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not going to call just Admiral Crowe. He is going to call each one of you and say, hey, come on in and let us know what you think. Don't you think that is the way that a President would work, even though, you know, finally and maybe in some meetings, you are only going to have the chairman in there? He is not going to take action without having everybody at least consulted. He is not going to let P.X. Kelley not have a word in edgewise if a major decision is going to be made.

General KELLEY. Well, let me just give you one example, that, during this administration and based on what I have seen, would probably be the norm. We, the Chiefs, have met with the Commander-in-Chief, and I like to call him that in his official role under the Constitution, 12 times. My predecessor, when he was Commandant, and his predecessor, met with the former Commander-in-Chief 2 times in 4 years. So, there is no guarantee that that will happen.

We are trying to say that there should be checks and balances in the system to ensure that this does, indeed, happen. Security of the American people is far too precious to leave to chance of personali

ty.

Mr. KASICH. Under the House bill, you have that option, correct? Under the House-passed bill, you would have that option with the ability to express dissenting opinions from what the chairman wants on any action?

General WICKHAM. The amendment that you put in there that requires dissenting views to be reported, takes care of that. As Admiral Watkins said, there is a fundamental flaw in your well-meaning effort, and it is well-meaning, we respect that. On the one hand, you say that you must consult to capitalize on the strengths of the corporate body of the JCS; on the other hand, by creating a full strength deputy, you take that away. You put another layer in there. Now, the Congress is baffled by this advice. You received advice from us, saying you do not really need a No. 2 Deputy, but you also have views from former people who are involved in the government and now retired, and some CINC's, who were here before and had a different view. Good men are going to differ on issues. I will tell you that those people who are giving you advice on the other side came from a time in history when there was a fractiousness on the Joint Staff, and among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I was a Director when there was a lot of fractiousness, and the fractiousness and the lack of opportunity to express our views to the Commander in Chief, at that time shaped people's attitudes. Therefore, I think their attitudes are: the Chiefs are not very useful, they are not being used; they cannot get along well together; and we, the CINC's, do not need people that do not get along well together, and therefore let's have a Deputy that is ranked number two. The Chairman and his Deputy can take care of everything. They can give the advice on everything, and you do not need it from the corporate body of the JCS. That is the danger of this No. 2 individual. When I was Director of the Joint Staff, I recommended that we have a four-star assistant to the Chairman, but not a No. 2 ranked deputy.

Mr. KASICH. What about the Laos-Iran-Grenada-Pueblo-litany of where you

Mr. NICHOLS. Let me say to the gentleman, I wish you had been here a little earlier. I am going to recognize Admiral Watkins to make that answer. [Laughter.]

Mr. KASICH. I certainly heard that-

General GABRIEL. First, General Wickham has to wind him up. [Laughter.]

Mr. KASICH. I mean, all I have to do, I have to endorse this Democrat every election to be able to get a couple of extra minutes and questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that was the last one I wanted. Thank you. And, I appreciate your comments.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett, do you have any questions, sir?

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir; just briefly. First of all, General Kelley read the definition of Operational Command. Would you agree-if that is a definition that CINC's operate under, would you have any objection to putting that definition in the law?

General KELLEY. Well, that is what we have always operated under, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. OK.

General KELLEY. I have no problem whatsoever. We have lived with that-but let me add to that. You know, it is just like life; as I said, we all suffer from human frailties. There have been strong CINC's and some who are not so strong. A good CINC, who wants to take a bull by the horns, has as much authority as he needs under that definition.

Mr. BARRETT. This subcommittee asked for the Grenada afteraction report and we never received it. I think the Senate has had access to it. I wonder if we might receive that report.

General WICKHAM. That is a Department of Defense report. We

will have to refer that to them.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, sir. Each of you brought up the theme of "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff". Could you tell us what you mean by that phrase? The Chairman has always got to be linked in your formulation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff-on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, let me just say, some interpretations of that phrase would completely hamper the chairman from acting independently-no independent advice, no independent control of the Joint Staff, those sorts of things. Is that the connotation you are putting on this term? If not, what is it?

General KELLEY. No. Absolutely, not. What we are saying is, that under normal circumstances, the day-to-day operations, when we operate as the corporate body, we meet as a corporate body, and we deliberate as a corporate body, which is the way it should be. The chairman always has, as we all do, the ability to provide independent advice if such is necessary.

What we are really saying is that there are those situations that happen quite often, when the chairman is required to, but does not have the time because of the press of circumstances to meet with his collegial group. He can operate independently, as long as it is clearly understood that he is operating, in fact, for us. So, we are giving him our proxy as opposed to denying him anything.

General GABRIEL. It does not really slow down the process this way, it really works. When you have a crisis, and you are the acting chairman or the chairman, you call up the CINČ to find out

what is going on. You do not have time to have a conference call among all the Chiefs, that is not necessary. You go ahead and take the action. You have your conference call later, and then clear it up. This is what is done.

We stay close together, so that the acting chairman or the chairman knows exactly the way we feel about a crisis. He does not have to check in and have a conference call every time he takes an action. He is acting on behalf of all of us.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you. No further questions.

Mr. NICHOLS. Any further questions from any members of the committee?

[No response.]

Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate your testimony very, very much.

Our next meeting of the committee will be Monday at 9 a.m. At that time, we will hear from Admiral Train, who is retired, Admiral Hansen, retired. Assistant Secretary of Defense Wade will also testify next week. He will bring two Defense Agency heads with him.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Monday, February 24, 1986.]

62-630 0 - 87 - 6

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Monday, February 24, 1986.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Nichols (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NICHOLS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. NICHOLS. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning the subcommittee continues its hearings on the reform of JCS and the agencies, and we are glad to have this morning as our first witness Adm. Harry Train, U.S. Navy, retired, former commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF ADM. HARRY D. TRAIN, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND Admiral TRAIN. No, Mr. Chairman. I just have an informal statement, if that would be all right?

Mr. NICHOLS. You may proceed.

Admiral TRAIN. Mr. Chairman, I am most grateful for this opportunity to contribute to the deliberations on this very important subject of JCS reorganization. As you may recall, I was privileged while still on active duty, as commander in chief with the Atlantic Command in 1982, to testify before the White Investigation Subcommittee in support of the General Jones proposal for improving the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I make that point because the fact that I testified while on active duty in favor of it, perhaps, will give more credence to what I am saying today.

I also participated in the 18-month-long project conducted by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies on the JCS organization, and I associate myself fully with the results of that study. The perspective that I bring to these deliberations is that of having been Director of the Joint Staff for 2 years and subsequently commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command for 4 years.

To set the stage for what I will say, I would like to make the point that in my view, and, in fact, it has to be in everybody's view, the Armed Forces of the United States exists for one purpose and one purpose only, and that is to support the political leadership of the United States in pursuing these political objectives and those

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