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General ANTONELLI. Thank you, sir.
This concludes our hearings for today. The next meeting of the subcommittee will be on Monday, March 10 at 9:30 a.m., in this room. At that time, the committee will hear from General Rogers, Commander in Chief of the European Command, and Mr. John Kester, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and former Assistant to former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Monday, March 10, 1986.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, Monday, March 10, 1986. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nicholas Mavroules (acting chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Mavroules, Skelton, Blaz, and Spratt.
Let me welcome our distinguished witness here before us. He has had a distinguished military career spanning more than four decades, from his graduation at West Point and being named as a Rhodes scholar to his present position as our commander in chief for the NATO Central Front. He attained a distinguished combat record in Korea and Vietnam.
General Rogers' career is also particularly noteworthy because of his contributions to the modernization of the U.S. Army in the 1970's, particularly noteworthy because of his contributions to the organization of the U.S. Army in the 1970's—we are appreciative of that-both as commanding general of the U.S. Forces Command and subsequently as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.
General, it is my understanding that you don't have a prepared statement but I also understand that in your testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee you were strongly in favor of JC's reorganization. Please tell us about your experiences that caused you to believe that reform is needed, and please outline the major things you believe need to be done.
STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD ROGERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND General ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have given to the counsel a two-page memorandum which is headed "CINCEUR's Views of Actions Required for OSD/JCS Reorganization.” I request that be placed in the record.
Mr. MAVROULES. Without objection it will be placed fully in the record. [The following information was received for the record:)
CINCEUR'S VIEW OF ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR ODS/JCS REORGANIZATION Assumption: Purpose is to enhance considerably the authority/influence of CJCS and CINC's of Combatant Commands.
1. Re OSD:
a. CJCS to integrate service POM's/budgets, with major input from CINC's, and submit integrated results to SECDEF.
b. Put in Chain of Command.
c. Should be Principal Military Advisor to President, NSC, SECDEF, taking into account Chief's views if time permits.
d. Joint Staff works for CJCS.
e. Should have true Deputy CJCS (Senior to JCS/acting CJCS when CJCS gone/ not dual-hatted as DJS).
f. CJCS should not have a personnel management system for all joint duty. 3. Re CINC's:
a. To correct disconnect between CINCs' contingency plans and Service force de velopment plans, change law to read: “Military departments are responsible to man, organize, equip, train, and support forces for joint/combined war-fighting in accordance with requirements of CINCs' operational plans.” b. Should make major input to CJCS as latter integrates Services POM's/budgets.
c. If 2a and 3b above not adopted, then institutionalize current DRB procedures: CINC appearances before DRB; CINC provide Integrated Priority List to DRB members and component commanders; direct coordination between ČINC's and Services.
d. Re UNAAF, give CINC's option of how they want to exercise command during any contingency, i.e., through component commanders, or joint task force, or other
e. As general principle, CINC and not NCA should command any operation in CINC's theater.
f. Tighten linkage between Services' resource/support responsibilities and CINC's operational responsibility. 4. Re Personnel Actions Related to Joint Service:
a. Assign a Joint Duty Skill Identifier, but do not establish a Joint Duty career field.
b. Have recurrent tours for successful joint service officers. (Define “successful” as: “did officer put good of Nation above good of his Service.")
c. Have periodic return to parent Service. d. Strengthen requirement for successful joint duty for promotion to flag rank. e. Have a disproportionately higher selection rate by promotion boards of those officers with successful joint duty.
f. Choose CINC's from those with successful joint duty. g. Choose CJCS/Chiefs from those with successful joint (preferably CINC) duty. 5. Other: a. Retain JCS-no Joint Military Advisory Council.
b. In view of 2a and 3b above, eliminate Service Secretaries. (Alternative would be an Under SECDEF for each Service).
c. Failing 5b, integrate Secretariat staffs with Military Department staffs. d. Combine programming/budgeting into single process. e. Have biennial defense budget. f. OSD senior staff comprised of long tenure professionals. g. Eliminate (reduce) Congressional/OSD micromanagement of Services. h. Provide CJCS and CINC's with adequate/appropriate PPBS Staff capability.
General ROGERS. As you will note in that memorandum, I say that the assumption is that the purpose is to enhance considerably the authority and influence of the Chairman of the JCS and the commanders in chief of the combat and the commands.
That is a purpose with which I agree. The memorandum I have prepared was done last fall based upon what I think has occurred within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD which really dates from about 1956 up through the present time. I am particularly interested in the views of the commanders in chief being represented to committees such as this one when they consider what reorganization is necessary.
