response, and how can demanding technical proficiencies be maintained with 38 Reserve training days per year? Handing the CM mission to Reservists raises as many questions as it answers and must be reviewed and managed carefully. Other Gaps Another issue is the role of the Armed Forces in the FEMA emergency response plan, which is mainly implied. Within this plan, military participation with Federal agencies is conditional: it is not planned a priori but requested, usually after 2-Marine Divalon (D.R. Storms) |