tains the implication that a conference will be called, and then contains recommendations for further steps to be taken under 51.

My understanding of your statement is that you have no objection on the merits to taking steps under 51, but you do not feel this is the time to do it.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I do not feel that we should proceed directly under article 51 until we have demonstrated that it is hopeless to accomplish a revision under article 109.

Mr. LODGE. You realize that under 163 that would also be true?
Mr. HOLLIDAY. Your 163 calls for a convention under 109.

Mr. LODGE. It does not actually call for it, but it contains that implication.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. It has that implication.

Mr. LODGE. There is a suggestion in 163 that we first exhaust those possibilities before proceeding under 51?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. Therefore, would you favor 163 at this time?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I will favor anything that will call for a constitutional convention to get that door open.

Mr. LODGE. I was interested because we have these two sets of resolutions before us.

It seemed to me from your statement that your only objection to 163, aside from the details of the amendments to which you might have some objection, was that you felt that this was not the time to do such a thing.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I did not intend to say in there, and I did not think I did, that I had any objection to 163. I have simply confined my remarks to 59, because I prefer 59. Ely Culbertson is one of my dearest friends, and you are not going to get him and me in a tangle on that. He even put me on the citizens' committee. I claim he did not ask me, and he says he did, but at any rate I said that anybody who wants to open that door of a convention I will go along with.

Mr. LODGE. I feel that this issue transcends personalities by a great deal. You say you prefer 59 to 163. Would you care to tell me why you prefer 59 to 163?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I felt for one thing that the criticisms of General Marshall were directed at 163 because he said the proposals called for a slap in the face at Russia.

Then also I think in his extemporaneous remarks he said that while he thought a resolution would be a good thing, that it ought not to be specific, so I thought he was shooting at 163 there because 59 is not specific.

Mr. LODGE. He actually made the statement, I believe the record will show.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LODGE. In just a moment.

He said he objected to Resolution 59, and then he said he would have no objection to a resolution along those lines.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Along the lines of 59?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

When it came to my time to question, I asked the Secretary of State whether, since he objected to 59 but did not object to something along that line, he would submit to this committee a suggested resolution, which he said he would do.

I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. You brought out the point I wanted to make. Secretary Marshall quoted the exact language of Resolution 59 and said he could not recommend that language.

Mr. LODGE. It is not the purpose of my question to involve you in difficulty with Ely Culbertson, who is also a friend of mine, but to discuss this matter solely on its merits.

I would like to know why you prefer 59 to 163.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. It goes further.

Mr. LCDGE. I do not see how it goes further.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. It goes further in that it clearly calls for a lawmaking government; 163, as I read it, does not call for government. Mr. LODGE. I suggest to you, sir, that it does not go as far, because it suggests no action under 51 at all.

Mr. JONKMAN. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Mr. JONKMAN. I would like to have accentuated a little more the difference between 59 and 163. You have only to read the last sent. ences in them to see a world of difference. Resolution 163 says:

The United Nations Organization shall be able to fulfill its stated mission as the principal and most effective instrument for world peace.

Resolution 59 reads:

For the purpose of making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war.

It promises the millennium, absolutely.

Mr. LODGE. That is perhaps the sense Mr. Holliday had in mind. It goes further in that sense. It does not go as far in the sense that it does not state what shall be done when the deadlock comes.

Mr. JONKMAN. It says the millennium has come if you carry this

out.

Mr. LODGE. I do not believe it carries that implication. Mr. VORYS. The gentleman says it goes further in one sense. What other sense is there to it? How can you describe a complete government more briefly and completely than to say it shall be capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing law?

Mr. LODGE. It says, "For the purpose of making the United Nations capable."

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. If the Soviet Union will not agree to any amendments designed for the purposes set forth in that resolution, there is no way of making the United Nations capable of doing these things under 109. Therefore, you have to do something else in order to proceed and that means, probably, proceeding under article 51. That is why I say that Resolution 59 does not go as far as 163, and my interpretation is that the purpose for which Dr. Judd introduced Resolution 163 was in an effort to go further than Resolution 59, not in an effort to go not as far.

Mr. JUDD. Well, you are wrong on that.

Mr. LODGE. You felt 59 went too far?

Mr. JUDD. No. I wanted the alternatives before us. If there had been three other alternatives, I would have put them all in. I was trying to get before us all the facts, all the proposals, and suggestions of any people who were thoughtfully working on the issue.

Resolution 163, as I said the first day, is, so to speak, a second line of defense. If we cannot move in the direction of Resolution 59 to amend the whole UN, then go as far as we can within the organization under article 51. To me 163 encompasses less ground. Its very specificity limits it.

Chairman EATON. Would the gentleman repeat that word? Mr. JUDD. I will spell out my meaning this way. that it is specific makes it less all-inclusive than is 59.

The very fact The sky is the limit under 59, as you said, but if I cannot hit the stars I want at least to clear the tree tops. Therefore, it was put in that way.

