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so-called "optional clause" under which any state desiring to accept for the future the jurisdiction of the Court in designated types of legal disputes, might make a declaration to that effect. If no such declaration were made, the state was required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court only when it entered into a specific agreement accepting that jurisdiction. The Committee of Jurists had been unable to reach agreement on this point and presented two alternative texts; one would have preserved the existing plan and the other would have provided that by the very fact of becoming a party to the Statute, states would be bound to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in the designated types of cases. These classes of cases are described as follows in Article 36 of the Statute:

"a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would con-

stitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the

breach of an international obligation”. In the debates, attention was called to the fact that at one time or another since 1920 forty-five states had made declarations under the optional clause although some of these declarations were subject to reservations and for limited periods of time. It was thought that the progress of arrangements for the pacific settlement of international disputes had advanced to a point at which it was now possible and appropriate to provide in the Statute, as a part of the Charter, for compulsory jurisdiction.

A majority of the delegates in the Committee took this view. On the other hand it was pointed out that the inclusion of such a provision at this time might make it difficult if not impossible for some states to accept the Statute, a result which no delegate wished to precipitate. In order to reach agreement, therefore, the Committee decided to retain the present system with its optional clause.

Two steps were taken with a view to moving along the lines desired by the majority. The first step has already been noted in another connection; Article 36 now contains a provision that outstanding declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice shall be considered by the parties to the new Statute to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The new Court therefore will begin its life with a considerable number of acceptances of such jurisdiction. In addition, Commission IV of the Conference recommended that the other Members of the United Nations should proceed to make similar declarations as soon as possible.


The Court is to be composed of fifteen judges as is the Permanent Court of International Justice. Article 3 of the Statute now makes explicit what was previously understood, namely, that no two of the judges may be nationals of the same state. The term of office is still to be nine years but Article 13 has been revised in order to ensure that the case will not arise in which an entire new bench would be elected at the end of each nine year period. This is accomplished by

providing that of those judges chosen in the first election, the terms of five shall expire at the end of three years and of another five at the end of six years.

The seat of the Court is to remain at The Hague but Article 22 of the Statute has been amended to make clear that the Court may sit elsewhere whenever it considers it desirable. The same freedom of movement is provided for the chambers of the Court (Articles 26–9). Slight changes have been made in this respect to give the Court a little more latitude in forming such special divisions of the Court. It may from time to time form one or more chambers composed of three or more judges for dealing with particular categories of cases such, for example, as labor cases and cases relating to transit and communications. It may also at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case, the number of judges being here determined by the Court with the approval of the parties. In addition, the Statute retains the provision for the annual formation of a chamber of summary procedure composed of five judges, which can handle cases more expeditiously. These provisions may be utilized to meet the needs of parties whose geographical location is distant from The Hague and who may wish to have the Court or one of its chambers sit in a more convenient place. No change has been made in the system under the existing Statute which permits the appointment of ad hoc national judges where one party has a judge of its nationality on the bench and the other does not.


Neither the Committee of Jurists nor the Committee of the Conference favored admitting as parties before the court individuals or various international organizations, and Article 34 of the Statute was not modified in this respect. Additions were made to this article, however, to enable the Court to secure and utilize information from public international organizations which may be able to assist in particular cases. Moreover, if the construction of the "constituent instrument” or statute of such an organization is in question before the Court, the organization will be notified and furnished with copies of the proceedings.


The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice con: tained no provision for its amendment. This lack has been supplied by the inclusion of new Articles 69 and 70. Article 69 states the rule that amendments to the Statute shall be adopted in the same way as amendments to the Charter of which it forms a part. This rule is limited, however, by the additional provision that the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council may adopt provisions rel- ' ative to the participation in the amending process of states which have been permitted to become parties to the Statute but which are not Members of the United Nations. Article 70 accords to the Court itself the power to propose amendments for consideration.


Sundry other amendments have been made to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice but those of chief importance

have been described. It may not be inappropriate to repeat that the revision has proceeded throughout on the basis of satisfaction with the old court and high hopes for the new. If the provisions on compulsory jurisdiction did not go as far as some wished, this progress may still be recorded in declarations made at the option of the individual states. Through such optional declarations they may record their satisfaction with the institution and their confidence in its ability to play its part in the general role of the United Nations.


(Chapter XV) Every organization needs an operating staff. The recruiting and the directing of the operating staff of an international organization present special problems. The personnel must be chosen from a great number of different nations. A person of high technical qualifications may be hampered by an inability to speak one or more of the official languages of the Organization. The staff must acquire a sense of loyalty to the Organization and of devotion to its service while not becoming expatriates. The experience of the League of Nations indicates that the best international civil servant is not the person who throws off all feeling of attachment to his own country but rather one who, while maintaining his national ties, can perform his international duties for the benefit of all the member countries including his own.

The direction of such a staff is clearly a task of the first magnitude. It calls for a high degree of administrative skill, of tact, courage, and of devotion to duty. In an organization like the United Nations it requires also a knowledge of international affairs and an imaginative ability to keep track of the vast complex of international problems in the political, economic and social fields.

