Thank you for allowing us to testify before your Committee on April 6th. We are in receipt of your follow-up question, asking: "What should the 'end state' of preparedness for a national strategy for federal assistance in domestic preparedness against terrorist attacks?" We are pleased to provide a response for the record. The appropriate "end state" of terrorism preparedness, put simply, is adequate preparedness. Efforts underway at the federal, state and local levels of government to prepare for incidents of terrorism have begun to address this issue. However, in our view, what is lacking is a well-defined and measurable preparedness goal. We believe that a more focused, and thus effective preparedness effort would involve the development of performance capability objectives that individual jurisdictions and regions should work towards. We in the fire service, and our colleagues in law enforcement and public health, have a good idea, based upon past experience, of the tasks that must be completed to effectively mitigate any public emergency. In our view, a collaborative effort, to include each of the emergency response disciplines at the local, state and federal levels, should be made to develop these performance objectives. These objectives would allow us to measure our progress and, most importantly, to define the end-game: adequate preparedness. In the fire service, we have a good idea of what ought to be put in place in order to provide adequate fire protection. This includes not just personnel and equipment, but the actions that must be taken to put out a fire. This concept is just as valid in our terrorism preparedness effort and should include those assets and capabilities that may be provided by all three levels of government, with realistic response times given serious consideration. It is only through the provision of a measurable goal that the "end game" can be realized. Providing leadership for the fire and emergency services since 1873 Member, International Technical Committee for the Prevention and Extinction of Fire/Comité Technique International De Prevention Et D'Extinction Du Feu (CTIF) 67-270 2001-5 Honorable Tillie Fowler Examples of performance objectives include, but are by no means limited to: • • • Establishment of command and control through the use of the standard Incident Inter-operable radio communications capability that allows responding agencies on Effective decontamination capability that will allow the rapid decontamination of an arbitrary, though reasonable, number of victims. These are but a few examples of objectives that would give any state, local jurisdiction or region measurable goals to work toward. A complete set of performance objectives, once met, would, in our view, define the "end game": adequate preparedness. We would be happy to work with you or your staff in further developing these principles. Again, thank you for allowing us to testify. We appreciate your concern for and advocacy on behalf of America's fire service. Respectfully yours, Mendialn Chief P. Michael Freeman John M. Fessole Chief John M. Eversole 4 Summary H.R. 4210 Would Madam Chairman: We are pleased to submit this statement for the record to comment on a bill introduced before this subcommittee at your April 6, 2000 hearing-the Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2000 (H.R. 4210). The bill creates a new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to coordinate and make more effective federal efforts to assist state and local emergency and response personnel in preparation for domestic terrorist attacks. Overall, we believe that H.R. 4210 would address some of the problems of fragmentation and duplication that we and others have found in programs to combat terrorism. Specifically, the bill would create a new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to centralize leadership and coordination of federal programs to help state and local governments prepare for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. However, the duties of the new office, as currently described in the bill, may overlap with some functions of the recently created National Domestic Preparedness Office. Our work on the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), on which the Office of Terrorism Preparedness is patterned, suggests that success in achieving the bill's goals depends on the Office head's ability to build consensus among the involved agencies. In addition, the new office may take some time to accomplish its objectives as laid out in the bill. The limited scope of the new statutory office would not address some of the larger problems with fragmented leadership and coordination in federal programs to combat terrorism. Establish, coordinate and oversee policies, objectives and priorities of the Federal government for enhancing the capabilities of state and local emergency preparedness and response personnel. Publish a Domestic Terrorism Preparedness Plan and an annual strategy for carrying out the plan. Review terrorist attack preparedness programs of state and local As currently proposed in the bill, the Office may overlap with some functions to be performed by the existing National Domestic Preparedness Office. The Attorney General established this office within the Department of Justice to be responsible for interagency leadership and coordination of federal efforts to provide assistance for state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. As an example of potential duplication, the National Domestic Preparedness Office recently issued a "blueprint" for federal assistance, which is analogous to the new Office of Terrorism Preparedness function to prepare a national plan and strategy. In addition, the bill would limit the scope of the new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. According to intelligence and law enforcement officials, terrorists are least likely to use these types of weapons. The Subcommittee may want to consider authorizing the Office of Terrorism Preparedness to assist state and local governments to prepare for both weapons of mass destruction and the more likely threat of conventional explosives. |