Now, with that as a prelude, I believe that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should be required to integrate Service programs and budgets with major input from the CINC's and to submit those integrated results to the Secretary of Defense.
I believe the Chairman should be put in the chain of command. He will have to be there in time of war. I think you will find it would be helpful in times of contingencies other than major conflicts that he be in the chain of command.
I believe that he should be the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council and to the Secretary of Defense, taking into account the Chief's views if time permits. Often it has been my observation that time does not permit.
The Joint Staff should work for the Chairman. The Chairman should have a true Deputy or Vice Chairman, senior to the JCSthe No. 2 man-and he should be the Acting Chairman when the Chairman is gone. I do not believe that the Deputy should be dualhatted as Director of the Joint Staff. That would be too much.
The reason I am concerned about the Deputy being the Acting Chairman when the Chairman is gone is that for us commanders in chief of the combatant commands the only military voice that we have in Washington to represent cross-service views is the Chairman. When he is gone, we CINC's want to have cross-service views represented by other than an Acting Chairman who is a chief of Service.
From my experience, frankly, I found that trying to carry water on both shoulders, that is, being both the Chief of Staff and the Acting Chairman for any great period of time, caused me to lose something out of each bucket, either as the Chief or as the Acting Chairman.
I don't agree that in order to be less parochial the chiefs of Seryice need to have rug time with the President from time to time as the Acting Chairman. I think that it is an admission against interest, frankly, for them to say that they have to have that opportunity in order to be less parochial.
So for me, having been a Chief, and now having been a CINC for almost 7 years, I would hope that the law would read that the Vice or the Deputy Chairman would be the Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman rather than to leave it to the option of the President or to the Secretary of Defense.
We CINC's need to have cross-service views represented at all times in all interagency groups within Washington and that can only be done, in my opinion, by the Chairman or by a Vice Chairman who knows the Chairman's thinking.
I do not believe that the Chairman needs a permanent management system. I will raise some other personnel items a little later.
With respect to the commanders in chief, I think to correct the disconnect that exists between commanders in chief contingency plans and Service force development plans, the law should be changed to read:
Military departments are responsible to man, organize, equip, train, and support forces for joint/combined war-fighting in accordance with the requirements of the CINC's operational plans.
I think as a consequence of that change to the law you would find a greater coordination between the CINC's and services and between the Chairman and services.
I believe that the CINC should make a major input man as the latter integrates the Service programs the Chairman is not to integrate the service PON and therefore not have the major input from the that, then I think we should institutionalize the c Resources Board procedures wherein the CINC's apr.
Board, provides an integrated priority list of requirements to the members and to his component commanders, and we have direct coordination between the CINC's and the services.
The CINC's should have the option of how they want to exercise command during a contingency, whether through the component commanders or a joint task force or some other means. As a general principle, the ČINC, and not the National Command Authority, should command any operation that occurs in the CINC's theater. Now, I say that as a general principle. It should not be commanded from Washington. The CINC himself should command it because one, that is what he is there for, and two, he has the assets within the theater to influence whatever contingency plan is being implemented.
I mentioned tightening the linkage between the services' resource support responsibilities and the CINC's operational responsibility.
I have listed in the memorandum some personnel actions related to joint service. I won't touch on all of those but I do want to touch on one. That is to have recurrent tours for successful joint service officers when we define "successful” as: Did the officer put the good of the Nation above the good of his service? I have not found any definition of successful other than this in my studies of transcripts and appearances by others before this committee and other committees. Then there should be the periodic return to the parent service.
I do not believe that a Chairman or Chief needs to have had a tour as a commander in chief before being appointed. It would be preferable, but they should certainly have had successful joint duties as defined in the manner that I defined it.
There are other personnel actions which I think are also important but I won't go into them at this time.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be retained as a body. There should not be a Joint Military Advisory Council; I am pleased to see that on both sides of the Capitol there appears to be no intent of establishing such a Council.
Now, if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is given the responsibility and authority to integrate the service programs and budgets with major input from the CINC's, then consideration must be given to what you do with the service secretaries. I believe that the service secretaries should be eliminated if my two other proposals are accepted. The alternative would be to have an Under Secretary of Defense for each service, or failing that, to integrate the secretariat staffs with the military department staffs.
I would hope the day would come when programming and budgeting could revert to a single process and that we would have biannual defense budgets.
I have a couple of other things here about micromanagement and necessary PPBS staff capability being given to CINC's and to the Chairman.
I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that the CINC's should be given programming and budgeting responsibility. I say that because the CINC should in fact organize themselves as they would have to be for wartime and then modify any organization as necessary for