The problems surrounding the creation of an international secretariat as part of the United Nations are, therefore, of the greatest possible importance for the success of the Organization. They raise difficult issues of political judgment and administrative efficiency. The San Francisco Conference faced these issues squarely and, it is believed, successfully.


The smooth functioning of the United Nations, it has been suggested, will depend to no small extent on the character of the Secretary-General and the competence and loyalty of the staff he selects. These considerations, which can not be written into the (harter, can be realized only through the action of Members of the Organization in their wise selection of a Secretary-General and in the development by him of a loyal and competent staff.

The discussions at Dumbarton Oaks on the provisions concerning the Secretariat were largely confined to the powers and the method of election of the Secretary-General. Although certain more detailed items were given brief consideration, it was felt that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals on this subject might be amplified, if found necessary, at the Conference of the United Nations. It was considered important, however, that the method of election of the Secretary-General and the powers conferred on him should be clearly stated.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals conferred upon the SecretaryGeneral the important political power of bringing to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion might threaten international peace and security. This was a power which had not been enjoyed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The granting of this power considerably modified the concept of a Secretary-General as being primarily the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

At San Francisco some delegations sought to confer still greater powers upon the Secretary-General. On the one hand, it was proposed that he be granted the right to bring to the attention of either the Security Council or the General Assembly any matter which might threaten international peace and security. On the other hand, it was proposed to grant the Secretary-General the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any violation of the principles of the Charter. The first of these proposals was disapproved because the Secretary-General would have been placed in the embarrassing position of having to choose between the Security Council and the General Assembly. The second proposal was not favored chiefly because it placed upon the Secretary-General a semi-judicial function which the conference thought inadvisable to confer upon him.

The method of election of the Secretary-General is to a considerable degree linked with the political power referred to above. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provided for his election by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Some delegations at San Francisco sought to eliminate the participation of the Security Council in his election and vest it entirely in the General Assembly. However, this effort proved unsuccessful because it was generally recognized that, although he is to serve all of the organs of the Organization in his capacity as Secretary-General, this was a matter in which the political and security functions of the Security Council required its participation in his election. While willing to empower the Security Council to nominate the Secretary-General, a number of delegations did not wish the vote of the Security Council on this question to require the concurrence of all of the permanent members, and considered that the concern of the Security Council would be adequately taken care of by a vote of any seven members. It was decided, however, that the Yalta formula should apply to the election of the Secretary-General and that the concurring votes of all of the permanent members of the Security Council should be required. The final text of Article 97 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council; it is in deciding upon this recommendation that the indicated voting procedure of the Security Council is applicable.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals left open the question of the term of office of the Secretary-General. An amendment offered by the Spojisoring Powers provided for a three-year term for eligibility to re-election. This was considered by some to be too short a term to permit the Secretary-General to abandon his previous occupation, and it was urged that a longer term of five or more years be provided. In behalf of the three-year term, it was pointed out that the SecretaryGeneral was eligible for re-election and that the shorter term would make it easier to remove an incompetent or unsatisfactory incumbent. At the same time, a provision for re-eligibility would enable the Organization to retain a Secretary-General who enjoyed the confidence of the Members of the Organization. As a result of this difference of views, it was agreed that no provision be made in the Charter concerning the term of office. It was understood by the Committee that in the absence of any mention of the term of the Secretary-General this matter would be subject to agreement between the Security Council and the General Assembly. It was also understood that the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council would be required in any decision on this question.


An amendment offered by the Sponsoring Powers providing for the elect of four Deputy Secretaries-General for a term of three-years by the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, provoked considerable discussion. It was feared by some that the proposal of the Sponsoring Powers for four Deputy Secretaries-General would mean that each of the permanent members of the Security Council would assure itself of the election of one of its nationals to the post of Secretary-General or of Deputy Secretary, General. As a result of this view, the Sponsoring Powers modified their proposal to increase the number to five Deputy SecretariesGeneral and to make them eligible for re-election. The opponents of this provision very effectively argued that if the Deputy SecretariesGeneral were to be elected in the same manner as the SecretaryGeneral, it would be impossible for the latter to control them, for they would not, in effect, be responsible to the Secretary-General but to the bodies which elected them. They pointed out that instead of having a Secretary-General as a single responsible officer charged with the responsibility of administration, there would in effect be a board or commission of six officers and that responsibility would be dispersed among them. It was also urged that the inclusion of such a specific provision on Deputy Secretaries-General would tend to make the Charter more rigid, and that this was a matter which should be left for the Organization itself to determine. These arguments prevailed over the Sponsoring Powers' amendment and it was agreed that no provision should be made in the Charter concerning Deputy Secretaries-General.


The Sponsoring Powers and several other delegations submitted amendments to add to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals a provision on the subject of the responsibility and loyalty of the Secretary-General and his staff to the Organization. Similar provisions had been included in the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Articles of Agreement of the Fund and Bank proposed at Bretton Woods. The intent of the proposals made at San Francisco was to make it perfectly clear that the nationals of member states

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