John R. Brinkerhoff 5411 Point Longstreet Way Burke, VA 22015 Representative Tillie Fowler Room 106, Cannon House Office Building United States House of Representatives Dear Congresswoman Fowler: I have read HR 4210 and commend you for initiating, preparing, and introducing this bill. From 1981 to 1983, I served as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board and as Acting Associate Director for National Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency. In those positions, I was responsible for national policy and programs to defend America against the full spectrum of threats and deal with the consequences of all emergencies. The primary concern then was a nuclear attack on the United States. Now, although a reduced nuclear threat remains, the major threat we face is terrorism. The Nation needs a top-level organization to establish national policy, prepare a national plan, and coordinate a national program to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Current efforts to deal effectively with terrorism are hampered by the inexplicable reluctance of FEMA to do its duty in this regard as required in statute and executive order. If FEMA will not expand its portfolio to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks, the President needs the flexibility to organize the Executive Branch as he sees fit to assure that this job gets done. HR2410 properly makes the President rather than the Director of FEMA responsible for implementation of provisions of the Stafford Act that deal with emergency preparedness, The proposed Office of Terrorism is an essential step; toward achieving a comprehensive national Emergency Management System that will deal effectively with terrorism and other emergencies. This new office will make it easier for the Department of Justice and the law enforcement community to deter and defend against such attacks by enlisting the resources of local, state, and other Federal government agencies in support of their cause. THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR 2 May 2000 James S. Gilmore, III James Clapper, Jr. L. Paul Bremer Raymond Downey Richard Falkenrath George Foresman William Garrison Ellen M. Gordon James Greenleaf William Jenaway William Dallas Jones Paul M. Maniscalco John O. Marsh, Jr. M. Patricia Quinlisk Patrick Ralston William Reno Kenneth Shine •U.S. Department of Defense Representative The Honorable Tillie K. Fowler Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management Dear Madam Chairman: This responds to your request of April 17, 2000, propounding certain questions to me from the subcommittee, to be included in the record of the subcommittee's April 6, 2000 hearing, at which I testified. The answers to the questions follow: 1. Is the United States vulnerable to an attack involving conventional weapons While perhaps we have not been "exclusively" preparing for a WMD Please address comments or questions to: RAND 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Telephone: 703-413-1100 FAX: 703-413-8111 2 2. How would the panel rate the federal government's efforts regarding preparedness for terrorist attacks to this point? Specifically within the Executive Branch, what areas does the panel believe need improvement? In its first report to the President and the Congress, the panel noted a number of specific concerns about the Federal efforts for preparation and response to domestic acts of terrorism, especially in the context of Federal assistance to state and local response entities. The panel believes that there are currently many well intentioned Federal efforts and programs that attempt to address terrorism preparedness and response issues. But panel members are especially concerned that programs are largely uncoordinated and may be duplicative, and that the Federal structure is so complex that state and local response entities do not, in many cases, know how to get Federal support, or know the best means to conduct coordination and planning prior to a terrorist attack. The panel stated its particular concern with the absence of a true national strategy for combating terrorism; and its view that one needs to be developed urgently, one with a "bottom-up" approach that clearly takes into consideration the preeminent requirements of state and local response entities. In its report, the panel also noted several other areas requiring improvement at the Federal level, including threat assessments; information sharing; research, development, test, and evaluation; standards for response; definition of terms; Federal, state, and local planning and coordination; and efforts to address the question of "who's in charge" when the next incident occurs. I should note, at this point, that the panel was also critical of the Congress's approach to Federal efforts in this arena; the Congress continues to authorize and fund numerous programs that attempt to address terrorism preparedness and response, but with little coordination among the various authorizing and appropriating entities. 3. Many state and locals emergency responders have stated that there is a disconnect between the awareness of threats on a federal level and communication of those threats to state and local authorities. How does the panel anticipate remedying this communication problem? Does this problem indicate that there are other more serious communication problems between federal and local authorities? There is, at a minimum, a perception among many state and local response entities that the Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies do not do an adequate job of sharing information with state and local counterparts. Nevertheless, there are a number of encouraging activities taking place, to help to overcome some of the perceptions and some very real problems. We can and must search for innovative ways, without compromising sensitive national security information, including intelligence sources and methods, to share more information horizontally and vertically, among various Federal, state, and local entities. In answer to the last part of the question, major improvements are still needed for better communications and coordination among various Federal, state, and local entities, in such areas as public health issues, public awareness and education, standards, and the use of the military to respond to incidents, just to mention a few. 3 At the April 6, 2000 hearing of the subcommittee, you also asked that the Advisory Panel comment on the provisions of H.R 4210, introduced by you that same day on behalf of yourself, the subcommittee's Ranking Minority Member, and others. Prefatory to more detailed comments, I must note that this Advisory Panel has concluded that it should not endorse any specific piece of Federal, State or local legislation. Likewise, the Advisory Panel has not determined the specific form or structure that a Federal "coordinating" entity for combating terrorism should take. Nevertheless, in its first report, the panel noted its general agreement with the "concept" behind the National Domestic Preparedness Office. Furthermore, based on extensive discussions in the period following its first report, the panel members have agreed on five broad "attributes" that such an entity should possess. I mentioned those attributes in response to a question during the April 6, 2000 hearing before the subcommittee. I have restated them below, with appropriate references to provisions of H.R. 4210. First, there needs to be a degree of autonomy in such an organization, independent of any agency, and where it isn't dependent on being funded or manned from within that agency's resources. By establishing a new entity within the Executive Office of the President, the new Section 651 appears to fulfill the first attribute. Second, to be credible, such an entity must have appropriate, full-time professional representation from the state and local responder community across all the requisite functions. Subparagraphs (1) and (3) of new Section 658 appear to give the Director the authority to hire personnel with state or local response experience or to reimburse state and local entities for the "detail" of such personnel, which collectively apparently meets the requirements for this attribute. Third, the various Cabinet departments and agencies who are stakeholders in this endeavor must also have full-time dedicated professional staff to promote the liaison which must occur, both laterally across the Cabinet departments and agencies, as well as vertically, from the federal to the state and local level. Subparagraph (1) of new Section 658 appears to give the Director the authority to hire personnel from other agencies; more importantly (and perhaps more efficiently) subsection (2) gives the Director authority, with the concurrence of the head of Federal agencies, to "detail" agency personnel to the new entity. On the surface, the third attribute could therefore be fulfilled. Fourth, it must have genuine visibility over the commitment of money, programs and resources to first responder preparedness and some degree of influence over the synchronization of these resources. The provisions of new Sections 654 and 655 seem to provide significant authority for budget and program review. Fifth, the entity needs to be appropriately resourced in terms of staff, money and facilities to accomplish its mission. Without commenting on the adequacy of the amounts authorized, new Section 661 provides separate appropriations for the new office, and previous sections apparently give the Director the authority to hire staff and acquire and maintain facilities. |