beyond that which previously was exclusively associated with their own school, might be somewhat larger.

But to that extent, then, there should be a corresponding decrease in the support that the Army is rendering to the present Strategic Intelligence School.

Mr. BATES. Would you expect ultimately that this will be a one for one basis, that is you take one out of the service as you take one into DIA, or have you made any estimate at all of the number of people that you are going to have in the immediate future?

General CARROLL. Are we still talking about the school, sir, now? Mr. BATES. No; overall now.

General CARROLL. I can offer a general estimate which stems from our present planning considerations, which would be a grand total of about

Mr. BATES. And you are going to grow to about

General CARROLL. We have anticipated so; yes, sir.

Mr. BATES. How does that compare with the combined services at the moment?

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is under study, Mr. Bates. I might add that those figures which have been requested as a matter of fact are now being correlated, and I understand that you have them available for the record. But one of your problems is to separate the pure intelligence activity from corollary activities, and in an attempt to give us an intelligent answer it is going to take a little longer time, is that correct, to give us the answer on that?

General CARROLL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BATES. The answer is, that information is being put together now and will be submitted to the committee.

Admiral FRANKEL. In round figures, according to an inventory which was made last year, the services have in the Washington areathese are their own figures-approximately people engaged in

intelligence.

Mr. BATES. They have

Admiral FRANKEL.

Mr. BATES. And this will just be in the Washington area?

General CARROLL. That is correct, sir.

Admiral FRANKEL. That is correct.

Mr. BATES. So it is

against

many will still remain in the individual services?

Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes.

Mr. BATES. To perform certain functions?

General CARROLL. That is correct.

Admiral FRANKEL. That is correct.

But of that

Mr. BATES. And you can give us at this time a breakdown of those who will be transferred and the overall real comparison?

General CARROLL. No, sir; we can't, because our plans which entail actually the greater number of personnel whom we anticipate would be transferred to the DIA have neither been finalized nor approved. Mr. BATES. So you don't know how many will actually stay over? General CARROLL. No, sir; not at this time.

I might mention that the figure which we have advanced is one which approximates our concept of the numbers of personnel that will be required in the performance of each function.

The figure was computed on a man-hour computation basis.
So these are not necessarily directly related.

Mr. HARDY. That is a very interesting little detour we took there. Are you through with that one?

(Mr. Bates nods.)

Mr. HARDY. Now, General, can you find where we left off?
General CARROLL. Pardon?

Mr. HARDY. Locate yourself.

General CARROLL. Yes, sir. We had just begun to discuss the directorate for processing, Mr. Chairman. That is processing intelligence data obtained through the requirements and collection functions. That directorate is on schedule and assuming and meeting its functional responsibility.

First production: Production as you know is a term which describes the converting of raw intelligence received from collectors into finished intelligence. It is only after raw intelligence has been evaluated, collated, and analyzed that we have an intelligence base upon which to predicate meaningful and realistic estimates and against which our current intelligence and early warning personnel can appraise the day-to-day happenings of intelligence significance.

In this area of production, we have not yet become operational nor was it expected that we would by this time. Because of the complexities of integrating the very substantial and somewhat widespread production activities and facilities of the three services, at the time we submitted our plan for the activation of the Agency, we presented only a concept with reference to our proposed assumption of production responsibilities.

This concept envisaged our integrating within DIA the bulk of the production activities of the three services in the Washington area. This concept was approved by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Extensive studies have now been completed and in direct collaboration with the military departments a detailed plan is now being finalized.

Next-Estimates: The Estimates Office:

(a) Produces intelligence estimates, and related intelligence support, for the Secretary of Defense, the staff assistants to the Secretary, specialized DOD agencies, the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified and specified commands.

(b) Provides the DOD contributions to, and DIA representation in, the preparation of intelligence estimates for the U.S. Intelligence Board and other designated national and international authorities. (c) Then it reviews intelligence estimates prepared by the unified and specified commands and international military organizations as directed.

The DIA Estimates Office is operational. Until DIA establishes its own production capabilities, it will continue to rely on the services to provide basic intelligence inputs for these purposes.

Chart 6 off.

Chart 7 on-current intelligence and indications:

This brings us to the Current Intelligence and Indications Center. Because of the vital importance of this function, I would like to highlight certain aspects of it.

First the current intelligence dissemination function. This is fulfilled through two primary publications.

Thus far, Mr. Chairman, I have addressed myself to DIA activities provided for in our approved activation plan. In addition, certain other specific responsibilities have recently been assigned to us. We are in process now of preparing plans for the assumption of these responsibilities for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. These additional responsibilities are listed on this chart.

Mr. HARDY. General, before we get into that, could I digress just for a minute, back to this Indications Center that you have? General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. This is an entirely new approach, is it?

General CARROLL. It is not entirely new.

Mr. HARDY. Well, this business of being caught with our pants down with respect to happenings all over the world has been one that has bothered a good many of us. It has seemed at least that most of these troubles that have cropped up here, there, and everywhere, have caught us completely flat footed, and we didn't have any notion that they were about to happen.

The thing that I am trying to explore is whether or not the trouble was in the system that we were then operating and which you are now correcting, or whether it is of a different nature, perhaps in the collection, or our capabilities to detect these indications in the field. If so, this organization won't necessarily overcome that problem? General CARROLL. That is correct.

