1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.

This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in these words:

"The president of the council has assured himself an outstanding place in Greek history and, whatever the future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war and his courage in rejecting without demur the Italian ultimatum when delivered in the small hours of that October morning, will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation."

A letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which is undated but which -this is clear from the contents-must have been written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November 1940, contained these sentiments:

"Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however from our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Jugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.

"Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any threatening move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore, Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways." (2762-PS)

It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. It was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to cooperate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude towards the liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts are disclosed in a "Top Secret Directive" issued from the Fuehrer's Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November 1940. This order reads, in part:

"Directive No. 18.

"The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines.* * *" (444-PS)

After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, the order continues:

"Balkans

"The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil area.

"In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

"So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

"The commander-in-chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations." (444-PS)

The positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in December 1940 may be summarized in the words in which the British Minister reported to Foreign Secretary Eden:

"The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom."

In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue with the order for the German attack on Greece.

This Directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret Directive number 20, dealing with Operation Marita, bears a

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGUIM,
THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG

*TC-4

Hague Convention (5) Respecting

*TC-13

*TC-16

opening of Hostilities. (GB 2). . . . VIII 279

Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in War on
Land. (GB 2)..

Arbitration Convention between
Germany and Belgium at Locarno,
16 October 1925. (GB 15)...
Convention of Arbitration and
conciliation between Germany and
the Netherlands, signed at The

VIII 282

VIII 320

Hague, 20 May 1926. (GB 97).... VIII 337

773

distribution list which shows that copies went to the Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the Commander of the Air Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Keitel), and to the Command Staff (Jodl). The first two paragraphs state:

"The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.

"My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected." (1541-PS) The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and paragraph 4 deals with the operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:

"The Military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff. The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania. "Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties." (1541-PS) Another "Top Secret Directive" carries the plan a little farther. It deals with decisive action in support of the Italian forces in Tripoli and in Albania. The first short paragraph reads:

"The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations demands for strategical political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies." (448-PS)

Paragraph three, after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania, sets out what the duties of the German forces will be: "a. To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there.