the "Anschluss" problem more and more to the academic field. The Successor States were satisfied that the idea of a restoration made no progress, and was being fought to some extent by us, as well as by them. The interested major powers, particularly Italy, turned their attention to other pressing problems, and busied themselves only in general with the phenomenon of Germany's growing power. The Duce especially found in the New Reich a strong ally in his fight against the poor conditions of the Peace of Versailles. HITLER cleared up the Duce's concerns about the South Tyrol. He abandoned this oldest and most faithful part of the old Reich to its fate.

On New Year's Day of 1936 the Austrian president's good wishes were transmitted to me by Dr. Guido SCHMIDT, then on the staff of the federal president (of Austria), and later minister of foreign affairs. On this occasion I asked him whether he did not think the time ripe for decisive measures from both countries, in order to remove the rubble left behind by the assassination of DOLLFUSS. Dr. SCHMIDT assented, and promised that he would loyally co-operate in this task.

On that day began a trusting collaboration and personal friendship with this sympathetic, and very talented man and his charming wife.

Through his assistance the German-Austrian treaty of friendship was signed 11 July 1936. Dr. SCHMIDT had succeeded the intransigent Baron BERGER: the latter had withdrawn to the post of ambassador to Rome. The entire Vienna diplomatic corps felt relieved, for the Wednesday receptions at the Ballhaus Platz were from now on filled with really productive discussions, and with good work.

This treaty was meant to bring about a lasting relaxation of tension and a normalization of the German-Austrian international life. The preparations for the treaty were not as simple as it may seem from this report. Though resistance had to be overcome on both sides, negotiations had to be conducted with the utmost discretion, in order to avoid sabotage by outsiders or by the Party. For HITLER, of course, the proposed pact never went far enough; for the federal chancellor (of Austria) it went much too far in the concessions demanded of him. The announcement of the pact was like a bombshell. It read as follows:

[Editor's Note: von Papen desired that the text of this document be inserted here as it was not available to him at the time of writing.]

When I told HITLER of the signing of the pact by telephone, he poured forth a stream of invectives, instead of expressing his

satisfaction over the work, which had really not been simple of accomplishment. He said that I had seduced him to make too far-reaching concessions, in return for only platonic concessions, which the Austrian government would not live up to anyway. He was just being taken for a ride. He seemed extremely upset and out of sorts.

The only answer I could make was that my office was at his immediate disposal, if he found my accomplishments so poor. Meanwhile the press of the world had gotten hold of the event and with undivided approval welcomed the progress which had now been made, two years after the catastrophe of the assassination of DOLLFUSS. Even those countries which had displayed the bitterest opposition to an "Anschluss" now refrained from any objection to the Austrian government's declaration that Austria regarded herself as a "German country", and intended to regulate its relations with the Reich in that sense. This was the best proof for the extent of my success in removing the Austrian problem from discussions of foreign policy to the peaceful field of an innerGerman debate. HITLER only came round after he had learned of this success among world public opinion, which he had not expected. He had the Secretary of State in the Reich Chancery, LAMMERS, invite me to the Bayreuth Festivals, where HITLER Iwas at the time.

I answered Mr. LAMMERS that I had no reason to accept the Fuehrer's invitation, in view of the preceding discussion. I refused. For several days following he tried to change my mind. Finally HITLER sent word to me that he şincerely regretted his initial criticism, and that he again asked me to accept his invitation. I flew to Bayreuth and found him in fine fettle. His mood, I suppose, reflected the jubilation which rose from Germany and Austria; jubilation over the apparent end of the terrible fratricidal dispute, in which the people on both sides of the Alps had taken active part. As outward sign of recognition HITLER gave me the title of Ambassador. I recognized much later that HITLER's complex character never knew how to judge a fact in its purely state-political merit. His talents as a statesman apparently were not sufficient for that. Here he only approved after world public opinion had reacted favorably. He denied the success of Munich, because he saw that the British press and others exercised criticism and recommended precautionary measures for the future.

During my stay in Bayreuth a decision was made, which proved of most fateful portent for the Reich's future. Our Ambassador to London, Herr von LOESCH, had suddenly and unexpectedly

died. The post had to be filled anew. During one of our conversations HITLER suddenly asked me, whether I felt like going to London.

The question was a surprise. After all, the work in Vienna was only half finished. I replied that I would be loath to turn this project over to others, just when it had successfully advanced through its first stage, adding that the London post was undoubtedly one of the most important, and interesting for Germany. Regarding the solidification of our foreign relations in the world, I said, London even took precedence before my mission to Vienna. For only in agreement with Downing Street could a fulfillment of our wishes for evolutionary removal of the fetters of Versailles be hoped for-whether it be the "Anschluss" problem, the Corridor, the equality of armament, etc., etc. If HITLER were serious about his question, I said, I would think it over thoroughly.

During the further course of our conversation I told him that my consent in any case required one condition: I would demand a guarantee that the RIBBENTROP Office (Buero RIBBENTROP) must exercise no influence whatsoever on London.