In my remarks, I believe, Mr. Chairman, I stated that a condition precedent to adequate warning is the collection of intelligence.

But this is insuring the most effective utilization of that information which does become available any place in the world within the Military Establishment.

Mr. HARDY. But somebody has to recognize this for what it is in order for it to be able to be of any value.

Now, if the raw intelligence has to come back into Washington and be evaluated by DIA before you figure out what it means, then you have slowed the process down instead of speeding it up.

Generall CARROLL. I am sorry. I haven't made that point clear to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARDY. I don't believe you can. Because I don't-I hope you have enough experience to tell whether that is likely to happen.

General CARROLL. Well, yes; but that isn't exactly what will happen. Mr. HARDY. Let's see if I can get down to what I am trying to explore a little more concisely.

The most recent thing of this kind that I can think of is the Laos violation of the cease-fire. Now, what, if anything, did you pick up in this indications system that this was about to happen?

Now, you didn't have the Air Force over there. You mentioned the Air Force. But we must have somebody over there.

General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Was there intelligence on this thing? Was it recognized for what it was? Did we know it was coming? If so, did your system work and did it get around to these different centers? And why, if that is the case, then the next question would be why in the

name of God did we wait until they reached the Mecong River until we did a damn thing?

General QUINN. I suggest we go off the record on this thing.

General CARROLL. Yes. Could we go off the record at this point, please?

Mr. HARDY. OK, off the record.
(Further remarks off the record.)
Mr. HARDY. Still off the record.
(Further discussion off the record.)

Mr. HARDY. Let's try to get this on the record.

The question is essentially what reason do we have to expect that this system, however well it may look on paper and in the organization stage, is going to serve to prevent the kind of situations we have had in the recent past where we have been caught flatfooted by outbreaks here, there, and everywhere?

General CARROLL. This does insure that the information isn't available someplace and not acted upon.

Mr. BATES. That is the point.

General CARROLL. This does not insure, (1) that there will be an adequate collection and dissemination of that information, because the information may not be collected, and, secondly, it does not insure that those responsible-does not in and of itself assure that those responsible are going to attach the full significance to the particular information that is available. But it does make certain that something that happens that some one activity knows about, does get around to others who should be put on notice or who may be able to make a contribution to a proper evaluation of what is transpiring.

Mr. HARDY. That is if you collect or recognize what is happening as an indication of something that ought to go on your indications network. But it has to be recognized as that. Otherwise, it gets lost before it ever gets distributed.

General CARROLL. Well, this information is almost invariably recognized as being of some significance, potential significance.

Mr. HARDY. But you are not going to put all of that on this indica tions network, are you?

General CARROLL. If the particular event is one which occasions that kind of potential concern, yes, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Who makes

General CARROLL. Beg your pardon.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Is there a throughput from Washington to the indications centers or is this the indications centers to Washington? General CARROLL. It is both. It is wherever the particular incident may come to attention.

Now in the initial stage, the originator may be over

Mr. BLANDFORD. In other words, you are not passing on this information. This is information that is gathered in the various unified commands all throughout the world.

Now, this means that you are going to get a cross section, then, of opinion from the various military commanders throughout the world as to something that is significant in their opinion that ought to be brought to the attention of everybody else, is that correct?

General CARROLL. That is correct.

May I go off the record on this, sir?

Mr. BATES. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. Off the record.

(Further remarks off the record.)

Mr. HARDY. All right, let's get back on the record now.
Go ahead.

General CARROLL. I had just started to mention, Mr. Chairman, that in my briefing I addressed myself up to now to DIA activities provided for in our approved activation plan.

In addition certain other specific responsibilities have recently been assigned to us.

We are in process now of preparing plans for the assumption of these responsibilities for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. These additional responsibilities are listed on this chart.

We have been directed to establish a Defense Intelligence School. We discussed this earlier during the course of this presentation.

In mapping, charting, and geodesy we have been directed to estab lish a management control arrangement to validate requirements, check priorities, establish a uniform geodetic control system and recommend overall requirements and priorities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. BATES. I would have thought that was one of the first you would have received.

General CARROLL. One of the first we would have received, sir?
Mr. BATES. Yes, one of the first responsibilities.

General CARROLL. It was one that was retained for further study and ultimate determination as to what would be the best assignment of responsibility in the Department of Defense.

Consequently, we have just received it.

All of these areas, Mr. Congressman, were specifically reserved from DIA responsibility for further study. All of them have now been resolved to the form where directives have come out giving us the responsibilities I am mentioning.

As yet, we have not prepared or finalized plans as to the manner in which we propose to implement them or as to the particular resources that would be involved in our assuming these responsibilities. Mr. HARDY. Now in this area, you are not taking over any of CIA's responsibilities?

General CARROLL. Any of CIA's?

Mr. HARDY. That is right.

General CARROLL. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. But are you going into field activities now? Let's put it this way, General. As I see these other responsibilities, with all of these other responsibilities you now become the Director of Collection, the Director of Requirements, the Director of Dissemination, the Director of Estimates.

So as a result, all intelligence officers and I am including the company intelligence officer who has additional duties in Korea and everyplace else, the battalion intelligence officer, and everyone else, in effect, even though he won't know it-will be reporting indirectly to you or to DIA.

Now, he will report through his battalion commander, and through his unified commander.