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the people who head them, they may not require very much supervision. On the other hand, if a problem does emerge, especially in a crisis situation and when priorities need be made, it then becomes a problem of who is in charge and where do you go to address the particular problem.

What we found in our studies-and I caution it was an exploratory study-were concerns, on the part of the consumers, the possibility for disconnects.

Mr. NICHOLS. You are familiar with the fact that Representative Courter has introduced legislation that would abolish the Defense Logistics Agency and the Contract Audit Agency and the Secretary supports that proposition.

In fact, I believe he was quoted as saying, maybe before our subcommittee, that he could take over these buying functions that are now handled for the Navy by DLA, and put them under Navy supervision without the necessity of any more personnel in the Navy.

Most of the other service sections are on record as being opposed to the abolishment of DLA. What is your opinion of that?

General ANTONELLI. Our report indicated a concern, on the part of some people in the services back then, that if you took the responsibilities of the agencies and put them back into the services, they wouldn't be funded properly.

I would be concerned that the services would not be able to perform up to the standards as effectively as DLA does now, if they were not given resources, sufficient resources, to take on those responsibilities.

Mr. NICHOLS. Don't you think, under the Gramm-Rudman proposal that it would be difficult to get the additional resources to hire the additional people that they would need?

General ANTONELLI. Yes, sir, I think it would be difficult.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett, do you have questions?
Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir, I do.

First, General, your report, which was an exploratory report, did express concern about the Defense agency organizations as a mechanism for structuring Defense functions. You said that because your report was exploratory, and your charter was limited, that you felt a much more comprehensive study of Defense agencies should be undertaken. In the bill before the subcommittee, there is a call for a study of the Defense agencies, to be directed by the Secretary of Defense. Have you had a chance to look over that bill?

General ANTONELLI. Yes, I did.

Mr. BARRETT. Does that requirement of the Secretary meet with the recommendation that you made-would that fulfill what you were recommending?

General ANTONELLI. I believe so. I would have hoped that it would have come from within the DOD rather than legislation to require it, and then you don't have the “not invented here” syndrome.

Mr. BARRETT. Then 7 years later,

General ANTONELLI. Then 7 years later, and so on. I would like to emphasize that what we are talking about is taking cuts across both Democrat and Republican administrations. I just feel that the study should have been accomplished. I wish that it had been done at the initiative of the Department of Defense, back in 1979. I am glad to see that it is being recognized as important and that it ought to be undertaken.

Mr. BARRETT. If you have any suggestions for the subcommittee as to how that report should be structured differently than the draft, you might make them available to the subcommittee before markup.

General ANTONELLI. I can't give you anything off the top of my head. I would be happy to think about it and come back and provide information.

Mr. BARRETT. The other set of questions has to do with the recommendations that you made in the study for things to be done while we are waiting for the comprehensive evaluation of agencies.

In particular, the questions relate to the relationship of the agencies that have combat support missions to the unified and specified commanders, the theater commanders, who would have to fight a war. There are provisions in the draft legislation, that would address the recommendations you make. I would like to read the provisions and ask if they fit the recommendations.

First of all, should the JCS chairman review the agency charters periodically to ensure that they emphasize the combat support mission? That is in the legislation. It would be a legislative charge.

General ANTONELLI. I wish it didn't have to be in a bill. I am concerned about legislation which gets into micromanagement. Yet, I think it ought to be done, and I prefer it being done without having a law-legislation that says it should be done-it should be done at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. BARRETT. As you know, the legislation is charging the chairman with many more responsibilities, not only in the area of Defense agencies. Should the chairman review agency war plans and contingency plans, and should he be responsible for ensuring that the agencies participate fully in joint exercises?

General ANTONELLI. Yes, sir.
Mr. BARRETT. But not in the law?

General ANTONELLI. I would prefer that it not require a law for him to do that, to undertake those kinds of things, but I think it ought to be done.

Mr. BARRETT. Should a readiness evaluation and reporting system for the agencies, like the one that exists now for service units, be developed by the chairman?

General ANTONELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARRETT. Should a policy council, like a board of Directors, consisting of the users—that is, representatives of the Services and the combatant commanders—be developed in certain agencies to ensure that they are responsive to the output needs to the users?

General ANTONELLI. I think a policy council would be useful. Again, I wish it weren't legislated as such. It may be that there may be some other mechanism that would accomplish the same purpose.

But I think the thrust of what is contained in the bill is most appropriate. Mr. BARRETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, General. We appreciate your being before us, and we appreciate the time you have given to us. Your testimony will be very helpful to us.

General ANTONELLI. Thank you, sir.
Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much.

This concludes our hearings for today. The next meeting of the subcommittee will be on Monday, March 10 at 9:30 a.m., in this room. At that time, the committee will hear from General Rogers, Commander in Chief of the European Command, and Mr. John Kester, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and former Assistant to former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Monday, March 10, 1986.]



