consider, I assume, their systems of government. Would your answer be the same if there were a radical change in the system of government of any of the principal powers or permanent members?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, I think my answer would be that whatever the circumstances, whatever the reasons that are adduced by a state which decides to withdraw, it is the judge for itself as to whether those reasons are good and proper. The rest of the nations are clearly entitled to have their judgment as to whether the withdrawing nation acts in the proper spirit and under proper circumstances and with proper justification. The statement is quite clear that it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.

Senator MILLIKIN. I think the statement that you read from carries the same idea, but if there should be a general frustration of the specified principles and purposes of the Organization, I assume that that would be a justifiable reason for withdrawing.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That, Senator, is also in the statement.
Senator MILLIKIN. Thank you very much.

Senator BARKLEY. Let me ask you this question in connection with that: Suppose that some nation which is now a monarchy and living under the monarchial form of government, and which is part of the Charter, should cease to be a monarchy and become a republic. That would be a change in the form of government but that would not be a justifiable reason for any other nation withdrawing, would it? Mr. PASVOLSKY. I would not think so, provided the nation continues to behave, internationally.

Senator BARKLEY. It would still be subject to the provisions of this Charter.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Surely.

Senator BARKLEY. If one nation gobbles up another and thereby brings about an absorption, that would be in violation of the Charter? Mr. PASVOLSKY. Very definitely.

Senator BARKLEY. And the Council would be supposed to have prevented that in advance. But suppose two nations regardless of their form of government, and which are parties to this Charter, voluntarily entered into an agreement to consolidate and become one nation, that would not be such a change or breach of the original contract involving this Charter as to justify of itself alone the withdrawal of any other nation which is a party to the agreement, would it?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That would depend upon the circumstancesSenator BARKLEY (interposing). It is difficult to present hypothetical cases which would or would not present justification for withdrawal.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Exactly, Senator, because it all has to be judged in the light of the circumstances at the time and the effect of the action by the nation.

Senator BARKLEY. And under the Charter, there would be no prohibition but it would be a matter for the nation desiring the withdrawal to determine for itself?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

Senator BARKLEY. No resolution or action that the Council or the Assembly could take could prevent its withdrawal?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That would be my view.

Senator WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question on this matter of withdrawal.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White.

Senator WHITE. This question of withdrawal interests me somewhat, because I assume that this Charter is in the nature of a treaty or it would not be here for ratification. I had already supposed that treaties of the United States were either limited in their time by the terms of the instrument, or that there was provision in them for denunciation or withdrawal by other means. Here we have no limitation of time on the instrument, with no provision for withdrawal and no provision for denunciation. What I want to ask you is, is there precedent in our diplomatic experience for the omission of these rights of withdrawal or denunciation and of the writing of an instrument without limitation of time?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Mr. Chairman and Senator White, I wonder if that would not be a more appropriate question to address to Mr. Hackworth who is our specialist on treaty history? Would you wait, Senator, to ask him that question?

Senator WHITE. I don't care who answers it, so long as it is answered.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. He would be better qualified to answer it than I. Senator WHITE. If there are precedents for an instrument of this character, which as I say has no limitation of time, and has no provision for denunciation and no provision for withdrawal of the signatory nation, I thought it would be interesting and perhaps of value ́to have it now.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, indeed.

Senator AUSTIN. Would it not be necessary to test the justification by the purposes and principles set forth in Chapter I?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, if the Organization was confronted with an act of withdrawal it would certainly look at the behavior of the withdrawing nation in terms of the purposes and principles of chapter I.

Senator WHITE. Mr. Chairman, may I jump to another article and ask just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator WHITE. Article 96 authorizes the Council to call upon the Court for advisory opinions. What I want to know is whether it was within the discretion of the Court to render an opinion when asked by the Council or whether it was mandatory?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, this is again a question which I hope you will address to Mr. Hackworth, because I did not discuss this chapter. I left it to Mr. Hackworth to discuss; he is much better qualified than I am for that.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in pure theory, but I sometime think that the reasons for writing the way in which it is written are quite as important as the writing itself. What is the theory behind the creation of the very harsh or hard amending power? As I read article 108 it would be impossible to amend excepting by special convention, that Charter, without the consent of the United States for example.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. What is the theory of making the amending powers hard?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. It is the same theory that underlies the voting procedure on the Security Council which is itself related to the type of responsibility which is to be assumed by the permanent members of the Council. That is, in the final analysis it is their power that has to be relied upon for the performance of the functions of the Organization. It is inconceivable that, having accepted this Charter and the obligations which it imposes, the permanent members of the Security Council with the special obligation and responsibility laid upon them, could consent to having the Charter altered in such a way as to alter their obligations and their responsibilities without their concurrence.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject right there? I think Senator Vandenberg will join me in this view. I was on the committee that handled this matter and offered the amendment which was adopted providing for the calling of a constitutional convention to reexamine the Charter at a later date. We took the view that the United States Senate would very reluctantly ratify the Charter if it were to set up an organization with the power, through the amending process, to increase our responsibilities and lay upon us heavier duties when a sum of those votes require to amend the Charter would be nations that would not be primarily responsible for the preservation of peace, and if the peace were breached would not bear any heavy burdens in preserving the peace or in making war. We thought we could hear the eloquent voices of Senators lifted in protest, at tying ourselves to this Organization endowed with authority to adopt amendments to send our boys to war when we do not want them to go and to do this and that and the other-we did not agree to do that. We wanted to have it like it is; an organization that could not increase our obligations, that could not add obligations that we know not of without the consent of the United States. That is one of the justifications, Senator Thomas.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think that is an understatement. I think we thought the Senate would not only be reluctant but that it would not do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree with me that you heard eloquent voices raised in protest on the floor of the Senate. I have heard echoes of that even this morning.