This brings me to some brief remarks about Herr von RIBBENTROP and his Office. I don't know when Herr von RIBBENTROP first met HITLER. I only know that he had put his Dahlem (Berlin) house at HITLER's disposal for the conferences which I had to hold with HITLER before 30 January 1933 on HINDENBURG's orders. I knew Herr von RIBBENTROP from World War I, at the end of which he was in Turkey as a young lieutenant. Certainly Herr von RIBBENTROP must have thought highly of his efforts in HITLER's rise to power. For shortly after 30 January 1933 he approached me with the request to help him to get the position of a State Secretary in the Foreign Office. I was rather astonished. For, as every initiated man knows, a state secretary requires an extensive knowledge of all foreign problems and also, of course, a thorough familiarity with the entire circle of people who are employed in any and all foreign posts of the Reich. It would be much easier to change a Foreign Minister than his State Secretary, for the latter must be the fixed pole of the ministry. I knew that Herr von RIBBENTROP had social ambitions. Frequently he had invited the ambassadors of foreign powers to fine dinners at his house. But it was news to me that he thought himself qualified for the part of a Secretary of State in the Foreign Office. I told him that I had no influence at all over the filling of this position, which was then creditably occupied by Herr von BUELOW, and that the appointment was

in the first place up to the Foreign Minister, Herr von NEURATH. I advised him to write a paper regarding the Reich's foreign relations, indicating his proposals for a policy to be conducted by the HITLER government. The paper was sent to me. I forwarded it to Herr von NEURATH with the request to examine it and to decide whether the author was qualified for the post he was interested in, that of State Secretary in the Foreign Office. Herr von NEURATH seemed somewhat put out, for he declared, a bit rudely and perhaps unfairly, that this was the work of "Garlchen Miesnick".

Thus this attempt proved vain. But RIBBENTROP's intimate relations with HITLER permitted an early new attempt.

HITLER was by nature skeptical about all reports of the Foreign Office. He mistrusted all people whom he did not know personally, or who were not followers of his Party. After all, what could ambassadors or envoys accomplish who were either descendants of reactionary noble families, or, anyway, had no idea of the Nazi ideology! It was Herr von RIBBENTROP who complied with this desire of HITLER's to supplement or prove as false the reports of the Foreign Office.

Large amounts of Party money were spent on the establishment of a "RIBBENTROP Office" on the Wilhelm Strasse, facing the Foreign Office. The RIBBENTROP Office contained sections (Referate) for every country in the world, and finally had a larger staff than the Foreign Office. The staff was made up from unemployed journalists; young businessmen who had gone bankrupt abroad or had found no future there; writers and people whose linguistic genius had been established by their passing of an interpreter's examination; and young members of the NSDAP, who had a desire for quick ascension of the diplomatic ladder.

Members of the RIBBENTROP Office contacted and buttonholed foreigners of distinction as well as newspapermen, merchants, bankers, or industrialists who were passing through Berlin. Whenever the people seemed of some importance, they were asked whether they were interested in an interview with the Fuehrer. Many people, particularly sensation-hungry journalists, thought that was great sport. Then the RIBBENTROP-men went to HIT. LER and told him they had this or that highly influential personality, or this or that journalist of world renown, available; it would be a unique opportunity for National Socialism to grant the man a long interview. The Foreign Office never brought such interesting people before HITLER. Not only that; it seemed to show an outright aversion to certain newspapermen, whose publications were never controlled, and whose interviews had often

done harm to the Reich. The RIBBENTROP Office, now, worked a different way, that one had to admit!

After all, what was the value of reports from chiefs of missions abroad, when much more satisfactory contact could be established with major British newspaper interests through the intermediary of a Princess HOHENLOHE, who lived in England and maintained intimate relations with Herr von RIBBENTROP? It was furthermore easy enough to brand the Foreign Office's opinions of certain foreign statesmen or governments as false or biased, simply by quoting the inevitable opposition to these statesmen or governments in their own country. All that was necessary was to translate interesting clippings from the world press for HITLER. Unfortunately, he knew no foreign language and was not capable of forming his own picture from the foreign press.

I believe that HITLER soon gained the impression that the RIBBENTROP Office served him much better and with more inside information than his Foreign Office; e. g., it was a matter of policy in the foreign service not to transmit information to Berlin until the chief of the mission was convinced of its authenticity. The RIBBENTROP Office was not burdened by the necessity of checking reports, and could therefore bring sensational reports before HITLER much faster. Generally speaking, such a ministry without responsibility was a fine thing altogether!

I have never been able to understand why Herr von NEURATH did not defend his legitimate interests by either putting an immediate end to this nuisance, or by resigning, if HITLER could not be persuaded.

These preliminary remarks about the "Buero" will better explain why I made the request referred to above, before accepting an Ambassadorship to London. Fortunately, the "Buero" had never had a chance to tangle with my Vienna work, since I had made myself independent of the Foreign Office and reported to HITLER personally, as stated above. HITLER also knew that I would never have put up with it.

HITLER seemed surprised by my demand, which is understandable in the light of the high esteem in which he held the "Buero". He asked for my reasons. I said there could always be only one responsibility, one channel of reports, and one policy. This set HITLER to thinking. Herr von NEURATH arrived at Bayreuth the next day. I talked to him about Austria and then familiarized him to some extent with my conversation with HITLER regarding London.

Herr von NEURATH expressed his disapproval with both hands. "No, no", he said, "Herr von RIBBENTROP must go