Now, this working paper which the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has just issued goes at the thing in the opposite way, Mr. Holliday, from the way you are suggesting. It reaffirms the policy of the United States to work for peace and security through the United Nations, and then suggests six objectives to pursue under the United Nations Charter. All of them are covered in our resolutions and have been proposed and discussed here:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving specific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States through constitutional processes with such regional and other corrective arrangements as are based on self-help, and mutual aid, and as affects its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Make efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty rights against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a general conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

So the Senate committee is definitely working more along the direction, just for the information of the committee, of 163, trying to develop and strengthen the present machinery, which, as you say, is based on a league, and the assumption that the independent sovereign nations will go ahead together. Only if these measures fail, try to get a revision of the Charter.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. I do not think that resolution moves toward peace at all, because it either relies on a league or upon a group of coalitionists.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, may I just revert for a moment to the original discussion which seems to resolve itself into a question of semantics. When Mr. Holliday says on page 17: "Frankly, however, I do not see why we need to consider this proposition at this time”— which is the question of a 51 federation. I interpret that to mean that we do not need to go as far as that at this time.

Now, what you mean by going as far as, is a question of semantics, and it is perhaps somewhat fruitless to go into it any further.

It seems to me, from my interpretation of the words, that 163 goes further, in that it recommends what we should do if we fail under article 109.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I agree with your position on that.
Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chiperfield.

I would like to ask one more question, if the chairman would allow me to, and that is this: Mr. Finletter's suggestion for amending Resolution 59 provides, as I recall it from memory, that there must be discussions of proposals and let us say an agenda must be set up before this meeting is called, in order that we may have some assurance of its success.

Well, would you suggest in that connection proceding under article 108, submitting amendments under article 108 of the Charter, to see how they take hold, and if they do not take hold, do not go ahead under article 109?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That would be the other alternative.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Will the gentleman yield at that point?
Mr. LODGE. I will be delighted to.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Has not that procedure under article 108 already been tried?

Mr. LODGE. I believe that it has, but the thought that I have is this: It was brought out this morning by Mr. Finletter that it would be unwise to proceed under article 109 unless there was some modicum of assurance that something could be achieved. In other words, he did not want this to be just a futile gesture. After all, our representative, Senator Austin, and our Secretary of State have told us that there have been continuous attempts to amend the Charter-perhaps not in this fashion, but in other ways. Some of those attempts have proved successful and others have not. I was just trying to point out that there is machinery other than 109 under which the Charter can be amended.

In view of this recommendation of Mr. Finletter's for amending 59, I wanted to ask Mr. Holliday whether he would therefore favor, first, proceeding under 108.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. The veto power applies in 108, does it not? I think it does. The only place where you can get around the veto power is under 109, following the precedent of our United States Constitution.

Mr. LODGE. May I point out there, Mr. Holliday, that that does not really vitiate the suggestion. The veto power applies in 108 as to the adoption of amendments. The veto power also applies under 109 as to the adoption of amendments. It does not apply as to the calling of the meeting, but it applies as to the adoption of any alterations agreed to at the meeting.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Only when it gets to the matter of the vote by the constituent states.

Mr. LODGE. You cannot veto the calling of the meeting under 109, but you can veto the amendments under 109.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. No; the General Assembly cannot.

Mr. LODGE. The General Assembly cannot under 108, either. You have to have the consent of all of the permanent members of the Council, whether it is under 108 or 109.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Not before the submission. You have called the conference and your constitutional convention adopts a new constitution, and then the question comes up in assembly, and in the Security

Council as to whether that should be submitted to the states, and there is no veto there, either. It is two-thirds of the General Assembly, and 7 of the 11 of the Security Council. If they say this should be submitted to the states it has to be submitted.

Mr. LODGE. Including all the permanent members of the Security Council?

Mr. HOLLIDAY. Not on that step.

Mr. JONKMAN. I think you are wrong.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. There is no veto power until you get to the matter of the individual states ratifying.

Mr. LODGE. I have it right here in front of me, Mr. Holliday.

Mr. JUDD. Read it.

Mr. LODGE. Article 109 provides that you have to have only twothirds for the calling of the meeting, but you must have the unanimous consent of the members of the permanent members of the Security Council in order to effectuate any change:

Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations “including all the permanent members of the Security Council."

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That is just what I say. That is the first place where your veto power comes in.

Mr. LODGE. That is the place where it can prevent any amendment to the United Nations Charter. There is no difference in substance between them.

I have attempted to express agreement on the thought that you do not need to have unanimity for calling the meeting, but you do need to have unanimity as far as the permanent members of the Council are concerned for the purpose of changing the Charter.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. However, there is an intermediate step. Your constitutional convention adopts the constitution that it recommends. Mr. LODGE. There is no mention of the constitution.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. All right, the alteration. Then that goes to the General Assembly and the Security Council to decide whether they are going to refer it to the states. If two-thirds of the General Assembly and 7 of the 11 vote to refer, then it must be referred. You cannot veto the referring.

Mr. LODGE. "Including all permanent members."

Mr. HOLLIDAY. That is on the ratification.

Mr. LODGE. The point is it cannot become law without the consent of all the permanent members.

Mr. HOLLIDAY. The point I make is that we have the precedent of showing the way in which you get around that. Your convention. might say that this constitution shall go into effect when ratified by two-thirds of the constituent states. If that then went to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and two-thirds of the General Assembly approves submittal, and 7 out of the 11, it would have to go for reference or for adoption or rejection, in accordance with the terms of the constitution itself. That was exactly what our founding fathers did.

Mr. LODGE. It says here, "Including all the permanent members of the Security Council."