General DOUGHERTY. Well, I did not mean that tritely. No. I just

cannot

Mr. NICHOLS. There must be something that I do not understand. They all seem to have great respect for the Chairman. It is "Mr. Chairman that," "Mr. Chairman this," and he is the top cat and the boss and no question about it. But, the Deputy Chairman. There are a lot of reservations about him. What might happen if we create that deputy chairman and if we make him No. 2? Would you give us your views on that? What is really bugging them about this?

General DOUGHERTY. Mr. Chairman, I have asked myself the same question, and I asked General Gabriel the same question. You know, these are smart men, and they are very big men, and they are not picayune at all. And, so, I do not ascribe anything picayune to them. I just do not know. I do think that they have all found that they are better chiefs because they walked in the shoes of the chairman. They have seen his responsibility and they understand the situations which he can get into, they understand the necessity for very rapid advice, and they understand the difficulty of blending what is the corporate view of the JCS with individual opinion and keeping them separated.

I remember talking many times with Dave Jones about how difficult that was in a rolling discussion; how he always had to qualify this as his opinion and say, "We do not have a corporate view on this." You tend to get, in a rolling conversation, the idea that there is not any corporate view on many things, where there really is. I cannot answer that question, and I am punting because I do not know.

Mr. KASICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, if you leave this room right now, I do not want there to be a Deputy Chairman sitting out there in the crowd because if you leave this room and this hearing is still going on, the Deputy becomes Chairman. Even if it is only for a minute, Mr. Chairman.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, I think that, it would be like one of these chiefs or the commandant: if he were to say to the Air staff or the Navy staff, you know, "When I leave, instead of the the vice chief taking over, I am going to have the operations deputy down here take over for awhile and put him in charge." You know, they are going to eat up No. 6 or No. 3. They will respect the vice because he is the alter ego.

I worked for a long time with a vice commander, and we did not have one bit of trouble. When he had the con, he had it, and when I came back, I took it, and it was up to him to make sure that he was doing what I thought was right and in a consistent vein. But there was not any question by the staff that his decision was my decision, and it stuck. I went 3 years like that and we never had a ripple.

I do not know what I would have done if I had rotated the responsibility around through my senior staff. Also, I think the Nation deserves a consistency in its upper military advisory and execution echelons that you do not get with five people rotating the duty. I think that consistency can only come with the incumbent or the person who is designated and has the responsibility for acting for the company. There, you are going to get a clarity and a con

sistency of action that is part of the reason that I think we need to beef up the chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General DOUGHERTY. Arch and I have been good friends for a long time now. He is going to eat me up.

Mr. BARRETT. No, sir. But, I do want to ask you a couple of questions about your testimony.

First of all, I was not clear in my mind as to the implication of the example you gave about your leadership of the JSTPS.

General DOUGHERTY. Yes. I can answer that, I think.

Mr. BARRETT. Well, could I just add one thing? We did put in the law 2 years ago that the Chairman will determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided.

Now, that should factor, I think, into your answer because what you were talking about was something along that line. Perhaps we did not go far enough.

General DOUGHERTY. Maybe I misunderstood the bill, because I thought that any time it is requested, you can get the JCS advice on any issue.

Mr. BARRETT. Yes.

General DOUGHERTY. If that is so, and many issues come up like that, it is very useful to have the advice of the JCS. People who have not worked this do not understand what a wonderful institution the JCS is for getting things done and coordinating, which is the most difficult thing in this town. Coordinating well is especially difficult with diverse things like services. But with that provision in there, I would suspect that the Secretary is going to want a lot of advice like that. The President is going to want it, too. Now if you get in there and you begin to get dissent or you get a scizzle, and you get somebody saying stop, we are not going to go forward with this, we are going to split it, then I think you are suddenly left rudderless and it is at that point that I think you ought to have the power to resolve it. Now, if it is already in the bill, I missed it, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. We put it in. It is a part of the law now, but that particular provision that I read is a new part as of 1984.

On combining the service staffs, you brought up a couple of times about the distinction between the policy and

General DOUGHERTY. I found the definition in the-where the executive level stopped in the bill was down through the DCS, was it not?

Mr. BARRETT. That is right.

General DOUGHERTY. Through the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. It seems to me that when you get down into DCS, you have got just acres and acres of implementing staffs.

Mr. BARRETT. But your objection was that you should have a policy level and an implementing level.

