under pressure from inside and outside. This pressure went so far as to include my person, as head of the State. In any case my own situation, that I was a prisoner of the mob, was quite clear. That was no longer the will of the authorities, but a dictatorship. The military ultimatum expired at 7.30 p.m. After this time limit, if this ultimatum was rejected, the German Army was to march in. But my firm attitude and refusal to accept the ultimatum was so successful that the Armed Forces delayed their entry until the following morning; from a military point of view they could do this easily, as already in the evening of 11.3.1938 the Austrian Armed Forces, in obedience to an Army Order, had withdrawn somewhat from the Inn-frontier in order to take up a secure position.

The President: Has the question of whether resistance could ever be carried out by our Armed Forces ever been looked into?

The Witness: This question was looked into; the little State of Austria has some 20,000 men in the Army, thus 10,000 to 12,000 men perhaps would be drawn up on the Western frontier; against them they had forces almost 20 times their strength, not forgeting the superiority of the German Air Force. I also invited the inspector of the Army, Infantry General Schilhawsky, to our discussions. Only with him did I discuss the question of whether we could offer resistance or not. He requested me to relieve him of the decision as to whether Austria could possibly be defended. In this connection he mentioned another General with whom I should discuss this matter. I should, however, prefer not to mention the name of this General.

The President: Was there ever any possibility of resisting? The Witness: No. It was from the very beginning a lost cause. The question of resistance was considered. The Generals discussed it and it was realized to be hopeless from the beginning. As I therefore was completely abandoned both at home and abroad, I decided finally, in order to avoid useless shedding of blood and to save the existence and the life of the Austrian people in these critical hours, to appoint a National Socialist as Austrian Chancellor. At midnight I therefore appointed Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the former Minister of the Interior, as Austrian Chancellor. By this means I saved the life of my soldiers and also the life and existence of my homeland. Political reasons (not alone military reasons) forced me to capitulate. There was no other way out. I was informed how terribly the German Armed Forces were acting in accordance with Hitler's instructions. The discoveries made in Berlin show with what brutal words Hitler had given permission to his troops to invade the country. The lives of the

civil population, above all of the working population of Vienna were in danger. Perhaps if I could have gained time and have entered into negotiations with the German Reich, perhaps I should then have succeeded in interesting the Western Powers in Austria's cause.

The President: Did you speak to Seyss-Inquart before his appointment as Chancellor?

The Witness: No, he was only summoned then; he did not come himself. I did not negotiate with him. Neither did I negotiate with Minister Glaise-Horstenau. I sent for Seyss-Inquart, after I had come to the realization above described. I even thought of the appointment of another head of the Government. But that was impossible. I therefore sent for Seyss-Inquart. That the opposition knew only too well that I was the only resister is shown by the fact that the next day (12.3.1938) during the morning, Himmler had arrived in Vienna from Berlin by air. His first demand of the new Austrian Chancellery was the dismissal of the President. This clearly shows that I was the sole and last resister in Austria.

The President: When the new Chancellor was designated in the person of Seyss-Inquart, did he inform you which Ministers he (Seyss-Inquart) had in view?

The Witness: Seyss-Inquart handed me no list of Ministers then. He told me at the time that he would have to leave for a short time in order to talk to his Party comrades. He compiled his list of Ministers only some time after his appointment as head of the Austrian Government. Actually a list of Ministers was compiled from among the National Socialists already admitted to the Chancellery. Thus a government revolution had already broken out before I had summoned the new head of the government. Names of Austrians, e. g., Prof. Menghin, etc., appeared on the list of Ministers. I said to myself that these men, who are Austrians, will yet endeavor by some means to place in some kind of favorable position and that Austria will perhaps remain a semi-independent State.

The President: When you summoned the Chancellor did he tell you what he intended to do? Did you ask him what steps he intended to take in the next few hours?

The Witness: No, I did not want to ask him, if I was compelled to appoint him head of the Austrian Government by force. I knew one thing, that the Nazis wanted an Anschluss with the German Reich in some form. Seyss-Inquart knew that I was opposed to and rejected this demand, so a mutual discussion of the matter was superfluous.

The President: When was the list of ministers presented to you?

The Witness: About midnight, after the appointment of SeyssInquart as head of the Austrian Government. The following names appeared on the list Dr. Neumayer, Prof. Menghin, Reinthaler, Jury, Wolff, Fischbock and Hueber. I then ordered that the swearing-in of the Seyss-Inquart Government should take place on Saturday, 12 March 1938. At this swearing-in I gave a very short address. The substance of this address was as follows: I said, "My Lord Chancellor and Ministers, you will not require me to speak to you about the events of the last few days and wish for an explanation. I demand of you one thing only: you have been appointed by virtue of the Austrian constitution and must fulfill all rights and obligations for Austria according to the Austrian constitution." Seyss-Inquart has become the head of the Austrian State. The swearing-in of the newly formed Government was carried out according to the old Austrian form. All the ministers took an Austrian oath of allegiance that is to say to an Austrian Government. This swearing-in took place about 10 a.m. on 12th March 1938.

The President: Was it immediately after this swearing-in ceremony or a little later that the accused came to you?