All right, Doctor, is there something else?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir; there is one more chapter, which deals with the procedure for the ratification of the Charter and the process by which the Charter would come into effect. These provisions are in article 110.

There is a provision, of course, that the Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States, and the Government of the United States as the custodian of the ratifications shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit of ratification, and, when the Secretary General of the Organization is appointed, shall notify him.

Now, the present Charter will come into force when there has been deposited with the Government of the United States the ratifications of the five nations which are to become the permanent members of the

Security Council, and of a majority of the other signatory states. That would mean that if there are to be 51-there will be 51 signatories-the Charter will come into effect when it has been ratified by the 5 powers that are to become the permanent members and by a majority of the remaining 46 which means 24. In other words, the Charter will have to be ratified by 29 nations before it comes into force. When it comes into force, the Organization presumably comes into existence.

Senator BARKLEY. Which is the fifty-first?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Poland.

When the Charter comes into force, the nations which have ratified it, that is these 29 nations, become original Members of the Organization. The other signatories, as they ratify the Charter after the Charter comes into force and deposit their ratifications as provided, then also will become original members, and will be included in the number of original members.

That is the process by which the Charter is to come into force and the Organization is to be established.

Finally, there is one more article in this chapter, and that is the article that provides that the Charter shall be prepared in five languages and that all of these texts shall be equally authentic, that these texts shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and that duly certified copies shall be transmitted by the Government of the United States to the governments of the other signatory states.

That, Mr. Chairman, concludes the provisions of the Charter.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Pasvolsky, I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the committee for your very careful and meticulous and thorough presentation of the Charter and its various provisions. We all know how long you have labored on this matter. We realize your service at Dumbarton Oaks, and your very great service at San Francisco, in which you not only were the adviser to the delegation at the Conference, but served as Chairman of the Coordination Committee which had to integrate the entire Charter, and where there were conflicts, eliminate them and draft the proper language.

I want to pay you this tribute to your efficiency and your ability and your industry and energy in performing all of these duties.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your presence here.

Does any other Senator have any observation or question?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. You expressed some desire to put the names of some of your assistants who helped you in the record. You can get a list of them and put them in the record. I see a number of your staff and assistants who rendered very fine service at San Francisco. (With Dr. Pasvolsky, in addition to Alger Hiss :)

Mr. Harley A. Notter, Adviser, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department
of State.

Mr. Benjamin Gerig, Chief, Division of Dependent Area Affairs; Associate
Chief, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.
Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, Acting Chief, Division of International Security
Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. Donald C. Blaisdell, Associate Chief, Division of International Security
Affairs, Department of State.

75608-45- -22

Miss Dorothy Fosdick, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. Hayden Raynor, special assistant to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Adlai Stevenson, special assistant to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Edward G. Miller, Jr., legislative assistant to Assistant Secretary
Acheson.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Green Hackworth, legal adviser of the State Department.

Mr. Hackworth was at San Francisco, where he rendered very fine service. I was a member of the committee that had jurisdiction over the Court, but Mr. Hackworth did all the work. I attended a good many meetings, but I soon saw that he knew what he was doing, and I was not very active on the details until he got through with his work for the final approval.

Mr. Hackworth, we want you to testify particularly on the World Court, the International Court of Justice.

STATEMENT OF GREEN H. HACKWORTH, LEGAL ADVISER,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HACKWORTH. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the Court is treated of in chapter XIV of the Charter, articles 92 to 96, inclusive.

Chapter XIV follows very closely chapter VII in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Article 92 of the Charter states that the International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the International Organization. That is a repetition of a similar provision in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals; it also states that the Statute shall be attached to and be a part of the Charter.

Article 93 states that the Members of the United Nations shall ipso facto be parties to the Statute of the Court.

Senator BURTON. Could I ask one question before he leaves article 92?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BURTON. As I understand article 92 it says that the Court shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute which is based on the permanent Statute of the International Court of Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter. Does that mean that when we ratify the treaty, that we automatically include in it the Statute which is a separate document annexed to it and we take no separate action as to that order?

Mr. HACKWORTH. That is correct.

Senator BURTON. It is just as much a part of the Charter as though it were article 112?

Mr. HACKWORTH. Precisely so.

Article 94 of the Charter is new as regards the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It provides that each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decisions of the Court.

It also provides that if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations encumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.