Now, I do not know of any other staff, military or civilian industry, where you have one staff on top of another for the purpose you say-that one has to be policy and the other implementation. General DOUGHERTY. Ôh

Mr. BARRETT. What I am asking about is▬▬

General DOUGHERTY. I can speak for some industries where you have a corporate staff, and then you have dozens of organizations-

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, but this is a case where you have one staff on top of one other staff, and that is all. There are not a number of staffs under the secretariat, there is just one.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, if you are going to charge the Assistant Secretary of Manpower with handling all the actions having to do with manpower, well, then, fine. But, I would submit that that is not what you want the Assistant Secretary of Manpower to do. You do not want him running the schools and making the assignments; you want him making manpower decisions in a policy mode. Mr. BARRETT. But, the question, I think, is, is there some problem with having an integrated staff in which both those types of functions are performed? What I was pointing out is that in other staffs, in the corporate world and elsewhere, you do not split staffs that way. Those two functions, implementing policy as well as developing policy, are contained in the same integrated staff. It seemed to me that your objection was that in this particular case, with the military-civil interface, you had to have separate staffs.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, I will take you to the page. I do not have the cite number. Just a minute.

"Each Assistant Secretary," now he is the Assistant to the Secretary, "shall be assisted by a Deputy Chief of Staff who is Deputy to a Chief of Staff."-So, if the Deputy Chief of Staff is assisting the Assistant Secretary, he is the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary. He is not a Deputy Chief of Staff. He is not Deputy to the Chief of Staff-"Who shall have the same functional responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary." So, you have got a Deputy Chief of Staff and an Assistant Secretary with the same functional responsibilities. Seems to me you fatally comingle policy and implementation. Mr. BARRETT. All right. Yes.

General DOUGHERTY. That is my concern, Arch.

Mr. BARRETT. Yeah.

General DOUGHERTY. And, again, I do not know about the other services. I do know the Navy is different. They are organized differently. I remember some years ago, during the McNamara period, you may recall this, that it suddenly dawned on Mr. McNamara that the Chief of Naval Operations was not like the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

So, he set about to try to make him like that. He found out that he was in one bureau and there were three coequal bureaus, you know, BUSHIPS, BUPERS, BUOPS. I do not know that he ever succeeded, though I do not know that it has ever been undone but the Navy is not the same as the Air Force. I do not think it is the same as the Army.

Mr. BARRETT. Well, presumably, then, your objection would be taken care of if the Assistant Secretary would delegate whatever functions within his authority that he would want the Deputy Chief of Staff to perform.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, I am concerned that you are going to get the Assistant Secretaries in the operational/implementation business. You know, you could appoint an Assistant Secretary and

he could run all the personnel actions of the Air Force. But do you really want him to do that? Who is going to handle personnel policies of the Air Force? I would be surprised if the people who have held those jobs really want that kind of comingled responsibility. Mr. BARRETT. Yes.

In your responsibility as the specified commander, in looking over the bill from that perspective, you may have noted that in drafting it, mostly the unified commanders were――

General DOUGHERTY. Oh, I understood exactly. As a specified commander, I had a different set of problems than CINCEUR did as the unified commander or CINCPAC.

Mr. BARRETT. Do you see anything counterproductive in the way the bill is drafted with regard to specified commanders? Anything that we overlooked or

General DOUGHERTY. Not really. I have had only overnight to look at it. But I did not see anything there that made my antenna twang.

I do see a lot of rocky road ahead when you start looking at putting together your strategic forces of the Navy and the Air Force. But, on the other hand, I would not back away from that. I think it is a bullet we ought to bite. I do not know how we are going to come out. I think you ought to bite it because you cannot afford not to. Here is what I see. The Navy operates submarines under the sea and they have got attack submarines, which is one kind, and they have got strategic submarines, which are another. Both are operating in the same element. I doubt if you will be able to separate those two, and if you were to put the attack submarines over in the strategic force, which they could well be because if they have a primary role, it is to get other attack submarines-I mean, other strategic submarines-you are going to have real trouble separating your submarines.

You see what I am talking about?

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir.

General DOUGHERTY. That is going to be a problem.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, General.

General DOUGHERTY. Thank you.

Mr. NICHOLS. We are most appreciative for your testimony. Tomorrow at 2 p.m. the subcommittee will meet in 2118 to hear from the Packard Commission. We will be joined by Mr. Mavroules' procurement panel, and Mrs. Schroeder's panel on the Grace Commission.

If there is no further business, the committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, the subcommitte recessed at 3:45 p.m., to reconvene tomorrow, Wednesday, March 5, 1986, at 2 p.m., in room 2118.]