The Witness: It was later and not directly after the swearingin. But as far as I can remember only a little time lay between. The accused thanked me for his reappointment as Finance Minister, which was not a customary procedure. I pointed out to the accused that it was Seyss-Inquart who had appointed him as Finance Minister and told him, that Seyss-Inquart had designated him as his colleague. Furthermore, I explained to the accused that I was thoroughly in disagreement with the whole affair and also intimated that in this situation I could no longer remain President.

On being questioned by the President the witness declared: It is possible, that I passed the remark that I could no longer remain President at the point of the sword. I also plainly told the accused that he naturally was not to assume that I was in agreement with the events of the previous night. The accused was rather astonished that, so to speak, I should announce my resignation to him and not wish to collaborate with the new system. He had to be prepared, therefore, for me not to be in agreement. The Prosecuting Attorney: You have said that it was clear to you, when you appointed Seyss-Inquart as Head of the Government, that the Anschluss with the Reich would follow and never

theless you allowed the Ministers to take the oath. Were you acting under compulsion? Why did you undertake the swearing-in?

The Witness: The swearing-in of every Cabinet named by me is the duty of the President; Seyss-Inquart was appointed as Austrian minister. He was Hitler's agent. There was always the possibility that, through him, Austria would remain a sovereign state or perhaps a semi-sovereign state like Bavaria. When Himmler was already in Vienna, Seyss-Inquart sent his State Secretary, Dr. Wimmer, to me and he explained to me how things stood. Germany had made the demand that I be deposed as President. Seyss-Inquart who also visited me on this subject, first talked round the matter by saying that it was extremely distasteful to him but that he was bound to comply with the order of the German Reich and he therefore urged it upon me to send in my resignation. My view of the resignation was as follows: Under Dollfuss, I repeatedly asked to be allowed to resign—naturally this was done in private without being announced publicly -since I could not tolerate that the head of the State was so to speak publicly held responsible at home and abroad for the Government and/or for any regents. I had had enough of it. However, at the time the foreign enemy presented me with these demands, I now more than ever felt it my duty to remain in office. I did remain and then, on 13.3.1938, when the law of reunion [Wiedervereinigungsgesetz] was submitted to me for my signature that was about 5 in the afternoon-I refused to sign it. Seyss-Inquart came to my official residence about the matter, accompanied by Menghin, who was then Austrian Minister. I refused to sign this law of reunion and I refused for political reasons. My refusal was due not only to my fundamentally opposed opinions, but I refused also because, according to the Austrian constitution, I would be obliged to institute a general plebiscite about the "law"-which sacrificed the sovereignty of Austria-before it was signed, the signature merely having the significance of that of the State notary, that is to say, a certification that the law in question had come into existence formally and in accordance with the constitution. There was, however, no time left for such a plebiscite owing to Hitler's impulsive and strong intervention-indeed Hitler is alleged to have said: "I will have finished with the Austrian business in 3 days". Thereupon, the government cited Article 3 of the Federal constitution. Seyss-Inquart wanted to account for Himmler's already described demand by means of article 3 of the 1934 constitution. He agreed, however, when I said I was quite prepared, in consideration of

Austria's position as it then was and under article 77, par. 1 of the constitution, to surrender to him the functions of President for as long as I was prevented from carrying them out myself, but without myself resigning. As a result of my refusal to sign the Anschluss law, there was no documentary authentication. For I saw that documentary authentication was not given. Naturally, the Anschluss law had then to be published by other means, signed by Seyss-Inquart and all the Ministers. At that time, I drew up in my official residence a letter to the Chancellor (SeyssInquart) saying as I have already stated above that, by virtue of article 77, par. 1 of the constitution, I was surrendering to him the functions of President for as long as I was prevented from carrying them out myself. Minister Menghin was called in as a witness to this. The "Anschluss law" that was submitted to me was a draft. I did not have the original but was only given a copy. The ministerial council had previously decided that SeyssInquart must be the sole plenipotentiary.

The Prosecuting Attorney: You have told us that you appointed Seyss-Inquart head of the government under political pressure from at home and abroad. You knew what course the Seyss-Inquart Cabinet would take. Why did you not resign on 12.3.1936 when it was suggested to you? What was there still to save?

The Witness: I considered resignation as cowardly flight. It would have been cowardly to abandon my fatherland in that hour of need and not to seek any possibility of negotiation.

The Prosecuting Attorney: But that was quite hopeless. Austria's independence was buried by that time.

The Witness: That may be.

The Prosecuting Attorney: As head of the state, I would have resigned.

The Witness: No, I would have regarded that as cowardly. The Prosecuting Attorney: In connection with the Berchtesgaden agreement, you stated that the Western powers showed themselves to be disinterested. What possibility of negotiation did you still have in mind on 12.3.1938?

The Witness: There were always possibilities. One had to have dealings with the German Reich to know what its demands actually were. And further, I wanted to gain time so that even the Western powers could realize what was happening; perhaps the Western Powers would then have intervened. It was more a question of gaining time, because I did not give up the hope that the Western Powers would perhaps still intervene.