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I want to say on behalf of the committee how indebted we are to each of you. This has been, as several of our members have stated, one of the most informative of our hearings in large part because we had such diversity of background and perspectives on the same set of problems. That has been very illuminating.

I anticipate that this is not going to be the last time that we will ask for your assistance, because we are close to completing our hearing phase and then moving into the development of our recommendations, which, in my judgment, is the most important aspect of this inquiry. It is not enough to have some sense that you know what happened, unless you are capable of then converting that into what changes should be made in order to avoid the tragedies of September 11 occurring again.

We look forward to the opportunity to continue to draw on your insights and wisdom to help us answer those questions.

Chairman Goss.

Chairman Goss. Nothing more, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman GRAHAM. Congresswoman Pelosi.

Ms. PELOSI. Nothing further.

Chairman GRAHAM. Thank you very much. Now it is on to base


Let me announce for our members and others that we will hold a hearing on Thursday at 10:00 a.m. in this room. The subject will be an expert panel not dissimilar from the panel we have just had. Various individuals, including former Directors of the CIA and FBI and other important intelligence agencies, as well as a former Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, will be on the panel to give us their insights as to what should we be recommending to the American people and our colleagues for reforms. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the joint committee was adjourned.]









September 20, 2002






September 20, 2002


I am pleased to provide the Committees with this Statement for the Record as requested in your letter of September 17, 2002. The Department of Energy continues to make significant strides in contributing to the US government's effort to deal with the threats posed and the issues presented since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Through the Department's intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components, the sharing of terrorism-related information within the Department and with the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities has improved significantly. I am personally committed to accelerating this process. The following statement reflects the outline of the specific questions posed in your letter.

Policies, Procedures and Processes for Receiving Information. National policies for the sharing of classified information are established in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 "Classified National Security Information.” Other national policies addressing cooperation among the Intelligence Community, law enforcement agencies and the Department are included in various Executive Orders and presidential directives such as Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," E.O. 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities," Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 61, "U.S. Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program," and PDD 39 "Counterterrorism Policy," and various Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID). The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) also identifies roles and responsibilities of Departments and Agencies for sharing intelligence information.

These national policies are implemented through the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards and Security, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence directives. Within DOE, the Office of Intelligence (IN), Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) and Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence (ODNCI) are component members of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Director, IN, is the Department's Senior Intelligence Official (SIO)

and point of contact with the IC for all foreign intelligence activities; the Director, OCI, who is on detail from the FBI, is the Department's point of contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for investigative referrals. As members of the IC, DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components receive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence directly through authorized IC channels. This includes relevant information concerning terrorism, suspected terrorists and their associates. E.O. 12333 implementation procedures govern departmental intelligence activities including the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence information.

Under E.O. 12333 and the DOE Intelligence Procedures approved by the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components are authorized to receive, retain, analyze and further disseminate law enforcement and security information relating to the Department's foreign intelligence and counterintelligence missions. In addition, the Department has in place specific procedures that authorize the sharing of information with intelligence components of law enforcement relating to DOE so that the information can be “fused" with intelligence information for timely, coordinated response to breaking events. Thus, while DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components do not collect purely domestic law enforcement/security information - i.e., without any international terrorist or other foreign connection -- they can and do receive missionrelated law enforcement information from the Department's security components and outside law enforcement agencies. In turn, DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components are authorized to disseminate relevant information to the appropriate federal, state or local law enforcement agencies. The primary directive controlling the handling and dissemination of intelligence within DOE is Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/6, “Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information." DCID 6/6 has been implemented at DOE in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Office of General Counsel and Community Management Staff as set forth in an implementation memorandum dated January 17, 2002.

The Department primarily receives law enforcement information concerning terrorism, suspected terrorists and their associates via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) network. That data is received and subsequently distributed to appropriate security elements within HQ and Field Elements by the DOE Office of Security (SO).

The Department receives intelligence information via Intelink and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), which functions as the IC classified equivalent of the Internet. Intelink allows web dissemination of all-source intelligence information, including a wide array of terrorist-related reporting and analysis. Additionally, DOE receives record message (“cable”) traffic disseminated by all intelligence collection entities. Analysts in IN and technical specialists at the Field Intelligence Elements (FIES), located at selected DOE facilities, have access to the full range of IC resources. From the law enforcement perspective, IN and the FIES receive terrorist-related intelligence reporting generated by the FBI as part of the Intelink information flow. Subsequently, IN and FIE personnel regularly brief and supply relevant intelligence reports to appropriately cleared individuals at DOE HQ and program offices.

Joint Organizations and Information Sharing. The Department is active in several joint organizations that support counter-terrorism. Within the Intelligence Community (IC), IN is actively engaged with the Director of Central Intelligence sponsored Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC). This group provides the focal point for the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) for dealing with the IC, and correspondingly provides the IC with a forum to collectively deal with those intelligence matters with which the OHS requires assistance. Such areas include information transfer issues associated with law enforcement, providing personnel resources to assist in terrorism analysis, organizational and procedural matters, and a vehicle for exchanging information on capabilities and initiatives.

IN is also an active participant in the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Groups (JLACG), created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff following 9/11. It provides an inter-agency forum for assisting the combatant commands with the support that they require from across the US government. Activity has been greatest with the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and Northern Command (NORTHCOM), both of which have domestically oriented missions. A particularly noteworthy project that has been led by JFCOM, but engages all of the domestically oriented government agencies, is the Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Database (HIFLD) which is creating a national map supported by imagery and facilities data to be available to all federal, state, and local homeland security agencies at various levels of classification. IN's contribution to this collaboration will be to provide all energy-related data (electric grid, pipelines and nuclear facilities) as online overlays that can be applied to baseline map graphics. The result will permit all government agencies engaged in crisis or consequence management operations to have extremely detailed views of the particular area of interest during any situation.

DOE Office of Security (SO) participates in several cooperative ventures designed to support counter-terrorism initiatives. The specific objectives of the task forces and joint efforts vary, but the overall goal is to facilitate the sharing of information and develop cognizant safeguards and security programs to address potential terrorism concerns, and include:

· The Weapons of Mass Destruction Task Force (WMDTF) was established by the President and run by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to facilitate the sharing of information across multiple agencies and to identify potential issues and operations of concern. The primary focus is the identification of materials, operations, scenarios and corrective actions options pertaining to postulated terrorist events.

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The Postulated Threat Working Group sponsored and operated by the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) is an intelligence community initiative to revise the
Postulated Threat as applicable to government agencies.

The Joint Design Basis Threat Working Group (JDBTWG) is a joint DOD and
DOE working group specifically formed to formulate a detailed threat statement.
The Sealed Sources Working Group is a joint effort between the DOE and NRC
with the primary function of assuring that sealed sources (such as radiological

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