responsibilities for executing those functions. It also emphasizes our view that simplistic categories such as "crisis management" and "consequence management" do not adequately describe the full spectrum of functions or responsibilities. Support for Panel Activities and Reports Mr. Chairman, it also says something about the foresight of this committee that you directed in legislation that analytical and other support for the Advisory Panel would be provided by a Federally Funded Research and Development Center. We have been exceptionally fortunate to have that support provided by The RAND Corporation. The breadth and depth of experience at RAND in terrorism and policy issues across a broad spectrum have made possible the panel's success in accomplishing its mandate. Its assessments of federal programs, its case studies and hundreds of interviews across the country and around the world, its seminal work in surveying state and local response entities nationwide, its facilitation of our discussion-leading to near unanimity of members on this broad spectrum of recommendations, its work in drafting reports based on our extensive deliberations, all have combined to make this effort a most effective and meaningful one. Our Reports In our first three reports, the advisory panel has, through its assessments and recommendations, laid a firm foundation for actions that must be taken across a broad spectrum of threats in a number of strategic and functional contexts to address this problem more effectively. First Report-Assessing the Threat The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment in its first report of the terrorist threat inside our borders, with a focus on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The very thorough analysis in that report can be summarized: The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for the entire spectrum of potential terrorist threats - both the unprecedented higher-consequence attack, as well as the historically more frequent, lesser-consequence terrorist attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in the near term. Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of the terrorist, will likely remain the terrorist weapon of choice in the near term as well. Whether smaller-scale CBRN or conventional, any such lower-consequence event—at least in terms of casualties or destruction—could, nevertheless, accomplish one or more terrorist objectives: exhausting response capabilities, instilling fear, undermining government credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the government. With that in mind, the Panel's report urges a more balanced approach, so that not only higher-consequence scenarios will be considered, but that increasing attention must now also be paid to the historically more frequent, more probable, lesser-consequence attack, especially in terms of policy implications for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources, to optimize local response capabilities. A singular focus on preparing for an event potentially affecting thousands or tens of thousands may result in a smaller, but nevertheless lethal attack involving dozens failing to receive an appropriate response in the first critical minutes and hours. While noting that the technology currently exists that would allow terrorists to produce one of several lethal CBRN weapons, the report also describes the current difficulties in acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling, testing, transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the capability to cause "mass casualties." We suggest that that analysis is still fully valid today. Second Report Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism By the second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis to specific policy recommendations for the Executive and the Congress and a broad programmatic assessment and functional recommendations for consideration in developing an effective national strategy. The capstone recommendation in the second report was the need for a comprehensive, coherent, functional national strategy: The President should develop and present to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office. As part of that recommendation, the panel identified the essential characteristics for a national strategy: It must be truly national in scope, not just Federal. It must be comprehensive, encompassing the full spectrum of deterrence, For domestic programs, it must be responsive to requirements from and fully It should be built on existing emergency response systems. It must include all key functional domains-intelligence, law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, public health, medical care providers, emergency management, and the military. It must be fully resourced and based on measurable performance. Of course, the Panel recognizes that in light of September 11, 2001 this objective has been difficult to achieve. However, the principles contained within this strategy and their requirements remain the same. The Second Annual Report included a discussion of more effective Federal structures to address the national efforts to combat terrorism. We determined that the solutions offered by others who have studied the problem provided only partial answers. The Advisory Panel attempted to craft recommendations to address the full spectrum of issues. Therefore, we submitted the following recommendation: The President should establish a senior level coordination entity in the Executive Office of the President. The characteristics of the office identified in that recommendation included: Director appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the · Authority to exercise certain program and budget controls over those agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism Responsibility for intelligence coordination and analysis Tasking for strategy formulation and implementation Responsibility for reviewing State and local plans and to serve as an information An interdisciplinary Advisory Board to assist in strategy development We included a thorough explanation of each characteristic in our Second Annual Report. For instance, we determined that this office should have the authority to direct the creation, modification, or cessation of programs within the Federal Interagency, and that it have authority to direct modifications to agency budgets and the application of resources. We also recommended that the new entity have authority to review State and geographical area strategic plans and, at the request of State entities, to review local plans or programs for combating terrorism for consistency with the national strategy. Although not completely structured around our recommendations, the model for the creation of the Office of Homeland Security came from this recommendation. To complement our recommendations for the federal executive structure, we also included the following recommendation for the Congress: The Congress should establish a Special Committee for Combating Terrorism—either a joint committee between the Houses or separate committees in each House—to address authority and funding, and to provide congressional oversight, for Federal programs and authority for combating terrorism. The philosophy behind this recommendation is much the same as it is for the creation of the office in the Executive Office of the President. There needs to be a focal point in the Congress for the Administration to present its strategy and supporting plans, programs, and budgets, as well as a legislative “clearinghouse" where relevant measures are considered. We recognize that Congress is still in the process of working towards this objective. In conjunction with these structural recommendations, the Advisory Panel made a number of recommendations addressing functional requirements for the implementation of an effective strategy for combating terrorism. The recommendation listed below are discussed thoroughly in the Second Annual Report: Enhance Intelligence/Threat Assessments/Information Sharing Improve human intelligence by the rescission of that portion of the 1995 guidelines, promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence, which prohibits the engagement of certain foreign intelligence informants who may have previously been involved in human rights violations Improve Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) through an expansion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of reliable sensors and rapid readout capability and the subsequent fielding of a new generation of MASINT technology based on enhanced RDT&E efforts Review statutory and regulatory authorities in an effort to strengthen investigative and enforcement processes Improve forensics capabilities to identify and warn of terrorist use of unconventional weapons Expand information sharing and improve threat assessments Foster Better Planning/Coordination/Operations Designate the senior emergency management entity in each State as the focal point for that State for coordination with the Federal government for preparedness for terrorism Improve collective planning among Federal, State, and local entities Enhance coordination of programs and activities Improve operational command and control of domestic responses The President should always designate a Federal civilian agency other than the Enhance Training, Equipping, and Exercising Improve training through better coordination with State and local jurisdictions Improve Health and Medical Capabilities Establish a national advisory board composed of Federal, State, and local public health officials and representatives of public and private medical care providers as an |