Washington, DC, Monday, March 10, 1986. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nicholas Mavroules (acting chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Members present: Mavroules, Skelton, Blaz, and Spratt.
Mr. MAVROULES. The hearing will come to order.

Let me welcome our distinguished witness here before us. He has had a distinguished military career spanning more than four decades, from his graduation at West Point and being named as a Rhodes scholar to his present position as our commander in chief for the NATO Central Front. He attained a distinguished combat record in Korea and Vietnam.

General Rogers' career is also particularly noteworthy because of his contributions to the modernization of the U.S. Army in the 1970's, particularly noteworthy because of his contributions to the organization of the U.S. Army in the 1970's—we are appreciative of that-both as commanding general of the U.S. Forces Command and subsequently as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

General, it is my understanding that you don't have a prepared statement but I also understand that in your testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee you were strongly in favor of JC's reorganization. Please tell us about your experiences that caused you to believe that reform is needed, and please outline the major things you believe need to be done.


U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND General ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have given to the counsel a two-page memorandum which is headed "CINCEUR's Views of Actions Required for OSD/JCS Reorganization." I request that be placed in the record.

Mr. MAVROULES. Without objection it will be placed fully in the record. [The following information was received for the record:)

CINCEUR'S VIEW OF ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR ODS/JCS REORGANIZATION Assumption: Purpose is to enhance considerably the authority/influence of CJCS and CINC's of Combatant Commands.

1. Re OSD:
a. SECDEF organize OSD as he sees fit.
2. Re CJCS:

a. CJCS to integrate service POM's/budgets, with major input from CINC's, and submit integrated results to SECDEF.

b. Put in Chain of Command.

c. Should be Principal Military Advisor to President, NSC, SECDEF, taking into account Chief's views if time permits.

d. Joint Staff works for CJCS.

e. Should have true Deputy CJCS (Senior to JCS/acting CJCS when CJCS gone/ not dual-hatted as DJS).

f. CJCS should not have a personnel management system for all joint duty. 3. Re CINC's:

a. To correct disconnect between CINCs' contingency plans and Service force development plans, change law to read: "Military departments are responsible to man, organize, equip, train, and support forces for joint/combined war-fighting in accordance with requirements of CINCs' operational plans.”

b. Should make major input to CİCS as latter integrates Services POM's/budgets. c. If 2a and 3b above not adopted, then institutionalize current DRB procedures: CINC appearances before DRB; CINC provide Integrated Priority List to DRB members and component commanders; direct coordination between ČINC's and Services.

d. Re UNAAF, give CINC's option of how they want to exercise command during any contingency, i.e., through component commanders, or joint task force, or other


e. As general principle, CINC and not NCA should command any operation in CINC's theater.

f. Tighten linkage between Services' resource/support responsibilities and CINC's operational responsibility. 4. Re Personnel Actions Related to Joint Service:

a. Assign a Joint Duty Skill Identifier, but do not establish a Joint Duty career field.

b. Have recurrent tours for successful joint service officers. (Define "successful” as: "did officer put good of Nation above good of his Service.")

c. Have periodic return to parent Service. d. Strengthen requirement for successful joint duty for promotion to flag rank.

e. Have a disproportionately higher selection rate by promotion boards of those officers with successful joint duty.

f. Choose CINC's from those with successful joint duty. g. Choose CJCS/Chiefs from those with successful joint (preferably CINC) duty. 5. Other: a. Retain JCS-no Joint Military Advisory Council.

b. In view of 2a and 3b above, eliminate Service Secretaries. (Alternative would be an Under SECDEF for each Service).

c. Failing 5b, integrate Secretariat staffs with Military Department staffs. d. Combine programming/budgeting into single process. e. Have biennial defense budget. f. OSD senior staff comprised of long tenure professionals. g. Eliminate (reduce) Congressional/OSD micromanagement of Services. h. Provide CJCS and CINC's with adequate/appropriate PPBS Staff capability.

General ROGERS. As you will note in that memorandum, I say that the assumption is that the purpose is to enhance considerably the authority and influence of the Chairman of the JCS and the commanders in chief of the combat and the commands.

That is a purpose with which I agree. The memorandum I have prepared was done last fall based upon what I think has occurred within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD which really dates from about 1956 up through the present time. I am particularly interested in the views of the commanders in chief being represented to committees such as this one when they consider what reorganization is necessary.

Now, with that as a prelude, I believe that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should be required to integrate Service programs and budgets with major input from the CINC's and to submit those integrated results to the Secretary of Defense.

I believe the Chairman should be put in the chain of command. He will have to be there in time of war. I think you will find it would be helpful in times of contingencies other than major conflicts that he be in the chain of command.

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